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The Duel: The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler

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This book is one of the most thrilling that I have ever read. It is about the 83-day period from May 10, 1940, on which day coincidentally Winston Churchill became Prime Minister of Great Britain and Adolf Hitler launched the German Army against the Western Front, until July 31, 1940, on which day coincidentally President Franklin Roosevelt decided that America would actively support England against Germany and Hitler decided that he would not after all invade England.

The author conceives of this period as the theater of a personal duel between the titanic figures of Churchill and Hitler (as he notes, the German word is "Zweikampf", a fight of two) during which Hitler had his best chance of winning what Lukacs called in an earlier book "the last European war". That this figure of monstrous gifts, as he is described by the author, did not win was the achievement of Churchill, who knew after the fall of France that England and its Commonwealth could not prevail against the power of Germany without America and Russia on its side, but willed that England would not negotiate with Germany until events or persuasion would bring these powers into the war against Naziism. Lukacs acknowledges that the overwhelming power of Russia and America was necessary to defeat Germany, but Churchill's achievement was that England did not lose the war.

In a later book, "Five Days in London, May, 1940", the author focuses on the period from May 24 to May 28, 1940 within the period of The Duel. Although this five-day period preceded the fall of France, Lukacs identifies it as the period of most acute crisis because the British War Cabinet came close to deciding that England should begin cease-fire negotiations with Germany. It was Churchill's eloquence and force of character that swayed the members of the government, and ultimately the British people, to reject this idea and fight on alone until Germany launched the invasion of Russia. In "The Duel" he deals with this crisis in a chapter called "The Slippery Slope", a metaphor used by the participants to describe the demoralization of the British public that would have resulted from peace negotiations that might have resulted in a surrender to Germany's demands.

Another reviewer has remarked, correctly I think, that there is some overlap and repetition in the several books by the author that deal with Churchill and/or Hitler. However, the author possesses such a powerful narrative drive and brilliance of insight into the psychology of his subjects and significance of events that the repetition of phrases from one book to the next has the effect of a recurring melody in a symphony.

I have had the privilege to meet and talk with the author about his work. In my first conversation with him about "The Duel" I told him that from his book I had learned both how close Hitler came to winning the war and how much we owe to Churchill. He commented that I had understood his book very well.

John Lukacs' book "The Duel" calls to mind the classic hypothetical paradox that asks what happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object. In this instance the irresistible force was Adolf Hitler and his armed forces and the immovable object was Winston Churchill.

The duel that is the subject of this book takes place in the tumultuous 80-day period between May 10, 1940 and July 30, 1940. Lukacs surrounds the recitation of this 80-day period with two coincidences. On May 10, 1940 Churchill became Prime Minister, replacing Neville Chamberlain. At the same time the battle for Western Europe began in earnest when Hitler launched land and air attacks on Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium. On July 31, 1940 Hitler began making formal plans for the invasion of the USSR. On that same day U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt decided to go forward with a lend-lease program that would provide the British navy with 50 aging, but much needed destroyers.

Events in May and early June provided evidence that Hitler and his advancing armies were something of an irresistible force. The German army and air force made quick work of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium. France and its forces were defeated in short order as well. At the same time, in these dark early days, Churchill's hold on power was tenuous at best. As Lukacs is quick to point out, the ousted Chamberlain was more popular amongst Conservative party loyalists. Churchill's only real popular support according to surveys cited by Lukacs came from working class (labour) voters. Hitler and the U.S. Ambassador to Britain Joseph Kennedy both seemed to think that, if anything, Churchill was an easily removable force. Facts, as Lukacs points, proved both Hitler and Joseph Kennedy wrong.

