Customer Reviews

Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II

5 star:		(26)
4 star:		(24)
3 star:		(7)
2 star:		(6)
1 star:		(4)

 

 

Embracing Defeat is an authoritatively researched and beautifully written account of the U.S. occupation of Japan by a leading specialist on World War II, Japan and the U.S.-Japan relationship. This is a work that pulls no punches. Like no earlier study, it brings to the fore the ironies and contradictions of the era and casts fresh light on several of the great political issues of the era: the making of Japan's postwar constitution, U.S.-Japan relations, the reconstruction of economy and society, the role of Japan in the making of the U.S. order in Asia, and the role of MacArthur. It also offers the first cultural history of the occupation.It is particularly valuable in bringing out Japanese contributions to shaping occupation outcomes. Embracing Defeat is a pleasure to read.Dower takes the reader on a tour that reveals ambiguity, irony, fallibility, vitality, dynamism, messianic fervor, theatre of the absurd, the world turned upside down, fall and redemption, flotsam and jetsam on a sea of self-indugence, cynical opportunism, top-to-bottom corruption, delicacy and degeneration, despondency and dreams, tragedy and farce, boggling fatuity, and carnival, to mention a few of the polarities that run through this beautifully written and astute volume.

This book is essential reading for those interested in the history of Japan as well as for those with an interest in how Japanese society came to be what it is today. While I am not qualified to comment on its historical scholarship, it certainly seemed very solid to me - the author's documentation is thorough and impressive and his treatment is painstaking and precise. It certainly rings true.

However, my sense was that the book started off as an excellent read and then began to drag somewhere after the first 200 pages. While I have no doubt that the latter half of the book is as accurate and important a history as the first half, it seemed to make for less compelling reading. The first third or so of the book concentrated primarily on the societal impact of the Japanese surrender and its immediate aftermath - and I found it absolutely fascinating. The latter portions of the book dealt more with political issues, including a very thorough treatment of how the occupying forces (i.e. the US under MacArthur) drafted and pushed through the new Japanese Constitution. Very interesting, but in my opinion not as compelling as the early material in the book.

In summary, if you are interested in the history of Japan and/or World War II this book has to be on your reading list. A very impressive piece of work.

As a company commander in far SW Honshu and Kyushu I would say Prof. Dower's scholarly work widely missed the mark when he attempted to discuss the life of the Army man in Japan. Occupation life in Tokyo and the rest of Japan were entirely different. Dower makes it sound very cushy. He has a photo of a Chief Petty Officer in Tokyo sitting down with his wife and children at family dinner. The Chief has on his full uniform, the children are scrubbed and brushed, the boys wear neckties and behind them are two Japanese maids in kimono and obi. As an officer commanding 200 men, I had no maid, our messhall had no maids, meals were served cafeteria style. Our enlisted men were pampered by Japanese who served as KPs. Instead of peeling potatoes, my men and officers were entirely free to perform training and reconnaissance missions. In that part of Japan I never saw homeless people squatted on the sidewalks, I never saw people who looked starved or in rags, I never saw the labor unions demonstrating. My company lived in the country 40 miles from division headquarters. There were no bowling alleys, there were no movies. We did have an E.M. club with slot machines and on occasion we used those profits to hire a Japanese show, a magician, a very unsophisticated musical with dancers. In a small nearby town in Shimane Ken there was as best described, a Japanese beer joint; this place had no girls but it did have a Wurlitzer juke box and served very cold, excellent Japanese beer that we paid for. After I was in Japan almost a year I was allowed a vacation to Tokyo and to see friends in Sendai. Tokyo was like a different world. There was the Ernie Pyle Theater, there was traffic, the Ginza was exciting but it in no way compared to the little town with railroad station located 4 miles from our isolated camp. Sendai was 10 times larger than our town but with little to offer for entertainment. So, in my view, the professor's reporting of the Occupation Forces was clearly distorted unless you lived in Tokyo. His reporting on politics and personalities in Tokyo was well researched but Tokyo was NOT the occupation. Harlan G. Koch

Dower's book has been widely praised among Japan hands and that admiration is justly accorded. He gives a balanced account of the American occupation of Japan and makes often provocative, though well thought out points that have often been neglected in earlier accounts of this period in the Japan-U.S. relationship. His thoughts on the emperor's war responsibility and the dubious nature of war crimes trials are especially salient. Moreover, being something of a fan of Japanese pop culture, I found his discussion of how popular media of the time reflected evolving Japanese attitudes to be fascinating. The only place where this lacks for me is that he doesn't really go enough into broader diplomatic questions about the Japan-U.S. relationship. For those like me who like to read several books at the same time, I would suggest that one read Shaller's ALTERED STATES: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SINCE THE OCCUPATION concurrently with Dower's book to get a more robust assessment of that issue. Nonetheless, for anyone interested in Japan, this is essential reading.

