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12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Not Your Standard Take on Dunkirk, January 15, 2008
For well over sixty years, British and American readers have been presented with the view that the successful evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from Dunkirk between 26 May and 3 June 1940 was a tremendous triumph and "a morale victory" that allowed Britain to stay in the war. Most historical accounts have focused primarily on the actual evacuation and the role of "the small ships" that came to rescue Britain's hard-pressed troops before Dunkirk fell to the approaching German forces. In Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man, the author takes a decidedly different approach and instead focuses more on the series of tactical actions fought to maintain the Dunkirk perimeter, particularly the desperate rearguard actions fought by units that were later all but forgotten in the post-war histories. This book falls somewhere between a somewhat comprehensive history and a collection of first-person tactical accounts, but it succeeds in painting a portrait of two desperate weeks of ground fighting in the early stages of the Second World War that most readers will find unfamiliar. Overall, the book is well-written - even exciting at times - punchy and impeccably researched. There is a whiff of British biases in this book (particularly against the French) that some readers will resent, but it provides insights into the campaign that rarely, if ever, appear in other accounts.
Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man consists of 36 sequential chapters, divided into two main sections, the German attack and the Evacuation. The first section is meant to put the evacuation in context but it is oddly put together and does not altogether succeed. In the second chapter, the author discusses the arrival of the BEF in France in late 1939 and the numerous equipment and training deficiencies. However, the author misses his chance to introduce the main British players (Lord Gort, Brooke, Montgomery) or to even sketch the BEF's order of battle. This will confuse many readers later on, as leaders and generals just begin to "appear" when the action begins. The author then shifts to spend a couple chapters on the Mechelen Affair and Dutch intelligence efforts to provide early warning on the up-coming German offensive. Among other things, this book reinforces the impression that Dutch and Belgian stupidity and their unwillingness to cooperate with the Anglo-French staffs until their borders were crossed contributed greatly to the disaster that followed. The author then shifts gears to cover the German breakthrough at Sedan and the French collapse, which is very similar to material presented in Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend (2005). I found these chapters gratuitously anti-French and unconnected to the main narrative - it was as if the author made a detour to flog the poor performance of the French 9th Army in order to make the BEF's last-stands appear all the more heroic. This first section concludes with the failed counterattacks at Arras (very well done, with excellent tactical detail on British Matilda tanks) and the BEF's retreat to the coast.
The second section begins with the German panzers reaching the coast and the futile Anglo-French defenses of Boulogne and Calais. However, the real meat in this section consists of detailed tactical vignettes covering key delay actions at places like Cassel, Le Paradis and Wormhout. Many readers will cringe as they read about one British battalion after another that was crushed with 50-70 percent losses merely to hold a village or a bridge for a few hours. While there are plenty of heroics and a few VCs on these pages, it is also apparent that many BEF units fought poorly for a variety of reasons (lack of proper equipment, limited ammunition, poor leadership) and some units did fight pretty much "to the last man" while others bolted to the rear. The author recounts several incidents of British officers having to shoot other BEF soldiers who refused to stand and fight. British tactical leadership was stolid and unflappable, but sometimes bordered on imbecility, as the author recounts instances of several British battalion commanders who refused to believe that the Germans could arrive so quickly until shells started exploding around them. There was also a "country-club" mentality among many of these BEF officers, not yet blooded in combat, and it is distressing to read about British officers dining on sandwiches and champagne while their troops went unfed for days. Indeed, one gets the impression that the BEF's quartermaster's efforts fell apart as quickly as their troops were some of the first to evacuate. Noticeably, British artillery played little role in the fighting.
Most accounts of Dunkirk tend to emphasize that 338,000 troops were evacuated with little further explanation, but the author provides an appendix with detailed break-down by day and nationality. About 122,000 French troops were evacuated (most of whom were then shuttled back to Le Havre just in time to surrender), leaving barely 100,000 unwounded BEF soldiers evacuated. Many of the infantry divisions, such as the 2nd, were all but destroyed and many of the best battalions made it back to England with only 100 or so troops and few officers. From this book, the magnitude of the Dunkirk disaster is much more apparent and stripped of wartime British propaganda intended to put a good `spin' on what was, in fact, a catastrophe. The author concludes with chapters on the 2nd BEF in June 1940, focusing on the loss of most of the 51st Highland Division and the sinking of SS Lancastria with up to 3,500 British troops aboard. By the time that France fell, Britain's army was well and truly wrecked for months to come. This book is well stocked with maps, although their location at the back of the book requires constant page flipping.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Fall of France, February 24, 2008
I saw this book in the local bookstore, and picked it up because I have always been interested in the early part of WWII. Paging through it, I was impressed to find that it did not only cover Operation Dynamo (the rescue of British and French troops from the Dunkirk area) but covered the entire scope of the fall of France, including some of the post Dunkirk operations (such as the surrender of the 51st Division at St Valery).
