Customer Reviews

A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War

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Most Americans don't know a lot about the intrigues that led up to the French declaration of war against Prussia in 1870, a calamity that led to the downfall of Napoleon III and his Second Empire. This book aims to bring light to that era, and does it fairly well. I think, however, that this was not written for the casual reader, but rather for those who already possess some knowledge of the personalities and issues of the day. Often the author speaks about some person or incident as if the reader should know about this man or thing already. With no explanation given, the lay reader is at a complete loss to understand what's happening, or who's doing something. Also, the language of the work does not allow easy reading; it's more academically oriented, with many references to other historians and their works and opinions on the subject. I did learn much that I didn't know before, howver, particularly about the famous Ems telegram, and the author's opinion that it was not the overriding cause of the war that I had always believed it to be. For that alone, I thought this book worth reading.

The title of this detailed account of the origin of the FrancoPrussian war in 1870 refers to Louis Napoleon 3, nephew of Napoleon, and Otto Bismarck. The FrancoPrussian War ended the government of Emperor Louis Napoleon 3 and gave Bismarck the opportunity to unify Germany.

Wetzel begins his book by describing the characters. There is the French Emperor Louis Napoleon and his diplomats Ollivier, Gramont. Their Prussian opponents are chancellor Bismarck, and Kaiser William and their subordinates. Then Wetzel explains the background, the decline of French power and the rising strength of Prussia. We see how Ollivier, Gramont and Empress Eugenie let their passions and nationalist chauvinism blind them to the new weakness of the French army and the growing strength of Prussia

Wetzel explains the complicated succession struggle in Spain. No candidate could hope to win without total permission of France. Wetzel analyzes Bismarck's complex policy toward the succession and France and comes to some non traditional conclusions.
Wetzel follows the actions of Bismarck and Napoleon 3, as well as the actions and mistakes of their individual subordinates. We see the expertise of French diplomats such as Visconti-Venesto and Benedetti. Most of all we see the belligerence of Gramont, who left no mistake untried.

This book is not always easy to read, since Wetzel goes into great detail about the actions of all the diplomats involved. Wetzel bases his book on both primary and secondary sources and includes an informative bibliography with notes. This book ends right before the outbreak of the FrancoPrussian war, so there are no discussions of military strategy or tactics.

A nice little read of the diplomacy of Bismarck and Napoleon III prior to the Franco Prussian War. What is so apparrent by this book is how the French and the French government were so arrogant about their power. Most people subscribe to the fact of Bismarck causing the war. However this book shows how the inflamed opinion of the French and their government led to the war. Popular opinion blames the Prussians but it was the French who caused the war.
Wetzel shows the French interfering in the affairs of the Spain to place their candidate on the throne. The Spanish provisional government was not especially interested in their candidates, and ultimately decided on a Prussian prince. This was even more unacceptable to the French government. They then demanded the Prussian prince to renounce the throne. This the Prussians did. Then they demanded the Prussians apologize for their actions and completely renounce any interest. When this did not happen, they went to war against a German nation angered by the French actions. Subsequent actions paint the French as the victims when the opposite was the case. The French played into the hands of Bismarck.
A great read for those interested in the diplomacy prior to the war. Michael Howard's Franco-Prussian War is also a great read of the war itself.

This is an extended academic treatise on the detail of diplomatic and political intrigue in the months immediately preceeding the Franco-Prussian war. Most notable were Prince Willam (Wilhelm) for his sanity; Napolean III for his inability to stay ahead of Gramont; Gramont himself for his arrogant assumptions about the nature of reality and the amount of control he could exert on events; and Bismark for his opportunism in turning Gramont's monumental stupidity into political advantage.

This is an interesting look at all that is now known about "behind the scenes," and may change one's views of who did what with what to whom. Whether or not intended, Mr. Wetzel also did an excellent job of demonstrating how easily events can overtake political leaders. A pity American leaders are not required to have truly extensive backgrounds in history. We might have avoided some disasterous wars, including Viet Nam and the current Iraq war, neither of which went "according to plan."

Ever since reading Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August 10 years ago, the Franco-Prussian War has intrigued me. A "dress rehearsal" to World War 1, so to speak, the war seemed a prominent display of militancy in the otherwise quiet European century between Waterloo and the Marne. It featured such fascinating personalities as Napoleon the Third and Otto von Bismarck, and seemed like a major step in the emergence of the German Empire, which would lead to such catastrophic results in the twentieth century. From the point of view of Military History, the Franco-Prussian War is remarkable for what didn't happen in it - unlike the contemporary American Civil War and the War of the triple alliance, and especially unlike the Great War, the Franco-Prussian war has been short and relatively bloodless. How had Europe managed to fight a war between two of its major powers with so little loss of life and treasure?

Despite all these remarkable aspects, the Franco Prussian War remains in something of an oblivion. As Author David Wetzel points out, very few books have been published on it in recent decades. As an anecdote, I'm the first person to have checked "A Duel of Giants" out of the Haifa U Library. Why is the war forgotten?