This book gives quite a lot of information concerning the motives of both MacArthur's post-war occupation and of the Japanese government as well as the thoughts and condition of the Japanese populace. Dower provides a very convincing argument the the Emperor was excused from prosecution as a war criminal, and explains why the U.S. helped cover up his probable guilt. His book is one of the first popular book which addresses crimes committed by some of the occupation forces. There is a wealth of information in this book which should interest any serious student of modern Japanese history. It is not likely to be of a lot of interest to those without an interest in the post-war Japan.

'Embracing Defeat' is a Pulitzer prize winning portrait of Japanese society after the defeat in WW2. It is a wide ranging survey, which, despite some guiding themes, often feels more like a collection of essays than a unified work.

There are, I think, several questions of great interest to the contemporary reader about Japan. One would probably be most interested in learning about how Japan dealt with the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; how Japan turned from a racist, imperialist country into a democratic and pacifistic one; and how Japan not only recovered from the economic devastation of the war, but finally became one of the world's leading powers.

Strangely, Professor Dower seem to give peripheral attention at best to the first and third question, and pays most attention to the second, as well as to minuet study of the interactions between the US occupation force and the Japanese population. He also focuses mostly on the early years of the occupation, up to 1949 or so, as if a chapter or two on the outbreak of the cold war were planned but later discarded.

Much of the book is 'social history' - a depiction not so much of the leading characters and figures, but of sociological and economic trends. All too often, Dower fall into the trap of this kind of writing - describing things that, for any observer with the slightest knowledge of the society, would be patently obvious. Who could fail to anticipate poverty and corruption in a country devastated by war? Given the existence of rationing, every one who ever took any economic course can predict the appearance of a black market. And obviously, a country that lost millions of its young population in war would pay more attention to its own casualties than to those of the former enemies.

One of the great advantages of social history is that it lends itself to quantitative, statistical analysis. Surprisingly, Dower hardly ever mentions public polls, and rarely attempts to quantify his observations about opinions as expressed in media articles. His use of economic statistics is only somewhat better. There is an old historian's maxim which goes "don't guess, try to count, and if you can't count, admit that you're guessing". Unfortunately, Dower fails to conform. I think that his analysis is robbed of much of its power because of this.

The central theme of the book is the paradoxes of 'Democracy from Above' - the US enforced an authoritarian rule to make people free. It is' of course an interesting paradox, but Dower's exploration of it is only as good as the specific topics in which he engages.

By far the best part of the book deals with American 'wedge strategy', the attempt to distinguish between the Emperor and the military government headed by Tojo. Most of part 4, dealing with the wedge strategy and the formation of the Japanese constitution are nothing short of breathtaking, as they explore the intrigue and politics of occupied Japan, and of Japan vis a vis the United States and the world. The image of McArthur, strangely aloof from Japanese culture, and yet also admired and dedicated for change, is an intriguing and well realized one.

Also interesting is Dower's report on (and especially criticism of) the War Crime trials. Although I was left unconvinced that the Japanese would have done a better job judging the war criminals themselves, it is a powerful demonstration of the great problematic nature of international law, which is in essence, as Dower calls it, Victor's Justice.

Ultimately, though, it is hard to see a clear plan in the book, and Dower's afterward, in which he attempts to pull everything together, feels shallow (but interesting). In it he for the first time engages fully the economic leap forward Japan took in the 1960s. Dower argues that the key to Japan's industrialization lies in the '15 years war', starting with the commencement of hostilities with China in 1931. Japan in the second half of the twentieth century, having renounced its militarism, came to excel in the other field open to it - economics.

For people who, like me, are trying to understand how Japan became the leading economic power it is today and how other countries could learn from its example. Dower's book supplies no answer. Its failures of narrative prevent it, in my opinion, from reaching the status of a classic. Yet for all its faults, Embracing Defeat is an interesting, informative and readable study of Japan after the war.