The Duel is set out in a point-counterpoint fashion. It alternates between examining the war from the German and then British viewpoint. Although Lukacs is a long-time admirer of Churchill (and with good reason) his analysis of events and of the character and judgments of both Churchill and Hitler seems both astute and objective. Lukacs avoids the easy picture of Hitler as madman and is quite prepared to give him credit for the efficacy of his military plans and his ability to think rationally (and often brilliantly) about military and political developments in Western Europe. Similarly, Lukacs is not above criticizing some of Churchill's decisions or pointing out many of the mis-steps that occurred during this period.

The critical events of the 80 days covered by Lukacs'seem to me to be the successful evacuation of 350,000 British and French troops from Dunkerque in early June, Hitler's subsequent decision to not proceed with plans for the invasion of Britain, and his eventual decision at the end of July to invade Russia. Lukacs makes it clear that the German armies could have been a bit more aggressive and could have taken most of those evacuated from Dunkerque prisoner. Yet Hitler grew unusually cautious at this critical juncture. There is some evidence to suggest that Hitler thought the British would seek peace in short order but Lukacs suggests that this evidence may not be totally persuasive. Lukacs does suggest however, that if those troops had not been evacuated successfully the forces in Britain seeking reconciliation or negotiation with Hitler may have won the day.

The `duel' ends in a stalemate. Five gruesome years of war would follow. However, in terms of the classic irresistible force/immovable object paradox the stalemate clearly benefited the immovable object. Churchill, as a rational thinker, could not have entertained the belief that he could have won any major battles during this period. However, the commodity most precious to him and for the future of parliamentary democracy in Britain, was not victory but time. Britain needed time to gather strength and, most importantly, time to seek assistance from the United States. That assistance was very slow in coming. Roosevelt was in the middle of an election campaign and the forces of isolation were still very strong in the United States. By doing enough to forestall invasion, and aided by Hitler's decision to divert attention to the Soviet Union, Churchill gained the time he needed. The British armed forces were not particularly swift nor strong but in time they would be. Churchill's desparate struggle to 'buy' that time may in fact represent his finest hours.

The Duel is a very readable popular history of a very critical time in Europe's (and the world's history). His portrayal of both Hitler and Churchill seems balanced and objective. This is a very well written book that can be enjoyed equally by casual or serious students of this period. It is a good book and it is well worth reading.

John Lukacs is without doubt one of the most creative and original historians of our time. To add further to his credit he writes as fine as any novelist, probably better than most of them. And most of his perpectives and theories are original thought provoking, and so much based on comman sense and insights that they are almost impossible to prove wrong.

In this intresting and compelling study Lukacs shows that, in May 1940 there really were a turning point in the historical development of the 20th century. He also shows that Hitler there and then, could have won the war if Britain would have given up. Lukacs criticize the idea that the "great-men" have no influence in the historical flow, and the marxist idea that only the great workings of the masses of people, and economical development is the engine of History. Lukacs again points out that without Hitler, Stalin or Chruchill the history of th 20th century would have been much different. In "The Duel" he points out Churchill as the driving force to make the brittish continue in their resistence to Hitler. In the psychological duel that continued over the 80 days Churchill succeded to rally the entire Brittish people behind him. Hitler, who never thought of invading Britain, becuse he was convinced the British would give in, when France was conquered. First in July did he realize that Britain would continue the war alone, that he would have to invade Britain to end the war. But then it was already to late, when the german airforce was unsuccesfull in destroying the RAF, he postponed the invasion of Britain. Later as Lukacs shows, he conviced himself that to invade Russia would be better. His main argument before the invasion of Russia was that it was the only way to make Germeny the sole ruler of Europe, and with the entire continents vast material reasources at his disposel, he would be untouchable even by the awesome powers of a future UK-US alliance.

All this is well written and make a great deal of common sense. But their is one disturbing annoyance. Having read a couple of Lukacs books, is that he continue to repeat the same themes in book after book, soon you have read it all before, and know exactly what points is going to come next. Approximately one third of this book I had read before in his other books and that is really disturbing. I can undersatnd that the author wants to clearify his points, and his remarkeble many good insights, in all his books, but the reader wants new and different perspectives. Althoug a geat book if this is the first time you read one of Lukacs books, its repetitive for those more familiar with Lukacs other works.

