Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960 [Paperback]

Isaac Alteras (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 1, 1993

 In this examination of U.S.-Israeli relations during a crucial stage of their evolution, Alteras breathes life into the political figures whose motivations and decisions helped shape the two countries' attitudes toward each other today.

 

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Editorial Reviews

Book Description

"Incorporates the most authoritative scholarship and exploits recently released archives. . . . This multi-layered analysis should be must reading for a wide audience."--Richard H. Immerman, Temple University

"Alteras writes fairly and intelligently. . . . His book is a welcome addition to the literature on American foreign policy in the Eisenhower years."--Robert A. Divine, University of Texas at Austin

This first detailed analysis of early U.S.-Israeli relations draws on recently declassified documents from both countries, most notably Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's diaries and correspondence and the Israeli State Archives.  Alteras explores the relations between the United States and Israel during the Eisenhower administration in the context of U.S. interests in the Arab Middle East and devotes considerable attention to the impact of American Jewry on Eisenhower's and Dulles's policies toward Israel.
 Among the controversies this book will be important in resolving:  who promised what to whom in the interchanges that preceded the 1956 invasion of Suez, and exactly what the relationship was among Israel, France, and Britain.  With persuasive support from primary sources, Alteras argues that although Ben-Gurion understood that Israel stood to lose the most in the event of failure, the British and French were at least as much to blame for the debacle that followed as were the Israelis.
 Further, Alteras shows that Eisenhower and Dulles agreed fully on U.S. policy toward Israel and that the secretary of state consulted the president at every stage of policy implementation.  He indicates that although Eisenhower at times questioned the wisdom of Truman's decision to recognize the Jewish state, Eisenhower never tampered with that decision or with the U.S. commitment to Israel's survival.  Alteras also details the manner in which organized American Jewry successfully lobbied Congress to thwart the administration's attempts to impose economic sanctions on Israel in the aftermath of the Sinai campaign.
 In this examination of U.S.-Israeli relations during a crucial stage of their evolution, Alteras breathes life into the political figures whose motivations and decisions helped shape the two countries' attitudes toward each other today.

[excerpt]
The emergency meeting of the General Assembly was scheduled to begin on November 1 at 5:30 p.m.  A meeting between Eban and Dulles, the first since the eruption of the [Sinai] crisis, was set for earlier that day.  Before the meeting, in a telephone conversation with Golda Meir and Shimon Peres, Eban inquired about the military situation and received a glowing report of military success.  Israeli forces, Meir told him, were now ten miles from the Suez Canal.  The Gaza Strip was about to fall, and the Egyptian army was collapsing in retreat. . . .  Eban had the unenviable task of trying to extricate his country from an unforeseen and most difficult political situation.  The news from the battlefield raised his spirits:  it would be very useful for the upcoming meeting with the secretary of state.

 

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

About the Author

Isaac Alteras, associate professor of history at Queens College, City University of New York, has published and lectured widely on Jewish history and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  From 1986 to 1991 he directed the Center for Jewish Studies at Queens College.

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 403 pages
• Publisher: University Press of Florida; First edition (June 1, 1993)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0813012066
• ISBN-13: 978-0813012063
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.5 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,328,713 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960, April 12, 2001

By 

Daniel Pipes (Philadelphia, PA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953-1960 (Paperback)

With the passage of time, the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower takes on added interest for understanding U.S. policy in the Middle East. Here was the one case of an American president who seemed to accept the Arabist view that good relations with Israel must harm those with the Arabs. When push came to shove, Eisenhower acted on this belief, compelling the Israelis to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula following the Suez War. Decades later, Arab leaders like Yasir Arafat still dream that another American president might "do what Eisenhower did" and force the Israelis from the West Bank and Golan Heights. Alteras shows in his thoroughly researched and elegantly presented study that the reality of U.S.-Israel relations in the 1950s differed substantially from their image. True, Eisenhower did minimize relations with Israel, but he did not reduce the U.S. commitment to the existence and survival of Israel. Even more striking, Alteras argues that "if the Eisenhower administration was less free with pro-Israeli declarations [than the Truman administration], it was more forthcoming with pro-Israel deeds" (shades of George Bush!). Eisenhower and Israel has much else to tell, including the story how Congress first became involved in a major way in U.S.-Israel relations and how the Israel lobby emerged. In short, Alteras masterfully traces today's American debate over the Arab-Israeli conflict to its origins in the 1950s.

Middle East Quarterly, June 1994