Customer Reviews

Dummett: Philosophy of Language (Key Contemporary Thinkers)

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I agree that this is much more readable and sophisticated than much of the "Philosophy Now" series. I also agree that what sets it apart is the attention to context, history, and deeper philosophical motivations. Particularly helpful are the links drawn between Dummett's philosophies of language, of math, and of mind. Also, Green's pedagogical style is crisp and refreshing: she notes possible objections or inconsistencies in passing, so as to show the issues at stake and stimulate our own imaginations, rather than simply laying out a series of alternative positions. An example for other professors to follow!

Since this book is about academic philosophy, I can't imagine it appealing to anyone other than philosophy students. But I would recommend it highly to any undergraduate studying the philosophy of language, who has read a little Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine, and Davidson. If I had read it earlier, it would have saved me some frustration. I feel that it enriched my understanding not only of Dummett but of the whole core of the analytic curriculum.

Karen Green's entry in the "Key Contemporary Thinkers" series compares very favorably with Bernhard Weiss' volume in Princeton's "Philosophy Now." I've already contrasted their very different styles in my Amazon review of Weiss' book (q.v.), so I will limit myself here to restating my gratitude for Ms. Green's constant willingness to juxtapose Dummett's views with those of other philosophers. I for one find it very helpful, when trying to form an initial impression of a thinker with whom I am unfamiliar, to see his or her work against the backdrop of that of others with whom I am already acquainted. Part of the pleasure I take in reading philosophy is seeing just how, in staking her own particular ground, a thinker in effect extends the available terrain with a previously unimagined combination of stances re specific philosophical questions. None of these positions need itself be original for their assemblage to appear unique and to thus expand thought's range of possibilities (at least as long as there is some adequate threshold of cohesiveness among them). If there is one thing I still find wanting in both Green's and Weiss' expositions is sufficient specification of exactly what a theory of meaning (or a meaning-theory, to hew to Dummett's terminology) will actually consist in. For my taste, this topic is addressed at a frustratingly general and abstract level. (Somehow I suspect that Dummett's own writings will offer me little relief on this account, although I am willing to take the risk and be proven wrong.)