Customer Reviews

East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)

5 star:		(17)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Appleman's book is meticulously researched and wonderfully detailed. (Though you will find yourself wishing you had a set of really detailed topo maps to follow the action.) The one weakness of Appleman's research has to do with the 31st Tank. Appleman seems to have relied heavily on the recollections of Col. Drake, who commanded the 31st Tank. Drake's recollections are generally correct but more details could have been obtained from the other survivors of 31Tank.

Despite this small personal quibble, Appleman's book is superb.

John F. Close

This book makes it possible to understand how the tragedy of Task Force Faith could occur. In part, it does this by showing how false assumptions made at critical moments led to weaknesses which the Chinese exploited. In part, it does this by showing how the 32nd RCT could have been saved. The most telling historical insights, to me, are the resources and energy used by the Chinese which might otherwise have been brought to bear on the Marines at Hagaru-ri, and which might have been just enough to have captured that road junction, and entrapped the 7th and 5th Marines. One of the proudest moments in Marine Corps history may honorably offer humble gratitude to the forgotten army men who's relics still lie unmarked, east of Chosin.

A very engrossing account. Despite the level of detail on the geography, personnel and their units it holds your attention. Also provides comment on areas of uncertainty over what actually happened. One of the most successful books on warfare in putting you there - to the point where it was difficult to read ( in this case an indication of the author's success ). One really sensed the isolation of the units and the desperate situation in which they found themselves. Recommended.

This is a book for Korean War hardcores, focusing exclusively on the command, tactical and other decisions which led directly to the disaster of Task Force Faith east of the Chosin reservoir in early December 1950. As such it is extremely detailed in its discussion of terrain, platoon layout and attacks by forces on boths sides, communication blunders, and so on. (Keep in mind the whole tragedy unfolded over just 4 days.) There are many maps in the book; even so, I was tempted at times to lay out a topographic map of my own and stick pins in it to represent crucial encounters the author refers to. Unless you can follow and appreciate this level of detail (and have a morbid need to understand the tragedy of the 31st RCT at its fullest) this book is probably going to bore you to death or you will just sail along with the text and not really get a FEEL for the battle.

Problems with Army troop training and command are discussed by many authors and occurred in numerous spots during the first part of the war, until Ridgway whipped the forces into shape and back into fighting mood. Appleman mentions them here, since there were a lot of problems with troop discipline as the breakout proceeded. But he does not make it a big issue, for two reasons. One, its easy to look back and second guess decisions made under such extreme conditions. Second he feels its largely unproductive; we should concentrate on learning from mistakes, not thrashing ourselves because of them.

The first error was moving troops up to the forward positions at Pyongnuri-gang inlet [henceforth, for obvious reasons, the 'inlet'] immediately after the Marines left the position. The 31st RCT mission was to protect the Marines flank on the east side of the reservoir, and army units were rushed to Hagaru-ri pell-mell. Forces in the area must have known plenty of enemy were around-- the Marines had just finished a 5 day battle with the Chinese as they climbed Funchilin Pass. A reconnaisance platoon sent up the Inlet simply disappeared. Given this it was foolish to send troops to the Inlet and beyond until they reached regimental strength. Not only were Army battalions smaller than Marine ones, but the Army personnel were, on balance, less experienced fighters and rifleman than the Marines were. In defense of the much-maligned soldiers Appleman points out that KATUSA's were a much larger portion of the Army's field strength; whereas the Marines used very few and chiefly as interpreters.

Still, it would require a lot of smoke and mirrors to hide all the army's deficiencies which brought on its Chosin disaster. Poor discipline, platoon placement and snoozing soldiers made the confrontation with the Chinese on the night of the 27th worse than it should have been. Even when Faith ordered a consolidation of positions at the Inlet the next day, he still must have been under the impression tank support from his 2nd battalion was on the way, as he merely ordered abandoned vehicles to be disabled...not destroyed. [Logistic bottlenecks, and Chinese control of large sections of the MSR in the vicinity of Funchilin pass meant the 2nd would never arrive.] Ammo drops were in the wrong place or drifted over the Chinese. Communications were so poor that Faith didn't even know he DID have tank battalion just a few miles away! Once the breakout began, communication within the column itself was poor or missing as platoons became mixed; some men didn't even know a breakout was taking place. Discipline vanished as more officers and NCOs were killed or wounded.

All these problems and others will fit in the readers mind better if you turn to chapter 22 near the books end--"Could Task Force Faith Have Been Saved?"-- where Appleman summarizes many of the problems the 31st RCT suffered. Appleman lays out eight factors which doomed the effort. Of these, the crucial command blunder was the withdrawal of the 31st Tank company (the one Faith couldn't talk to!) from Hudong-ni, just 4 miles to the south, the day before the breakout. "In the end," sighs Appleman, "this doomed Task Force Faith." Other blunders are smaller but still incomprehensible: the failure to have a backup plan in the event the road convoy stalled, for example.

Interestingly, Donald Knox's 1st book [The Korean War: Pusan To Chosin] includes many first-person accounts of the attack, consolidation, convoy and escapes over the ice. Only two of them appear in Appleman's book: USMC Captain Stanford, who was the forward air controller, and Sergeant Chester Bair, with the convoy as a mechanic. Perhaps--and this is pure speculation on my part-- the many others in Knox's book were among those who slipped away prematurely on hill 1221 and over the ice. If they declined comment because they thought Appleman (or anyone else) would be judgemental they would be mistaken.