Imagine you are watching TV - on the left side is Winston Churchill, assuming leadership and consolidating power, urging on the doomed French, at times teary but always resolute, battling the forces of appeasement in his own party and cabinet as much as he is dueling with Hitler. On the right side of your screen is Adolph Hitler, coldly calculating his European chessboard, conferring with his generals, working diligently on speeches, and waiting for what believed was inevitable - a backlash against Churchill in England and a move back toward appeasement. And occasionally, in a small box in the upper left hand corner, you see Roosevelt, wary of Churchill at first, running for an unprecedented third term, promising no American involvement in 'foreign wars,' but ultimately using all his cunning political skills to push for Lend-Lease. This will give you a sense of Lukac's great book on the months immediately following Winston Churchill ascension to the Prime Minister-ship of England.

Often, Lukacs achieves this split-screen narrative down to the very hour - for example, on the night of June 24, 1940, as Churchill writes a letter to Stalin asking him to reconsider his 'friendship pact' with Hitler, Hitler assembles his closest circle to engage in his 'table talk.' "The war in the West is over. France has been defeated, and with England I shall reach an understanding shortly...There remains our settling accounts with the East (ie, Russia)." Similarly, on the very night (July 31) that Hitler told his generals that there would be an invasion of Russia, Roosevelt made his decision to go ahead with Lend-Lease to aid Britain.

Minor characters move about these images - the depressed Joseph Kennedy, disgraced but still viable Neville Chamberlain, and the canny Lord Halifax.

Much of The Duel focuses on Churchill's leadership in the 80 days between May 10 and July 31, 1940 (a year he said he wanted to relive 'again and again'). Many in his party were 'reasonable men' - men who recognized that Hitler was unbeatable in Europe, and that the best course of action was to reach an accommodation with him. Lukacs shows a Churchill who understood the impending doom, but at the same time had an almost otherworldly, "unreasonable' loathing of any compromise with Hitler. This ability to unblinkingly stare into the abyss, as France fell and the British retreated at Dunkirk, but keep going strong is what saved Britain not only from Hitler, but ultimately from its own 'pragmatism.' Pragmatism is usually a good trait - but in this instance, it would have been suicidal for England.

Clear writing, adroit character studies of the protagonists, and, above all, a perfectly executed split screen structure make this book read like a novel. I consumed it in two days. Highly recommended.

More than the new fad of "what if's". What one man and those that stood by him in those days did for us all. The younger generation should, or rather must, realize how much they owe to WSC to be able to read these lines !
jan breman

"The Duel" tells the incredible tale of the struggle between two world leaders during the 80 days in 1940 beginning with Churchill's selection as His Majesty's first minister.

The pages of this book take the reader through the parrying in Norway and the collapse of France, the German preparation for the invasion of England and its abandonment for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

A good measure of a book is whether it causes the reader to view things differently. "The Duel" meets this test.

I had always viewed Churchill as a great leader for his success in rallying the British people in defiance of the German onslaught. In "The Duel" we see that Churchill lead a parliament which was by no means united. Even though Churchill was determined never to surrender, there were others for whom a negotiated peace was a desirable option. Not limited to pro-fascists, like Oswald Mosely, who was a real contender to lead a Quisling or Petain style government, potential peacemakers includes such British stalwarts as Lord Halifax, David Lloyd George and the Duke of Windsor.

Churchill was challenged to rally the French before their collapse, stiffen the resolve of Parliament and coax the U.S. into an alliance with Britain. Although a failure with the French, Churchill was successful in holding his parliamentary support until he was able to gradually lure President Roosevelt and America out of neutrality.