I have just finished reading the book. It is outstanding - I have quite a few books on the fall of France, including Horne's "To Lose a Battle" and Schirer's "The Collapse of the Third Republic", but this, from a military history point of view, is the best I have ever seen.
The author covers the action down to about Battalion level; in many cases, down to company level. He is outstanding on the events surrounding the breakthrough along the Muese at Sedan and Dinant. Reading Horne, one misses the fine grained detail of what happens : this author explains the events very well indeed.
In "To Lose a Battle", Horne points out that the official French version of the events of May 1940 had not been released when he wrote the book, and that it was difficult or impossible to consult French military sources. Sebag-Montefiore seems to have had unprecedented access to French military archives, as well as rooting out accounts in such strange places as Czechoslovakia and Russia.
Sebag-Montefiore has also made excellent use of primary sources, conducting many interviews with participants of the events he writes about. The book is very extensively footnoted (or rather, end noted) - probably enough to satisfy the most rigorous investigation.
There are a few small niggles - in the beginning of the book, Sebag-Montefiore disparages the French 25mm AT gun, which I understand was pretty good at the time; he also makes the comment that the "raison d eitier" for armoured divisions was to fight other armoured divisions, which conclusion I disagree with most strenuously. Fortunately though, there is none of the old complaints about "how useless the 2 pounder" (British anti - tank gun) was.
An outstanding book. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the period and the theater.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A new interpretation which helps to put record straight, December 7, 2009
Scores of books have appeared on evacuation of Allied troops from Dunkirk. So why this one? Well, focus of this book is different. author goes to great extent in showing that apart from naval dimension to Dunkirk evacuation there is equally another important side to the story.
Montefiore has argued that stubborn rear guard actions fought by British troops slowed down the advance of Wehrmacht.This gave Royal Navy sufficient time to mobilise assets which made extrication of beleaguered Allied troops possible. Evacuation was an incredible feat of daring,organisation and skill executed brilliantly under German fire. Only blemish was British failed to rescue 51st Highland division which was surrounded by Rommel's panzers at St Valery.
Book discusses ground combat in detail. But emphasis on tactical/unit level combat. Tommies excel in positional defence.Author narrates the actions fought by British troops at Ghent,Arras,Calais,Boulogne,Cassel,Ypres-Comines canal,Ledringham and Dunkirk perimeter.
Author has made some caustic comments on France holding it responsible for the ensuing debacle.Firstly,French failed to adopt suitable precautionary measures prelude to German invasion.Mechlen incident on January 10 1940 is case in point.German plan for the coming invasion of West was brought to the notice of Allied High Command by Belgian police. Consequently,Germans were bound to alter their plan.Author argues French ought to have anticipated this move and make suitable changes in force dispositions to counter it.Similarly, warnings from German traitor Hans Oster about impending German attack were ignored. But to be fair , French thought Oster association with Abwehr made his warnings lack credibility.
Actually,French were demoralised lot when German invasion opened.. These men had no will to fight.Their resistance melted when Germans attacked.Defence of Meuse river crossings Near Sedan speaks volumes of their military prowess.German High Command further managed to fool Allies.Wehrmacht feinted in the north which pulled the cream of Allied armies to Belgium and Holland. By doing so Allies unbarred defences in the south where Germans launched their principal assault.Train of events stemmed from the misconception that hilly,wooded Ardennes terrain was unsuitable for large scale movement of armour.Massed armour [7 panzer divisions] attacked weakest point in Allied defence and crashed through.Within a week Allied front sundered into two halves by German armoured penetration to Channel coast.
Author has interviewed [while researching for this book] scores of Dunkirk veterans .These men jogged memory to recall details of events which happened six decades ago.As a result Montefiore has uncovered facts which lay concealed for a long time.For instance, massacre conducted by SS troops at Le Paradis and Wormhout. I think unexpected stubborn resistance aroused German fury which prompted them to carry out such reprisals.
The book is very detailed with text running into more than 500 pages.Though written in a simple language there is tendency to get bogged down. Maps are located on the rear section that reader has to frequently flip pages backwards to have a look. This was a trifle inconvenient.
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