Appleman does make clear that, despite common belief, a relief tank/infantry relief force did not leave Hagaru-ri on the morning of December 2 in an attempt to rescue the convoy. In agonizing detail the author makes clear that a preliminary Marine order was never issued in final form, partly because of some discussion over the size of the accompanying infantry force. This mistaken belief is probably because readers confuse this relief force, never sent, with the tank battalion at Hodong-ni, withdrawn on November 30th.

I've long been very familiar with the 1st Marine Division's history at the Chosin, but until I read Roy Appleman's book I didn't realize just how much I didn't know about the Army's side of the conflict. This tale of desperation and bravery should be required reading amongst all American service personnel and perhaps even in High Schools. Excellently written, this book holds your attention despite the huge amount of very detailed geographic and unit data presented.

Having read several books about the Chosin Campaign, I was pleased to finally get the story of what occurred on the East side of the reservoir. Mr. Appleman exaustingly found the details through official Army and Marine combat reports as well as listening to the survivors of this tragic event. The 31st RCT was doomed almost before they started and poor weather, traffic jams, raw Korean recruits, bad luck and command mistakes caused its demise. The Soldiers fought bravely and tenaciously but being out-numbered by as much as 10 to 1 was just too much to overcome.
The author has given us a clear, detailed, hour by hour account
of this heroic but heartbreaking episode in American military history.

I was also at Chosin and this book is for real. It refreshed memories, and explained the many reasons we were in such horrible, outmanned conditions.Appreciate the authors kind considerations of all the men who endured this part of the Forgotten War.

I've read a lot of military history over the years, though I'm definitely not as well-read as some. This book and the others in Appleman's Korean War series really helped me understand small unit operations. They can be dry and a little tough going, but if you give them a chance you may discover a side of battle often overlooked. Making great use of original after action reports as well as interviews and the more common types of sources, Appleman reminds us that (unlike the movies) often ammunition and rations run out and what happens when they do. (Real men have to be sent to get more.) He shows us how and why troops are moved from one nondescript hill to another. (Almost never due to command brilliance.) And better than anyone else he shows us how great battles are built up from squad and platoon actions.

You may lose track of which regiment "L Company" is a part of, but you will come to care what happened to L Company.

This book should become required reading for any officer in the Armed Services. The hardships that our soldiers faced East of Chosin make me proud to be an American. Appleman pulls no punches.

Roy Appleman's book is a must for the Korean War buff. The level of detailed research outlining the aspects of leadership, logistics, and tactics specific to the Korean conflict make this an excellent addition to any historians' library. When reading East of Chosin; Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 it is easy to forget that the 23 chapters cover a disaster that takes place just over a 100 hour period. This story focuses on the disastrous results for 3000 Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division sent to protect the eastern flank of the 1st Marine Division along the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea from 27 November to 01 December in Macarthur's push to end the Korean War by Christmas, 1950. The rushed and poorly planned operation was thwarted with the Chinese surprise assault over the Yalu. The chronological chapters outline the Chosin build-up, leading into a day-by-day account focusing on the major actions leading into the break-out from the Inlet perimeter to the final escape to Hagaru-ri. The book provides 11 maps and 24 pages of pictures spread throughout the book which help in keeping the reader oriented as the events unfold. This book addresses in extreme detail the good and bad of America's efforts to do the "right thing" but where we simply failed to meet the challenge. It outlines the failures, the successes and the bad luck experienced during this operation without searching for scapegoats. This is important history to capture for future audiences since it is easy to underestimate the potential for failure in any military endeavor. This book addresses the many failures that contributed to the tragedy, but focuses on the lessons learned from the event and how those lessons played out on the men who were at Chosin at that time. This story is reminiscent, at certain points, of the Battle of Little Bighorn and Vietnams' Ia Drang Valley with bad tactical decisions and poor intelligence sharing. As a career soldier, this book was difficult to read at times because of the many preventable failings experienced by the Soldiers of the 7th ID. Failings like the disastrous decision to send troops to Hagaru-ri in small groups instead of consolidating a regimental size unit before movement to the objective. The utter failure to pass intelligence forward that indicated up to eight Chinese divisions were in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir on 26 November 1950. While this information was known at levels above, it was not shared with the Soldiers and Marines on the ground that day. The 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was virtually destroyed as a fighting unit by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) 80th Division, but if it is any consolation, the 80th Division was also destroyed in the process. The research points out little known facts such as the Army units sent to the area had a much larger percentage of their formation made up of the poorly trained South-Korean conscripts to fill vacancies, where the Marines had a much smaller portion and only used them as translators. This certainly played a role in the performance differences by the units on each side of the reservoir. Many tactical errors made in employing the roughly 30,000 American forces against the 100,000 Chinese forces at Chosin guaranteed the Americans would fail against the 10 to 1 odds they faced in the battle. The research is particularly impressive considering the fact that most of the 31st RCT records were destroyed in the battle. Other challenges included most of the leadership were dead and survivor's memories faded with age. Chapter 22 summarizes evidence that demonstrates that better tactical decisions regarding basic communications and ammunition re-supply could have resulted in a very different outcome to the Chosin Reservoir operation.