Hitler is portrayed as a calculating politician whose rise to the pinnacle of world power was not a fluke. No madman, Hitler had a plan for Germany which he executed with skill. The succession of sophisticated European visitors who were favorably impressed speaks of his charms during personal meetings. In the pages of this book we read of Hitler's appeals to political personalities in France, Britain and the U.S. There is a saying that "If you can't be good, be good at it." Although tragically flawed, Hitler was good at what he did. His personal magnetism, his "vision thing" and his insight made him, temporarily, the most powerful man in the world. Fortunately he was not good enough at it to hold his position for long.

Besides the portrait of the individual duelists, we learn of some of the early operations of the war. Of particular fascination is the case of Dunkirk. One of the major unanswered questions of the War is why Hitler held his army back during the evacuation. Did Hitler hope to negotiate a settlement with England, a country for which he often expressed admiration, after letting its army escape? Was he motivated by a desire to create a showpiece for the Luftwaffe? Or was he motivated by practical considerations of the terrain over which the army would have to fight? Although we will never know the answer to the question of why he held back the army, we can speculate that the war would have turned out differently had the B.E.F. been annihilated.

The reading of this book left me with an enhanced respect for both Churchill and Hitler. It was Churchill alone who stiffened the resolve of the British people to fight and to never surrender.

This book does not deal much with the atrocities which Hitler committed in his quest to lead Germany to its place of dominance in Europe. What it does show is a leader who was a charming, calculating and, for a time, highly successful, political and military leader. Although now widely regarded as a mad man, this does not describe a lower class man who rose to unchallenged leadership of a great power. Hitler had much going for him. Although his obsession with the Jews certainly sullied his legacy, he did lead Germany to greater heights than any which Bismarck and Wilhelm achieved. When one realizes how many, both within and without Germany "did business" with Hitler, we realize that we cannot be justified in condemning them all.

This is a book which makes you think and changes your view of history. Magnificent!

I've always had great interest in World War II, and specifically the Battle of Britain, so this book seemed like a great fit, especially considering the author's strong reputation. Interestingly, this book is not so much about the pivotal Battle of Britain -- it spans May 10, 1940 to July 31, 1940, right before the Battle began in earnest -- as it is about how the personalities and ideas of Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler shaped the impending Battle of Britain and the bloody war that would follow. While the book at times moves at a glacial path and it can take time to fully digest given the author's prose, it is a fascinating analysis of Churchill and Hitler the men.

Coming away from "The Duel", I was struck by how much more impressed I was with Prime Minister Churchill than before -- if that's possible. Clearly, the author is a fan of Churchill, but his language is never gushing or over-the-top; rather, he takes great pains to show the incredible pressure Churchill faced every day as France collapsed and it seemed the Britain was next in path of the Nazi war machine. While I knew Churchill had many enemies not only in Parliament but in his own cabinet, I never knew how many of his peers -- including Lord Halifax, US Ambassador Joe Kennedy, and General Weygand in France, among many others -- doubted Britain's chances and wanted Churchill to negotiate with Hitler, even at the expense of the Empire's freedom and autonomy. The author draws this theme out, focusing on Churchill's relentless refusal to never negotiate with Hitler regardless of the consequences.

"The Duel" does a tremendous job in demonstrating not only Churchill's resolute leadership, but more how he held off Germany by the sheer force of his will. Indeed, as France was crushed, and it appeared that England had no chance to fight off a similar fate, Churchill -- often by himself -- worked tirelessly to convince French and American leaders of Britain's viability and the importance of fighting Hitler to the bitter end. It is very difficult to not feel even greater pride and respect for Churchill after finishing this book.

