Customer Reviews

The Eagle's Last Triumph: Napoleon's Victory at Ligny, June 1815

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

"Eagles Last Triumph" is an outstanding treatment of the Waterloo Campaign, with special focus on the battle of Ligny, 2 days prior to the more commonly known battle of Waterloo. Uffindell counts on a variety of primary and secondary sources. Nor does he depend heavily on British accounts; German, French and Dutch-Belgian sources are used as well, balancing the writing so that the reader can understand the why of the decisions made by the battlefield commmanders. There are maps, though not many of them, but clear and relevant to the accounts in the book. His after-battle analysis, leading to the impact the twin battles of Quatre-Bras and Ligny had 2 days later on their more famous cousins, Waterloo and Wavre, is excellent. Through it, you may (as I have) come away convinced that Ligny, though a French tactical victory, was a strategic defeat in that it was the best chance in the campaign for Napoleon to destroy one of the armies he faced during the campaign. If the Prussian army had been destroyed at Ligny, Waterloo would not have been fought. Strongly recommended for all readers.

This short, concise, and insightful book is not a tactical study of the battle, but rather an objective operational and strategic study. So maps, although plentiful, lack details. Among the author's conclusions are that Napoleon believed that defeating Britain, with the great financial support and subsidies that it gave, would end the coalition and war against him. As a result, he originally planned a quick advance on Brussels, but Blucher concentrated more quickly, forcing him to change his plans. Prussian Chief of Staff Gneisenau thought that his nation had no interests in Belgium and that the Brits alone should defend it. Wellington, expecting Napoleon to fight defensively behind fortresses like in 1814, was slow to respond but did not intentionally mislead Blucher about his difficulties in concentrating. Dutch-Belgian commanders at Quatre-Bras stayed in place, against orders, helping to save the situation. From their pre-battle conference, Blucher believed that Wellington would attack Napoleon's flank, but as he left, the Duke added, "if possible", which the Prussian may not have picked up on, as both the French and Prussian armies deployed with the hope of help from the west. Napoleon intended an encircling a flank attack by D'Erlon's corps and an attack on the enemy's center at Ligny, but his army encountered a great crisis and was on the verge of panic when D'Erlon's unidentified corps mistakenly approached Napoleon's rear. The crisis was ended, however, and Blucher rashly committed all of his reserves, making the battle ripe for Napoleon to commit the Imperial Guard. A decisive victory was stymied because of the blundering and miscommunication regarding D'Erlon's reserve corps. Although Napoleon had changed his plan and now intended to attack Blucher, the staff officer sent to get D'Erlon's support did not continue on to explain this to Ney. Ney recalled D'Erlon, who despite being in sight of the battle at Ligny, compromised and brought most of his troops back toward Quatre-Bras - but too late to effect that battle. Napoleon's orders were not precise, so D'Erlon had not advanced into the Prussian flank, but into Napoleon's rear, nearly causing a panic. All the parties involved are responsible in some way. The failure to achieve a decisive victory and the failure to pursue quickly the following day made Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo possible. There, the author argues, Wellington prepared, if necessary, to retire toward Ostend on coast, and not through the forest behind him. This implies a readiness to abandon Blucher, who, despite advice to the contrary, was prepared to stand by Wellington to the end.

Excellent campaign study of the battle of Ligny. Many good maps at both the campaign and tactical level (much improved from the 1st edition from 1994). Several good appendices on D'Erlon's meanderings, Ney's blunderings, communication breakdowns, and a tour of the battlefield today.

Blucher emerges as the true hero, which is unusual in histories of the 1815 campaign. Good exposition of how the "other half" of this double battle (Quatre Bras) influenced Ligny. Very nicely written.

Uffindell clearly spent lots of time walking the battlefield and has an excellent knowledge of it. He is also enthusiatic about his subject and the book is a good read. However, it is bad history. Too often, the myths about the campaign are repeated as fact. Too often questionable statements by Uffindell's hero Wellington are taken at face value. Of course, the British did nothing worng in this campaign and foreigners like the Prince of Orange, Dornberg and Ziethen are to blame for Wellington's errors. This book is very much inferior to Hofschroer's work.

This book summarises the battle of Ligny neatly, putting it in tactical context with the twin battle of Quatre-Bras and 2 days later, in strategic context with Waterloo.
Wellington comes across as an overly cautious general, Blucher as an over-enthusiastic general.
And Napoleon? He continued to belittle the capabilities of his opponents, underestimated their fighting prowess, was careless, and was ultimately let down by his own generals and sloppy staffwork. Napoleon had himself to blame. Great opening moves, but failed to win the mid-game and was checkmated in the end-game.