Customer Reviews

Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-45

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This book is exactly that as it provides a wealth of detail that others merely gloss over. This book is not a tired recitation of the standard WWII European theatre timeline = D-Day, nothing much, Cobra, Race Across France, nothing much, the Battle of the Bulge, marking time, The Rhine, German Surrender.

The author presents a thorough operational history of all facets of the campaign including details on such little studied topics as; a.)The Cherbourg Peninsula campaign b.) The Aachen / Roer fighting in Oct. '44 c.) The Hurtigen Forrest fighting d.) Operation Dragoon - the invasion of Southern France in Aug. of '44 e.) The Colmar Pocket f.) Patton's Palatine campaign of '45 g.) The role of the French Army in Alsace and Lorraine

In addition the author fixes American strategy in the tradition of the "find 'em, fix 'em and destroy 'em" approach to strategy that dates back to US Grant and the Civil War. And he demonstrates the shortcomings of that strategy. Logistics and troop shortages are not neglected either as the author clearly demonstrates that, although the United States possessed much more potential combat power than Germany, the US Army was oftentimes outnumbered (or possessed only a thin superiority) at the point of attack. Original plans at the outbreak of war (for the U.S.) in 1941 called for an American army of 210 divisions. In fact only 89 were formed and not all of those went to NW Europe. The disparity between plans and execution is effectively analyzed by the author.

This last point is an important one because it puts to rest that tired old saw that the US Army and their allies simply overwhelmed the 30% of the German army that faced them in the West while all the "real" fighting was done in the East.

The book is invaluable because it casts light on those "other" combat commanders - at Corps and Division level - that we hear almost nothing about. Men like Collins, Corlett, Gerow, Eddie, Robertson, Allen, Van Fleet, etc., (the real heroes of the struggle) finally get their due.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the author's treatment of that WWII international superstar Bernard Law Montgomery. I feel Weigly is very evenhanded when it comes to Monty. He gives credit where it is due and clearly points out those instances where Monty promises much and delivers little. This approach will surely upset both sides of the debate on Monty's true contributions to the Allied effort. His partisans, weaned on a steady diet of Monty hagiography, will see the author taking sides against their man. Monty bashers will not get enough satisfaction from Weigly's evenhanded approach.

In conclusion, f you are interested in this period and have not read this book - get it.

This book is an in-depth, critical critique of the western campaign in Europe after D-Day. Although as dry as the technical journals used as source material, the first three chapters contain the bulk of Weigley's thesis. After a lengthy comparison, he clearly states that the Wehrmacht, even as last as January, 1945, was the best army in the world. "With unvarying consistency it had achieve proportionately greater results than any other army for the numbers of men and divisions it employed." It took the vast industrial power of the United States, and the combined arms of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union, the U.S. and France to finally break the Germans. The Wehrmacht survived and won with a highly trained and competent officer corps and strong unit loyalty among the men. The U.S. Army was woefully short in these traits. Disgusted French and British officers referred to the Americans as "our Italians" during the campaign in North Africa.

The U.S. Army transformed itself into a modern, professional fighting force through its service schools. The Army's concept of war was heavily influenced by its greatest generals up to that point in time: Grant and Lee. Since Grant won, his influence was stronger in the Army. Americans tried to emulate his approach to war by trying to use artillery in a head-on confrontation in an effort to destroy the enemy. Although Grant's influence was predominate, there were generals like George S. Patton, Jr. and John S. Wood, who were swayed by Lee's legacy of maneuver for oblique attack. It is then no surprise that the only part of the U.S. Army that the Germans respected was the artillery and that Patton was the general they feared the most.

Given this overall effort of trying to destroy the enemy with a mass of shells, logistics was extremely important to the Americans. Indeed, Weigley devotes two chapters to the role that logistics played in slowing down the allied advance. The Germans, as a result, had enough time to regroup and prevent an allied breach of the Reich. Supply shortages became critical during the Battle of the Bulge, when U.S. units began to run out of ammunition.

Weigley's portrayal of Eisenhower is not quite as harsh. He had a talent at getting people to work together. Ike, however, vacillated on several strategic decisions. He also treated allied armies as being interchangeable entities. Weigley's Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery is a bold and creative leader, given the severe manpower problems the British faced at this point in the war. Monty, however, had little strategic vision and inflamed national tensions in the allied command with his public belittling of the Americans. Patton is treated as a brilliant, but able general.

Like many other military historians, Weigley argues against claims that President Franklin D. Roosevelt won the war but lost the peace. He, however, makes this contribution not with an emphasis on strategy, but on quality. Many historians have argued that alternative strategies would not have avoided the Cold War. Weigley, instead, contends that without the Soviets the Americans could never have beaten a force as good as the Wehrmacht.