The author's deep analysis of Hitler's goals and motives is equally interesting. While it is easy -- and quite justifiable -- to refer to Hitler as a manical brute, the book does not take that route and, for the most part, looks at Hitler dispassionately, even acknowledging his military and rhetorical talents. In doing so, the author argues that Hitler was not obsessed with conquering the entire world or even every inch of Europe, as is often believed, and as a result was not hell-bent on physically conquering England in the same way he had done to France and other nations. Rather, Hitler did not want to force Britain to surrender through the use of invasion, in part because that was not entirely necessary in his view and also because he realized how difficult it would be to cross the channel -- thus, Hitler's multiple postponments of Operation Sea Lion. I found these areas very interesting, as it was my impression that upon France's surrender -- and even before -- Hitler was determined to crush Englad militarily. Indeed, as the author shows, Hitler held on to the hope of making peace -- obviously, a peace very slanted to Germany's advantage -- with Churchill up until July and August 1940 when he pondered Sea Lion and began the bombings. To further make the argument that Hitler was determined to force a deal upon Churchill, the author makes the bold assertion that Hitler's ill-fated decision to invade Russia in 1941 -- which he first began to forumlate around this time in 1940 -- was made by Hilter to force Churchill's hand. In other words, because Russia (along with the US) was Churchill's last great hope to help defeat the Nazis, Hitler believed that defeating the Russians would truly make Churchill alone, and thus force him to make a deal with Germnay to avoid Britain's destruction.

So, the book is full not only of tremendous personal analysis of Churchill and Hitler, but also of some arguments not generally made in World War II scholarship. One note of caution. While the book is not terribly long -- just over 200 pages -- it can be difficult to get through in parts because the author can tend to be very wordy (ex: "There survives a photograph of that event: the officers in a circle, leaning forward in their long greatcoats, listening earnestly to the general of their democratic citizen-army, who spoke to them without notes and without a microphone, in a quiet tone of determination, on that grassy cliff above a silent lake on a cool and gray day."), and also delves into very great detail throughout. In the end though, the writing -- which appeal to many anyway -- does not really take away from the book. It is a great book about the Second World War, and any one with an interest in Churchill, Hitler, or the Battle of Britain should check it out.

Professor Lukacs provides a fascinating account of two men on a collision course with destiny. Hardly the usual, boring academic treatise, Lukacs bring these men alive for us. I couldn't put it down.

This book is a thoughtful treatise on that tense summer, the period leading up to it, and these two leaders. It also provides insight as to why the people of various nations cheered, voted, or reacted as they did, sometimes to the surprise of Hitler or Churchill. I found the comparisons and contrasts (on a personal level) of the two men interesting.

Lukacs' treatment of Hitler is anything but superficial. The author explains why some of Hitler's decisions and convictions are unknowable, and debunks some popular myths.

This book filled in a lot of gaps in my knowledge. I learned a *lot* about WWII.

While the author properly introduces a few unknown figures (certainly unknown to me, such as the Norwegian Colonel Eriksen) and explains the weighty impact of their actions, his treatment of more prominent figures assumes prior knowledge. Unless you already have some knowledge of World War II and know who these people are, you will be lost in the corresponding discussion of them --meaning a page or two at a time.

Another small nit to pick: the author says the "V" in "V-2" (rockets) stood for "Vergeltungswaffen" which he translates to "revenge weapons," but "Vergeltung" actually means "repayment" or "retaliation." I would translate it as "retaliatory weapons."

The last chapters include a concise summary of major events of the war to its end, and a sparse yet profound description of the solemn fall of the Reich, and how Europe was changed forever. The earlier lives and backgrounds of Hitler and Churchill are touched on where necessary for clarity or insight, and I found it interesting.

The book includes a pretty good index.

John Lukacs book has an excellent premise; which is that the period of 1940 generally known as the Battle of Britain represented, for the leaders of Britain and Germany, a personal duel in which their ability to motivate and lead their respective governments were critical to the outcome. He makes his case very convincingly; while Britain would certainly have fought under a number of possible wartime PM's (Anthony Eden, perhaps, or Lord Halifax), the personal leadership provided by Churchill was critical to Britain's success.

The book assumes a good working knowledge of the players involved and of the period; this is a good book for a World War II history buff, but is not intended to be a primer. This aspect of the book makes it difficult for novices; after having read Churchill's 5 volume history of the war and half a dozen other works, I understood the nuances of the book.