John Dower's recent offering is a lively page-turner as well as an all-embracing account of MacArthur's presidency after WWII. It deals with almost every aspect of Japanese society following the cessation of hostilities and then goes on to chart how life changed over the course of the Occupation. It's sympathetic look at Japanese society and doesn't shy away from pointing the finger at US hypocrisy when the Cold War changed American attitudes towards Japan's burgeoning political parties - particularly those on the left of the political spectrum. Embracing Defeat is a very, very good book.

Some reviewers believe that Dower has whitewashed the fact that Japan never publicly admitted its war guilt. I don't think this is fair since it is common knowledge that they haven't - at least as a state. There seems little point in repeating what everyone already knows.

Where Dower does break new ground is his analysis of why there has never been an admission of guilt. A deal was done to pin the blame on the militarists and absolve Hirohito and, by extension, his loyal subjects too. Moreover, at the time, it was widely touted that Japan had been defeated by science and not the Allied forces. The Americans were just as guilty as the Japanese when it came to spreading disinformation about who was to blame.

On a wider scale, Embracing Defeat looks at a vast array of topics. We see how society changed once the Emperor declared an end to the war. Japanese became entrepreneurial almost over night after spending almost twenty years as yes-men to the militarists. There was a burgeoning of political, artistic and lifestyle movements that formed the basis for today's world-wide love affair with Japanese comics and cartoons. Dower takes us through the formation of the new constitution and leaves you fully congiscent as to why the 'Convoy' system so derided by Washington is in fact an American creation that the Japanese have never tried to change.

Then there's an account of the war trials where Tojo went through the trap door. In Dower's opinion, the show trials were cleansing act of revenge without a proper trial or any attempt to round up those really responsible. This is probably correct, although some readers will find it hard to stomach given the staggering atrocities committed by Japanese forces throughout the Pacific Rim.

The one area that is badly lacking, however, is economics. Japan experienced chronic hyperinflation before the Pacific War and remains highly reliant on imports of almost every raw material. The economy was absolutely knackered by 2nd September 1945. Its railways and maritime capabilities had been almost totally destroyed.

So, how did Japan manage to stabilise its economy and then go on to become the world's second largest economy? I know since I'm an financial economist in Asia. But most readers probably aren't and I'm sure they'd like to know. Dower makes a stab at it, but this part reads more like an add on written by a historian with little knowledge of the Dismal Science.

Still, I really liked Embracing Defeat for its broad sweep coverage of MacArthur's reign. Four stars.

