The Dynamics Of Defeat: The Vietnam War In Hau Nghia Province [Paperback]

Eric M Bergerud (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0813318742 | ISBN-13: 978-0813318745 | Publication Date: August 31, 1993

Some of the most active debate about the Vietnam War today is prompted by those who believe that the United States could have won the war either through an improved military strategy or through more enlightened social policies. Eric Bergerud takes issue with both of these positions. Carefully analyzing the entire course of the war in a single key province, The Dynamics of Defeat shows that the Vietnam War was a tragedy in the true sense of the word: American policy could not have been much different than it was and could only have led to failure.Examining the war at the operational level, where political policy is translated into military action, The Dynamics of Defeat provides a case study of the efficacy on the ground of policies emanating from Washington. Many of the policy alternatives now proposed in hindsight were actually attempted in Hau Nghia to one degree or another. Bergerud is able on that basis to critique these policies and to offer his own conclusions in a thought-provoking but utterly unpolemical fashion.Based on extensive research in U.S. Army archives and many personal interviews with those who experienced the war in Hau Nghia, The Dynamics of Defeat is a story full of violence, frustration, and numbing despair, but also one rich with lessons for American foreign policy.

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

Most studies of the Vietnam War deal with the broad scope of the conflict and with major issues, organizations, or groups. Personal accounts predominate among titles dealing with more geographically focused books, e.g., the Central Highlands. Bergerud (military and American history, Lincoln Univ.) has written an important study at the province level, always in the context of wider events, which adds significantly to the understanding of the war. He concludes that the United States could not have won the war: the South Vietnamese government lacked legitimacy with its people; the National Liberation Front was organized and determined enough to overcome military setbacks; and even though Americans demonstrated an appreciation of the political aspects of the war, only in application of military strength were they effective against the enemy. For informed laypersons as well as specialists and scholars.
- Kenneth W. Berger, Duke Univ. Lib., Durham, N.C.
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

About the Author

Eric M. Bergerud is professor of military and American history at Lincoln University in San Francisco and the author of Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific, Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning and The Dynamics of Defeat.

Product Details

• Paperback: 400 pages
• Publisher: Westview Press (August 31, 1993)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0813318742
• ISBN-13: 978-0813318745
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,030,467 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars too broad of a generalization, June 7, 2007

By 

Mai Linh Nguyen (The Diaspora) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Dynamics Of Defeat: The Vietnam War In Hau Nghia Province (Paperback)

I find this type of history to be dubious. The author looks at one province and then generalizes his findings over the entire South Vietnamese nation. If one were to look at the attitudes of American colonists during the Revolutionary war by region one would find great disparities of opinion and support for the independence cause. Some areas of the colonies were strongly loyalist. Did this make the independence movement less valid? Another example; take two cities in Texas, Austin and Fort Worth. Survey the populations of these areas about their opinions of President Bush. You would find greatly divergent aggregate views. My point is that this type of regional analysis is of limited use if you are trying to generalize over a population larger than the one investigated.

It was no different in Vietnam. There were areas where the locals strongly supported the insurgency, such as in the Iron Triangle which included Hau Nghia I believe. It is no surprise that the author found support for the insurgency here. On the other hand there were many places were the population strongly opposed the insurgency and even fled their arrival. Finally, let us not forget that during the Tet offensive there was no general uprising against the South Vietnamese government as the communists fully expected there would be. Quite to the contrary in fact. The ARVN fought valiantly and the general population tried to stay out of the way and let the military restore order. Much as the general population does in all conflicts.

This sort of parochial view of situations can have devastating effects on Policy, just as it did with the over throw of Ngo Dinh Diem. The Saigon elites wanted Diem gone. But the Saigon elites had no more in common with the populace at large in Vietnam as Wall Street Financiers have with Iowa wheat farmers. Again, the ideas of a small sampling were generalized over a large population and policy was formulated based on this. Another example of this concept can be found in one of the oft criticisms of Diem. Diem was often faulted for being a catholic in a predominantly Buddhist country. Calling Vietnam a Buddhist country is like calling the USA a Christian country. Probably most Americans call themselves Christian, but what does this mean? It means many things and encompasses many ideas. Ideas that are often at odds with each other. The same was true in Vietnam at the time. This kind of historic generalization is of limited usefulness to understanding the larger context. The Author should have refrained from extending his conclusions to the larger whole based on an otherwise interesting investigation.

