The Economic Basis of Politics [Paperback]

Charles A. Beard (Author), Clyde W. Barrow (Introduction)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 076580932X | ISBN-13: 978-0765809322 | Publication Date: July 1, 2002

Economic interpretations of history are irrevocably identified with the name of Charles A. Beard. This is mainly due to his early book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). Yet, in Beard's later work, The Economic Basis of Politics (1922), he articulates the main principles of his method and argues for its applicability to understanding of current events. In this brief survey of Western political philosophy and contemporary constitutional arrangements, Beard concludes that it is well established doctrine that "there is a vital relation between the forms of state and the distribution of property, revolutions in the state being usually the results of contests over property."

In advancing this axiom, Beard responds to charges that he was a "Marxist" by constructing an interpretation of Western political philosophy and history that draws a firm distinction between his economic interpretation of history and Marx's historical materialism. Beard traces the origins of his own method to the works of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and Montesquieu. This view of political theory and political theorists stands in sharp contrast to the view prevailing among many contemporary political philosophers, who insist that political theory must somehow transcend history and rise above ordinary politics to count as theory.

Beard's observations on the nature and tradition of Western political philosophy provide an entre into New World political thought, which many academic political philosophers have long regarded as something less than "political theory." In contrast, Beard regards the development and application of the method of economic interpretation to be the greatest contribution of American political thought to the tradition of Western political theory.

In his surveys of thinkers such as Madison, Webster, and Calhoun, Beard links American political thought to the Western tradition of economic interpretation, which undergirds both "liberalism" and "republicanism." The present-day relevance of this important volume will be evident to all social scientists.

Charles A. Beard (1874-1948) taught at Columbia University, then resigned to become a founder of The New School for Social Research. Among his many works are Development of Modern Europe, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, The Rise of American Civiliation, and President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War.

Clyde W. Barrow is professor of political science and director of the Center for Policy Analysis at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth. He is the author of More than a Historian: The Political and Economic Thought of Charles A. Beard, published by Transaction.

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About the Author

Charles A. Beard (1874-1948) is regarded as one of the most influential American historians in the first half of the twentieth century. He is famous for his evaluation of the founding fathers of the United States, who he believed were motivated by economics as opposed to philosophical principles. Some of his works include An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, and The Administration and Politics of Tokyo.

Clyde W. Barrow is Chancellor Professor in the Policy Studies Program at the University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth where he also serves as director of the Center of Policy Analysis. His works include More than a Historian: The Political and Economic Thought of Charles A. Beard, Economic Impacts of the Textile and Apparel Industries in Massachusetts, and Globalisation, Trade Liberalisation, and Higher Education in North America: The Emergence of a New Market Under NAFTA? (with Sylvie Didou-Aupetit and John Mallea).

 

Product Details

• Paperback: 112 pages
• Publisher: Transaction Publishers (July 1, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 076580932X
• ISBN-13: 978-0765809322
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 0.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 7.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,795,063 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A small book for big thinkers, October 18, 2003

By 

Bruce P. Barten (Saint Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A.) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Economic Basis of Politics (Essay index reprint series) (Hardcover)

This book was originally four lectures delivered by Charles A. Beard at Amherst College in 1916. The fourth lecture was revised when the book originally appeared in 1922, to try to keep up with events. If anything, the relationship between economic interests and the ability of governments to reflect the general will of the governed suffered an agonizing setback after World War One, when constitutions which provided universal suffrage, soon to include women in many countries, were abrogated by fascist forms of totalitarian political control leading up to World War Two. In 1945 a long chapter was added to attempt to relate events to that point to our understanding of the political possibilities which still remain open to those who might support some new constitutions.

Economics used to be much more stable than governments, and the early philosophers who had opinions on the role of the governed in systems of government assumed that the components of the system would represent various economic interests. Aristotle gets credit as ` "the father of political science" because he took it out of the sphere of utopian idealism where Plato left it and placed it on the strong foundation of natural history.' (pp. 4-5). For an ideal society, even then, "A city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes." (p. 20). A father of the United States Constitution, James Madison, wrote in Number Ten of the Federalist, on `the protection of the different and unequal faculties of men for acquiring property. "From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results." ' (pp. 16-17).