Dower describes the pathos of Japan's defeat and its difficult post-war journey to remake itself and its society - the backside of WWII in the Pacific. In the 1860's Emperor Meiji embarked upon a similar, but deliberate, journey. In this case, it was ignominiously thrust upon the Japanese. Dower uses a prodigious amount of detail and cultural insight. Deeply researched and well written, it's far ranging and often poignant as it captures the post-surrender chaos and struggles. It is also pragmatic and evenhanded.
The opening chapters are a tour of a defeated nation. The Japanese, a once proud people, were utterly crushed by the Allies. In the war's waning days they were clearly on their last legs, and like a boxer staggered by an overwhelming opponent, they were carrying on the fight by sheer will. "In this all-consuming milieu, the immediate meaning of 'liberation' for most Japanese was not political but psychological. Surrender...liberated them from death. Month after month, they had prepared for the worst; then, abruptly, the tension was broken. In an almost literal sense they were given back their lives. Shock bordering on stupefaction was a normal response to the emperor's announcement, usually followed quickly by an overwhelming sense of relief. But that sense of relief all too often proved ephemeral. Exhaustion and despair followed quickly in its train - a state of psychic collapse so deep and widespread that...[t]he populace, it was said, had succumbed to the 'kyodatsu condition.'" (88-89)
Our occupation was quintessentially American with a missionary zeal. "For all its uniqueness of time, place, and circumstance - all its peculiarly 'American' iconoclasm - the occupation was in this sense but a new manifestation of the old racial paternalism that historically accompanied the global expansion of the Western powers. Like their colonialist predecessors, the victors were imbued with a sense of manifest destiny. They spoke of being engaged in the mission of civilizing their subjects. They bore the burden (in their own eyes) of their race, creed, and culture. They swaggered, and were enviously free of self-doubt." (211-212). Dower includes a fascinating discussion of an interesting dilemma facing America: how to break away from the racist vilification of the Japanese by wartime propaganda and now show that the Japanese could measure up to sustaining a democratic form of government.
For the most part this book is exactly as the title states: how Japan embraced defeat. There is precious little directly about how the US administered Japan. It is not devoid of it, however. There is fascinating insight on how and why MacArthur used the Emperor's position during the war and during the Occupation (see chapter 7, especially 282-283 and 286). In the days immediately following surrender, "An alien from another planet...might easily have concluded that Emperor Hirohito had ascended the throne in August 1945 just in time to end a terrible war, and that no one's feelings other than his mattered" (287). Also, one gets a sense of the breadth and depth of the American occupation and the immensity of MacArthur from the discussion of SCAP's censorship policies.
The discussion about the Tokyo war crimes trials is also quite illuminating. "[The proceedings] called attention to the fact that the recent war in Asia had taken place not among free and independent nations, but rather on a map overwhelmingly demarcated by the colors of colonialism...The tribunal essentially resolved the contradiction between the world of colonialism and imperialism and the righteous ideals of crimes against peace and humanity by ignoring it. Japan's aggression was presented as a criminal act without provocation, without parallel, and almost entirely without context." (470-471). The trials did produce one star - the Indian Justice Rodhabinod Pal (one of only two Asians on the 11-justice Allied tribunal). He had harsh things to say about the way the Allies, and in particular the US, prosecuted the war (for example, "in the war in Asia the only act comparable to Nazi atrocities was perpetrated by the leaders of the United States" in their decision to use nuclear weapons (473-474) - events still pregnant with controversy). He also viewed as hypocritical the Allies' indignation over Japan's aggressive aggrandizement, as their militant expansion was characterized. While I disagree, clinging to my sense of Western values, I can see how those on the receiving end of the West's moral largesse could embrace his argument.
In the months preceding the war in Iraq members of the Bush Administration reportedly were reading this book for pointers. (The extended quote from Bonner F. Fellers on 282-283 could have been written in 2003 for Ba'athist Iraq rather than in 1944 for Imperial Japan.) There are parallels between the two conflicts, to be sure. An obvious similarity is the US's role in post-war Iraq. "From start to finish, the United States alone determined basic policy and exercised decisive command over all aspects of the occupation" (73). It will be the same in Iraq vis-à-vis the other Coalition powers, not to mention the UN. An obvious dissimilarity is the situation after hostilities ended. Total war left the Japan and the Japanese devastated. Iraq was the opposite. This is the first time in history, as far as I know, that an invading force toppled a regime with minimal death and destruction of the civilian populace and the nation's infrastructure.
In the end, this book promises hope. As we look towards an uncertain future with anti-Americanism growing and our War on Terror stretching in front of us indefinitely, we can draw hope from WWII-era Japan. Here was a nation with virulent militarism playing the cultural and race card. We destroyed them and they eventually became fast allies, even if born only of convenience. So it will be, hopefully, in Iraq; maybe (sans the hostilities) in dar al-Islam in general. We've done it before; and for all of our mistakes then and to come, we can do it again.

This book is an important and valid addition to the WWII genre. There are countless volumes on the war in the "Pacific Theatre", but considerably few on the impact of defeat that has essentially made Japan into what it is today, and this book is as good as any to begin that journey.

I feel that some reviewers have been rather unfair about Dower's supposed bias, due in no small part to his having a Japanese-descent wife. However, in my opinion you would have to miss a major portion of this book in order to come to that conclusion.

Dower, at no point in time, made ANY excuses for Japanese agression and the atrocities committed towards POWs and the civilians in their occupied lands. In fact, he laments again and again about how the Japanese eventually came to very conveniently remember their war-dead without actually remembering their crimes as well. He also clearly feels that the late Emperor Hirohito got "off the hook" way too easily, and should've borne a substantial portion of the responsibility for Japan's actions throughout the war.

What some readers are uncomfortable with, I believe, is the fact that Dower has very meticulously analyzed the period of occupation by the Allies (more specifically, the Americans) following Japan's surrender. There are some of us who believe so strongly in the fallacy that the Allies could do no wrong that we simply do not want to confront the victors' hypocrisies and inconsistencies when they're pointed out to us.