There are two shortcomings in this impressive study. Weigley presents the Germans as monolithic. The three German land forces--the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS, and the Luftwaffe paratroopers--did not fight in the same fashion as one another. Also, he fails to take into account the effect that Hilter's purge, which followed the failed attempt on his life, had on the Wehrmacht. Many officers were arrested and executed after July 20, 1944. All in all, an impressive read with much merit.

Russell F. Weigley, a military historian at Temple University, used Freeman's classic Lee's Lieutenants as an inspirational model for his effort to produce a one-volume account of the Allied campaign in northwest Europe in 1944-1945. While Allied forces are addressed the main focus of this book concerns American strategy, doctrine and operations. Weigley's hypothesis is that American war-fighting doctrine called for a war of annihilation against enemy armies by means of a "power-thrust" with massed armies and material, but that the actual conduct of the campaign deviated from this doctrine. Furthermore, due to mistakes made in the War Department, Eisenhower was forced to fight with inadequate means and according to Weigley, the US had mobilized "just enough resources to win by a narrow margin."

Weigley's main hypothesis about the US "power-thrust" doctrine is similar to the modern-day Powell doctrine of massive force. Based upon study of the US Civil War and the First World War, American war planners envisioned overwhelming and destroying enemy armies by massive and sustained application of combat power. Unfortunately, Weigley concludes that this theory was undermined in reality by the coalition strategy and inadequate US military mobilization. The British, who were initially the senior partner in the alliance, preferred to avoid costly head-on battles against the main German armies in favor of indirect approach through the peripheries, like Italy and the Balkans. Yet even once the British acquiesced to an invasion of France, the lack of adequate forces inhibited the Allied campaign. Weigley states, that "the basic trouble was that the Anglo-American alliance had not given Eisenhower enough troops to carry it [Allied strategy] out safely," and the "mobilizing [of] a ninety-division army for the Second World War was not an altogether impressive performance for a superpower." Lack sufficient infantry replacements and a galling shortage of artillery ammunition in the Fall of 1944 greatly weakened the US armies at a critical point in the campaign. Lacking sufficient divisions, Eisenhower was unable to either mass his forces for a breakthrough or assemble a strategic reserve to deal with unexpected contingencies. When the Germans struck in the Ardennes in December 1944, the Americans were forced to throw in partly trained units and precious airborne infantry to stop tanks, exposing the 90-division army as a risky gamble.

Weigley's argument about inadequate resources bears serious consideration, but the argument is incomplete. While it is a fact that Eisenhower lacked an adequate number of divisions in late 1944, the reasons were due more to lack of strategic priorities rather than poor mobilization policies in Washington DC. Although President Roosevelt had called for a "Germany First" strategy - and the British concurred - the Allied chiefs of staff had violated this preference by not ruthlessly trimming secondary and tertiary theatres. While Eisenhower was scrambling to come up with adequate troops in the Fall/Winter of 1944, there were 6 US divisions in Italy and 26 in the Pacific. The British were even worse, committing only 12 commonwealth divisions to northwest Europe but leaving 5 divisions in Italy and several more in Burma. Slim's 14th Army in Burma was allowed to waste 18,000 high-quality infantrymen in the fruitless "Chindit" operations. If the Chiefs of Staff had adhered to the "Germany First" strategy, they would have ordered a defensive posture with residual forces in Italy and Burma and scaled back offensive operations in the Pacific. Thus the problem was not inadequate resources, but failure to reign in competing strategies and practice economy of force.

A positive feature of this work is the light it sheds on the virtually-forgotten operational-level US commanders of the Second World War, corps commanders such as Corlett, Haislip, Eddy and Middleton. Other than Bradley and Patton, most US wartime commanders tend to appear as ciphers, if at all. Despite the title, this book unfortunately misses the opportunity to present a study in command that would profile the US operational-level commanders. One issue that is apparent is the poor selection methods used to choose senior American commanders; George C. Marshall's famous list was a ridiculous method for a major power to select its combat leaders. Only Patton and Van Fleet of the 23 senior US combat commanders in northwest Europe had been wounded in action and many such as Bradley and Devers, had missed the First World War altogether. Patch, who lacked any combat experience, was chosen to command the 7th Army over the much-experienced Collins because Patch was a favorite of Marshall's. On the other hand, Marshall's whimsy excluded Van Fleet from senior command for most of the war, but Van Fleet went on to become a very successful combat leader in Europe and Korea.