Wetzel does not attempt to answer this, or the other questions I find fascinating about the Franco-Prussian War. What he offers is an account of the crisis diplomacy surrounding the war's outbreak. After the first chapter, which sets the stage and introduces the players, most of the book is a blow by blow account of the diplomatic and political evolution of the crisis surrounding the so-called "Hohenzollern candidacy" - the nomination of Prussian prince Leopold to the open vacancy of the monarch of Spain.

In 1868, the bourbon Queen of Spain, Isabella, was disposed of in a coup d'etat. The revolutionaries, led by General Juan Prim, set out for a substitute monarch. Unfortunately, the politics of king making were complicated: the various royal families in Europe had too close or too distant ties to one another. Each candidate raised the specter of leaning Spain towards a certain power and against the other ones. The various factions in Spain and Portugal, Italy and France and Prussia all had their say. So had the Vatican, which was worried of the pernicious effects of a Liberal King. The result was a stalemate: various names raises, and various offers were made and refused. Finally, the offer went to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern - a Prussian.

The candidacy sparked a minor upheaval within Prussian, with the King opposing it and the Chancellor, the legendary Otto von Bismarck, supporting. Finally the prince agreed. The plan was to elect the Prince in secret, and present the world with a fait accompli. But through error or sabotage, it was not to be. The French learned about the candidacy and were understandably livid. A Pro-Prussian Spain would pause a great danger to France in any Franco-Prussian confrontation. The French demanded that Leopold withdraw his candidacy.

The incredible thing is that, as in the First World War, the request was acquiesced to, but that was not enough. French hardliners decided that the Prussian king would have to endorse the retraction, and forbid Leopold from taking back his withdrawal. For the Prussians that was out of the question, and they let the world know. Public statements by both sides inflamed public opinion, and French warmongers, eager for a fight, pressed for raising troops. At some point, as in World War 1, the "train timetable" played its role - the French wanted to outrace the Prussians in fielding armies. In July 1870, war was declared.

Wetzel's book is hardly ideal for a general interest reader like me. From the very beginning, it assumes a lot of knowledge about 19th century European politics, knowledge I frankly lack. After a very readable introductory chapter, and a good chapter about the Spanish Revolution of 1868, the book slows down as it offers a minuet account of the diplomacy and intrigues in the various capitals of Europe, an account which I frankly found to be quite dull. The lack of any consideration of the future - the lessons, consequences or memories of the build up to war - is also disappointing. Overall, Wetzel offers an impressive in depth look into the immediate diplomatic origins of the Franco Prussian War, but one that I can recommend only to specialists.

David Wetzel writes a concise essay on the events which brought about the Franco-Prussian War. The question of succession of the Spanish Throne turned into the events which start a domino effect which would not end until 1945.

Wetzel examines the major players and how their activities brought about the war, specifically Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm and Napoleon III. Wetzel is evenhanded in his analysis of the events of the events, but fails to delve very deep into the factors which caused the conflict. A more in-depth work would provide a better understanding for readers. Despite the brevity, Wetzel produces a well written work which explains why the Franco-Prussian War occurred.

Patricia Kollander said: " Much mystery has surrounded the Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne which initiated the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Although historians have been provided with valuable information on the subject--such as the long-suppressed documents from the German foreign office archives as well as significant documents from the Sigmaringen archives--Bismarck's motivation in the affair remains unclear.

Bismarck's promotion of the Hohenzollern candidacy has provided fuel for debate among prominent scholars in German history. On one hand, historians such as Josef Becker have concluded that Bismarck specifically aimed at achieving German unification by instigating a conflict with France. They assert that the process of German unification was in a Stagnationsphase by 1870; therefore Bismarck needed a war against France lest the whole unification process fall through altogether. On the other hand, another school of thought (notably represented by Jochen Dittrich) has concluded that in promoting the candidacy, Bismarck sought nothing more than to weaken the position of the French Emperor Napoleon III, thus peacefully facilitating the unification process. Dittrich believes that the candidacy was simply a 'diplomatic weapon'; a policy designed to avoid war.Still the question remains as to why Bismarck needed a 'diplomatic weapon' or a war with France in the first place. "

In this book, David Wetzel doesn't really answer this question. Nevertheless, it's a very well written book that makes a good summary of this important war of the 19th century. Wetzel is well nuanced in this interpretation that uses german, french as well as english sources. It's a very valuable book for anyone who really want to get to the point in a jiffy - and for historians, it's good too, for it summarizes the most important elements that explain the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71).

Does a fine job explaining how the war happened. Recommend it to anyone curious about the issue.

The author of this volume has lifted, almost verbatim, passages from Edward Crankshaw's biography of Otto von Bismarck. Not only does the author utilize these passages without attribution, he also does not cite Crankshaw in his bibliography.

This petty thievery is unfortunate, since this book does give an in-depth and quite interesting account of the diplomatic machinations that led up to the war of 1870.