As for those who served in Vietnam and had their opinions validated by this text. Again, this is a question of generalizing over the whole one's own personal experiences. We all like to think of ourselves as representative of everyone else, but this is not necessarily true either. I have the utmost respect for those who served in Vietnam. They did their duty during a difficult period in our history. However, most American service personnel did not speak the language, were isolated from the local population, and only received a limited understanding of the situation in Vietnam. How can one truly fromulate a concrete understanding of something in such circumstances? Also, is the perspective of the grunt humping the boonies going to be the same as a Saigon warrior? Clearly not. Many soldiers came away from Vietnam with opinions about the local population that were shaped by an extremely limited exposure to them in a myriad of different contexts. One does not have to look far, however, to find countless books by soldiers and civilians who worked closely with the Vietnamese and local populations and came to completely different conclusions. Most of the books written by those who understood the language, or dealt with the Vietnamese regularly show a strong belief in the cause of aiding the Vietnamese. Those who got to truly know the Vietnamese most frequently came away with a very positive feeling toward them, believed they were worthy of the efforts being expended by the USA, and were sincere in their desire to be free of communist domination.

It has been my intention here to point out the limitations of interpreting broad historical events by looking at microcosms in history. Having established this, I do believe that this book is a worthwhile read. It is an interesting regional investigation of a complex environment. I would just admonish people to approach it with an appreciation of its limitations and seek other sources to contrast this book with for a broader understanding of the war in general.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Case Study in "The Dynamics of Defeat", October 15, 2006

By 

Jon Thomas - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: The Dynamics Of Defeat: The Vietnam War In Hau Nghia Province (Paperback)

I was highly impressed by this book on Vietnam. It's a densely written historical account loaded with military of acronyms of the history of the Vietnam war in the strategic small province of Hau Nghia. This former province was located just northwest of Saigon.

I think the author really got the war right. His accounts of the US pacification projects, attitudes of the civilian population towards the US military, attitudes of the GI's towards the rural Vietnamese, anti-colonial nationalism of the Vietnamese, etc. all ring true to my ears. It's consistent with my experience of 6 months in Vietnam with the 25th and with my subsequent attempts to understand the nature of that very troubling war.

I believe the author learned the main lesson of Vietnam very well. There are very real limits to the use of military power. You cannot change people's "hearts and minds" with military force. That is ultimately the reason why we lost in Vietnam. We didn't lose militarily, we lost politically. The great majority of Vietnamese saw us as trying to colonize Vietnam--mistakenly I believe. Vietnam was more of an ideological crusade by the US than a sought after economic prize--it simply never had the resources. The North Vietnamese Communists, despite all of their massive shortcomings, were largely seen by the rural South Vietnamese as being their nationalistic "anti-colonial" liberators. It was a war that we couldn't win is the author's conclusion. I'm in agreement with him. The South Vietnamese government never achieved any degree of credibility with the rural population--no matter how many bombs we dropped on their behalf.

One wonders if this book might have slowed down our present White House occupant and his band of advisors if they had bothered to read it?
Probably not. They are too busy repeating history to take the time to learn anything from it. Maybe all of that oil mesmerized them and all of that old history was simply too boring to take the time to read about.

3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Bottom-Up Analysis of Warfare in Vietnam, July 16, 2010

By 

Kevin M. Boylan - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Dynamics Of Defeat: The Vietnam War In Hau Nghia Province (Paperback)

An earlier review of this title was critical of Eric Bergerud's generalizing about the Vietnam War as a whole based upon his bottom-up analysis of a single province (Hau Nghia). While I agree in principle with that reviewer's critique, one must add that such generalizations are inevitable and that most readers would be disappointed if DYNAMICS OF DEFEAT did not address the large question of how its findings might apply to the Vietnam War as a whole.

Moreover, the earlier reviewer fails to note that most studies of the Vietnam War employ purely top-down analyses based upon what are necessarily generalizations about the course of the war in South Vietnam's provinces. Since these works depend upon data (HES scores, PHOENIX 'neutralizations,' body counts, etc.) aggregated at the national level -- and subject to deliberate and accidental distortion at many stages as they passed up the chain of command -- one cannot rely upon them as a sure indication of what was actually happening in the provinces.

In short, we will not be able to build a truly accurate picture of the Vietnam War until we have works like DYNAMICS OF DEFEAT covering many of South Vietnam's other 43 provinces in similar detail.