Weigley also tends to nurture the shibboleth about German combat superiority by stating that, "the German army remained qualitatively superior to the American army, formation for formation" for most of the campaign in northwest Europe. While there were painful episodes in the bocage and the Huertgen Forrest of German forces inflicting heavy losses on US units, the argument of German tactical superiority does not square with the facts. In September 1944, the much-maligned US armor units were able to smash four German panzer brigades in two weeks in essentially even-odds combat. In December 1944, the thinly-spread and badly-bruised 28th Division was able to delay superior German armored forces in the early stages of the Battle of the Bulge. While the Germans were certainly better than the Americans at quickly rebuilding units from odds and ends, German tactical superiority was at best confined to the elite panzer units by 1944. Furthermore, American troops demonstrated improved tactical ability by late 1944, having learned many lessons in the previous six months. Weigley's conclusion that, "in the end, it was its preponderance of material resources that carried its army through to victory in World War II," is out of synch with his "army of emptiness" and "inadequate force" arguments.

Excellent book on the overall ground campaign in Europe during WWII and the generals involved. This book could have been a doctoral dissertation because of the numerous footnotes. It was meticulously researched. If nothing else it should be used a source for reference to other sources.

When Dwight Eisenhower rated his Lieutenant Generals in the beginning of 1945, he gave them the following rank; 1,2 Omar Bradley, Carl Spaatz, 3. Bedell Smith, 4. George Patton, 5. Mark Clark, 6. Lucien Truscott, 7. Jimmy Doolittle, 8. Walter Gerow, 9. Lawton Collins, 10. Alexander Patch, 11. Courtney Hodges, 12. William Simpson. There have been many books written some of the generals and particularly on Bradley and Patton, but there have been a dearth of popular books on the other generals that contributed to the victory in WWII. The author brings he rest of the generals into perspective.

This book is basically a excellent massive tome on the European Theatre in WWII within an overall backdrop of the generals involved in the ground campaign theatre; particularly on Bradley, Patton and Montgomery. (Because of the focus on the ground campaign there is scant reference to Spaatz and Doolittle.) He then delves into the corps commanders and how they implemented the tactics. If the book was just about the generals' attitudes, approach, and interaction it would have been one third as long.

The vast majority of the book is an objective account of the campaign but the author adds his subjective analysis that is some times critical and sometimes laudatory of the generals' actions. He recognizes the contribution of artillery arm of the army and the spotty success of airborne programs. He pays particular attention to the quality and strength of the Nazi Armies committed against the American Forces and the logistical, and manpower supply issues of the Allies and how it affected the offensive.

The maps added to the book seem to have been an afterthought. I used an atlas to follow all of the activity. Because of the amount of detail and quick pace, I also took notes to follow who was leading each army, corps, and division in the campaign. So much detail it was hard to focus on the character and thinking of the Generals involved.

Mr Weigley, a noted academic and author of several other books on WWII, has written an impressive summary of the closing months of the war in the west. This book is suitable for both interested new students and experienced readers for it contains a wealth of information and insight on a critical campaign. You will not only learn about the key events of the day but you will see how well key people did in prosecuting the war.

The author begins by explaining US war doctrine which was greatly influenced by General McNair. The doctrine was based primarily on our experiences in the Civil War and WWI and it ignores the realities of the strength and habits the Germans had shown since the start of the war and what the Soviets were showing since 1943. I found our war doctrine to be confused and outdated. After further discussion of the US and German armies, the author begins his operational coverage with the D-Day landings and diligently works his way to the German surrender in May 1945. The coverage is predominately American but from time to time the 21st Army Group is discussed. There is also much discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton and Montgomery but also of 20 other key commanders. The discussion involves their performance on the battlefield as well as how they got along with their fellow officers. There is also coverage on the usefulness of artillery and air power in support of the ground troops as well as an entity unto themselves.

This is the most complete, single source tactical summary I've been able to find. It shows the hardship of the landing and the first week moving off the beach, fighting through the hedgerows, St Lo, Operation Cobra, the drive through Brittany, Mortain, Falaise, the crossing of the Seine etc, etc. The Aachen-Hurtgen-Roer River campaigns was especially revealing and one of my favorites. The German determined resistance is shown as well. The analysis and criticism of Bradley, Hodges and Collins for their poor planning and shortsightedness of this campaign seemed warranted. Hodges and Collins are veterans of the Argonne Forest debacle of 1918; you would think they would avoid a second occurrence but they didn't. The loss of life in the Hurtgen was horrific and could have been less if our commanders were less obdurate and more thoughtful.

Included with the narrative are 23 full page maps showing the countryside but not detailed troop movements of each campaign discussed. There is an extensive 43 page Notes section and Index. There are photos of 23 commanders and a few other battlefield shots.

Though some reviewers disagreed with some of the author's analysis and judgments, I agreed with much of it. The poor utilization and coordination of infantry and armor, though it improved somewhat later, the refusal to upgrade our tanks, the general insistence of a wide front advance, the over cautious commanders and the mobilization of too few troops to Europe, the lack of a combined long term strategy for both Europe and the Pacific are legitimate concerns that needed to be addressed. However, I would temper the author's high appraisal of the German war readiness by late 1944-45. Though the Germans were still dangerous and still had amazing recuperative powers, the American fighting ability greatly improved as indicative in the defeat of the Germans in the Ardennes in December/January if not earlier in the breakout and pursuit of July/August period. And these Allied victories occurred even with a pronounced reduction of planned mobilization of troops.