There is a lot to be said for systems which can combine representatives of different interests and produce results which would be considered satisfactory to a majority. The form of political theory tending to demand this result most strongly is Rousseau's SOCIAL CONTRACT, which proposed giving a majority the power to impose "the general will." (p. 51). The French Revolution is considered an example of the inability of a vast number of people with no economic interests to run a society.

"Then followed the Revolution of violence and terror in which radical readers inflamed the disenfranchised by appeals to the gospel of Rousseau and to the proclamations of the bourgeois. To save themselves the latter had to resort to that other great source of authority, the sword. This instrument was wielded by Napoleon Bonaparte, a man who understood the relation of property to political power, and who, through his constitutions based on checks and balances, gave stability to bourgeois institutions." (p. 55). We still have some terror and proclamations of the bourgeois, but there seems to be little evidence than anyone is about to write a constitution with the checks and balances that can defeat the gospel that inspires those who are no longer fired up with zeal by the doctrines of Rousseau.

The United States was in a *nice country, if you can get it* category at the time of the American Revolution, with fundamental equality through land ownership available to those who were not involved in productive activities or being enslaved. Jefferson's choice of "the free-and-equal doctrine" (p. 58) was easier to proclaim in America because "There was no established clergy here. There was no titled aristocracy." (p. 57). Those who pictured themselves governing themselves in America had no reason to worry that "Jefferson, while justifying the revolt against George III, in fact challenged the rule of property which was guaranteed by the state constitutions drafted by his fellow revolutionists in that very epoch." (pp. 57-58).

This book is small, but there is some question if the simplicity with which it begins can lead to any enlightenment in the face of the complexity which we face. Chapter IV, The Contradiction and the Outcome (pp. 62-70), only leads to "In other words, there is no rest for mankind, no final solution of eternal contradictions." That idea comes from 1922, shortly before "No less drastic than its consequences has been a transformation in the functions of government, particularly in those which call for wholesale intervention in economic operations." (p. 71). Looking back in the spring of 1945 might have been more comforting than facing the end of 2003 with economic sanctions still in force against some political regimes which displease the global superpower more than any form of economic activity or illegal substance ever will. But the gross distortions of political economics in this book hardly extends beyond the restrictions which communism imposed on itself.

The first page of Chapter V, Economics and Politics in Our Revolutionary Age, mentions Lenin and Trotsky, "the early leaders of the Russian revolution." (p. 71). The problem they faced, representing a party which predated the vanguard of the economic system they intended to run, seems similar to the United States trying to establish a constitution for Iraq, a country in which people have interests which are not economic, the lack of security there now extending beyond the concern for property rights. Beard was even fearful. "But military men have, necessarily, a set of values which differ in many respects from civilian values; and the military interests, enlarged by universal conscription, will constitute a powerful influence in American affairs, with all that may involve amid the domestic and foreign contingencies of coming ages." (pp. 102-103). It is not likely that Beard was then worried about how long it might be before Iraqis act like civilians. Some might be wondering how long it will be before electricity will even allow economic activity.

4.0 out of 5 stars A Majority of Individuals vs. a Majority of Economic Interest Groups, June 30, 2011

By 

George S. Crockett (Franklin, NC USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Economic Basis of Politics (Hardcover)

Beard, Charles A. 1922. The Economic Basis of Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 99 p. Reprinted 1928.

Until Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson, governments of the leading western states, contained organs which represented the major economic interests of the states' populations. In England the Parliament had two houses; in France, three; and in Sweden, four. Spain also had a parliament. England's House of Lords represented the great landlords of the state; the House of Commons was composed of gentry who represented the rural communities and burgers who represented the urban communities. In France the three houses, or estates, represented respectively, the nobility, the clergy, and everyone else who had a political voice.
Rousseau and Jefferson replaced the political equality of economic interests with the political equality of all individuals, though Jefferson did not mean it; he was trying for a declaration that would not alienate anyone from support of the war for independence.
This book is an excellent one for reading along with John C. Calhoun's A Disquisition on Government.
I read Beard during spring of 2011.