From Library Journal
This history might be read as a conservative counterpart to Stanley Karnow's Vietnam (LJ 10/1/83). Morrison argues that U.S. defeat in Vietnam was the product of an unrealistic fear of China and the Soviet Union, resulting in a strategy of reaction and attrition. Civilian authorities, especially MacNamara, insisted on "micromanaging" the war. Military commanders were unwilling to back their doubts by resigning. Ill-advised U.S. attempts at nation-building kept South Vietnam from developing its own identity. Morrison is better at articulating positions than supporting them. He never proves his key point that China and Russia were bluffing. His critique of the war's conduct too often depends for support on descriptions of battlefield heroism or sacrifice. Pathos, however, is no substitute for analysis.
- Dennis E. Showalter, Colorado Coll., Colorado SpringsCopyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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