There are 730 pages, excluding the Notes and Index, that pertain to the war. The operational coverage of the US engagements in the last year of the war in the west is very good and most readers will learn about the key commanders that prosecuted the war. If you're looking for a one volume summary of the fighting in western Europe in the last year of the war then this book is highly recommended.

I always wanted to read "Eisnhower's Lieutenants" and finally got round to it recently after several previous attempts. It's a hefty tome weighing in at some eight hundred-odd pages (took me about a month to get through it all this time) but it was well written and moved along at a steady clip. There is no photo section which would have been a great help. I would have liked to have been able to associate a face with each commander. Not having photos became a source of irritation once the author got down to discussing corps and division commmanders. I spent a good deal of time connecting names with faces on Wikipedia and Google. There are maps included and they're pretty good, certainly better than no maps at all. Not every village or town is indicated leaving the reader guessing at unit locations occasionally. It's also hard to tell rivers apart from boundaries and roads as the maps are black & white repros. Focus is on the operational level and the movements of corps, divisions, and brigade-sized combat teams. Surprisingly, it's not nearly as dry as one might think. Prof. Weigley kept the story moving in a smooth, logical, and easy-to-follow narrative. The editing was superb and I believe his assessment was very fair and evenhanded. Overall, this book is a solid and valuable piece of work. 4 out of 5 only because the maps could have been better and it could have benefitted from a photo section. That being said, I think the book is indispensible for any serious student of military history and reflects great credit upon Professor Weigley and the work he left behind.

This book was published in 1981, but stands the test of time very well. Professor Russell Weigley (RIP) from Temple University wrote a very detailed analysis of the Allied Leadership on the western front from 1944-45. Relying on the words of the principles from diaries and other official sources of the time, Weigley argues that the Allies won by weight of mass and material as opposed to a well executed strategy. He is clearly more impressed with the firepower, tactics and resistance of the German Wermacht than the US or British forces.

Whether or not you agree with Weigley, he certainly backs up his positions with facts, figures and dates. In addition to providing an overview of the Armies, he traces the battles of Normandy, liberation of France and conquest of Germany. I rated the book four stars - at times, it can bog down with this unit then did that or that unit attacked this unit, the maps could have been better.

Although Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, Bradley and others tried to paint a picture of harmony and cooperation during the war, of course, the facts are different. Huge egos, national interests and honest mistakes led to the war taking longer than perhaps it should have. Logistical problems after the landings of Normandy, exploiting the breakthrough better, the single thrust to conquer Germany vs. the broad front strategy, the capture of Berlin or not are key controversies covered.

Serious reading, must reading for all of those interested in the defeat of Germany, the coalition war of WW2. This book provides great insight into what happened and why. I highly recommend Eisenhower's Lieutenants.

This book details all the battles that the allies (French included, surprise, surprise) fought from D-Day to the German surrender. It's the best book with an overall perspective that I've read. The author, I feel, from all my reading, mostly biographies, is scrupulously fair in his assessments of the personalities involved. He gives credit where due and criticizes that which is justified.

I won't give a more in depth description because it's been done so well by other reviewers. I echo the cricism of the poor maps, a defect felt most strongly because of the detail the author provides about the strategy, battles and tactics. Also, given all the personalities identified and described, photos of them would be appreciated. The soft cover edition has a row of 14 photos on the cover but no identification is provided.

This book provides an excellent overview for the campaign in Western Europe from the Normandy landings to the fall of Berlin. Weigley focuses on the challenges faced by Eisenhower as he sought to manage the talent (and lack thereof) of his subordinates. Ike often found the feuding of his commanders as exasperating as the Germans themselves. Despite its emphasis on high-level command, the book is also quite useful in providing a reasonably detailed look at the significant operations making up the drive on Germany by the Western Allies.

This is one of the best books on the Allied European campaign. Weigley analyses almost all of the main issues of the campaign. Beginning with the tactics and strategies that the opposing sides used, he goes on to the weaponry, and of course the battles themselves. While he doesn't get into the how the soldiers felt etc., he does give the main battles alot of detail going down to the regiment action many times. The main drawback of the book is that the maps are poor and if you don't have a good picture of the battles before you read the book it is hard to follow the book. I also found that because of the book goes down to the regiment, it took a couple of readings to understand it. The main asset of the book is that Weigley put alot of original analysis into the book. As far as the Montgomery controversy goes, Weigley is quite even handed. He appreciates Monty's abilities, but doesn't accept all of Monty's claims at face value. If you have already read other books about WW II like Wilmot's Victory in Europe or Bradley's memoirs, this is a great follow up.