That is a dangerous and myopic viewpoint. Six decades after WWII, I would have hoped that modern readers would be enlightened enough to be able to discuss topics like that without being entirely driven by the "us versus them" mentality. In times of peacetime minimal propoganda, we should be able to thank Dower for bringing this important topic to light without screaming that he is "on the side of the Japs". He certainly is not. What some readers are uncomfortable with is that Dower is simply not on ANYONE'S side, per se, but was presenting us with a thorough and objective look at the Allied Occupation; its ups and downs, the subsequent Japanese reactions, and the impact their policies have made in shaping modern Japan.

In fact, before I started this book, I too thought that it was going to be disappointingly biased towards the Japanese (based on some of the reviews I had read), but it turned out not to be the case at all. I commend John Dower for his far-sighted objectivity and unwavering committment to presenting a well-researched, highly readable and important work.

This fine book is a thematic exploration of the experience and consequences of the American occupation of Japan. Dower is concerned with understanding how Japanese society, at all levels, experienced the occupation, how the Americans perceived Japan and the reasons for specific American actions, and how the occupation set the stage for the subsequent development of Japanese society. Readers should be aware that this is not a conventional narrative history. Rather, Dower moves through the occupation discussing issues thematically. The best way to get the maximum benefit of reading this book is to review the relevant narrative history in a overview text of modern Japanese history. Both James McClain's and Marius Jansen's recently published books provide concise and illuminating narratives about this period.
Dower begins by discussing the aftermath of the war and the expectations of the victors. It is clear that from the outset, the American occupation would be based on a paradox. The Americans wished to construct a democratic society but also wished to impose, without discussion, their views of how to conduct democracy. The Americans also made the decision, different from the initial occupation in Germany, to govern indirectly through the existing Japanese state. This was convenient in the short run but reinforced the importance of the central bureaucracy, which had already become increasingly important during the pressures of managing a wartime economy. Many of the Americans, notably MacArthur, his principal subordinates, and many of the important figures in Washington, viewed Japan as an 'Oriental' state populated largely by slavish subjects and needing paternalistic guidance. This was true even for experienced officials with considerable experience in pre-war Japan. In fact, virtually all of the important changes imposed in the early years of the occupation were embraced by the Japanese. Land reform, a new legal code granting women greater rights, functioning labor unions, the destruction of paternalistic rights, guaranteed civil rights, and a reformed electoral system, were imposed by the Americans but implemented enthusiastically by Japanese. Large segments of Japanese society had chafed under the authoritarianism of the preceding decades and found the new system liberating. Even the new constitution, written quickly by a group of idealistic, younger Americans, was embraced by the Japanese. During the initial years of the occupation, the Japanese ceased to be Imperial subjects and became citizens.
The effects of the American occupation were, however, mixed. Particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War and the hardening of antagonism with the Soviet Union, the Americans became increasingly concerned about leftist movements. American censorship and pressures against what were perceived as threatening movements were often harsh and irrational. The Americans preferred governing through conservative politicians and the powerful central bureaucracy. The Americans often utilized informal censorship and informal control of objectionable movements. This style of government encouraged conservative conformity and would have lasting impact. Other American actions had long term negative consequences. The American decision to proceed with a relatively small number of show trials about war crimes contributed to Japanese reluctance to face the aggressive and often criminal activities of the pre-war and wartime Japanese state. The often farcial efforts of the Americans and conservative politicians to shield the Emperor from criticism contributed to this problem.
Dower also has a very interesting section on the effect of the occupation on the Japanese economy. The relatively centralized direction of the Japanese economy is often stated to be a distinctive feature of Japanese culture. Dower shows that this system is a relatively recent phenomenon with strong roots in efforts to centralize direction of the wartime economy. During the occupation, American actions would wittingly and unwittingly reinforce these centralizing tendencies. In addition, many prominent Japanese economists and planners, quite a few of whom had been purged from Universities and public life during the war, were leftists sympathetic to central direction. The new found, and American instigated, freedoms of the post-war period allowed these individuals to re-enter public life.
An additional attractive feature is the presence of a number of revealing photographs. See page 55 for a devastating image of the consequences of failed Japanese imperialism.