Customer Reviews

The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century

5 star:		(7)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(6)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Almost everyone agrees the current U.S. ascendancy in global politics is temporary. Even conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer says Americans should enjoy their current geopolitical dominance because it will not last. In "The End of the American Era," Charles Kupchan also thinks that American dominance is temporary and believes a strategy is needed by which the U.S. transfers some of its global responsibilities to other emerging powers.

He begins his book by addressing the shortcomings of other recent major conceptual frameworks of global politics as conceived by Frances Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Paul Kennedy and Robert Kaplan (who Kupchan groups together), John Mearsheimer, and Thomas Friedman. The flaw in all of these thinkers, according to Kupchan, is that none of them have recognized the most important fundamentals of the present global system, which is America's current overwhelming power and the fact that its hegemony cannot last.

If the U.S. is in decline, who will take its place? Kupchan believes a united Europe is rising and that East Asia (China and Japan) is not far behind. In this global environment, and because of U.S. domestic tendencies towards isolationism, he thinks a grand strategy is necessary for the U.S. to smoothly make the transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one. While Kupchan is not entirely clear about the timing of this transition, in at least one area of the book he says Europe is about a decade away from forming a credible alternative axis of world power and East Asia about three decades away. Other countries - mostly Russia, sometimes India - are also mentioned in places throughout the book as potential poles, but without much detail.

Europe is the main object of Kupchan's attention. According to his argument, Europe's ever-growing economic and political solidarity will soon naturally give rise to geopolitical power. If the U.S. cedes some of its power to Europe now in preparation of that development, a healthy relationship will grow between the two; if not, then we can expect a bumpy ride on the way to multipolarity.

While I agree with some of Kupchan's premises, such as the inevitable relative decline of U.S. power and the likelihood that the new world will be multipolar, I disagree with both his vision of what that new world will look like as well as his suggestion for a grand U.S. strategy on how to handle it.

Contrary to Kupchan's thinking, Europe has neither the will nor the military to become a geopolitical force within the next decade. If economics and some shared values were all that was required, Europe would have become an alternative axis of power rivaling the U.S. years ago. Instead, as the crisis over the U.S.-led war in Iraq makes clear, if the Europeans are ever going to be a geopolitical force, they will need institutions to make common and *binding* diplomatic and defense policies that override the national priorities of their constituent states. And even if they have these institutions, the money will have to be found to build a first-rate military. With many European nations heavily in debt, and a demographic crisis looming on the continent, where will this money come from? Kupchan brushes aside these difficulties.

Europe's common military does not have to rival America's, but it must have power projection capabilities to both Eastern Europe and the Middle East. If it doesn't, then Europe will still require the United States to enforce stability in those areas using its military power when other measures have failed. After all, a resurgent Russia might still haunt the future of Eastern Europe, and Europe, as a whole, is far more dependent on Middle East oil than the U.S. Nothing we see today shows Europe will be ready to handle those responsibilities any time soon.

The less said about Kupchan's thoughts on East Asia, the better. His brief sections on the region and the countries in it are surprisingly thin, devoid of fresh thinking, or even proof he did anymore than just remedial reading on the area. What's more, his vision of how U.S. strategy fits into the region is shockingly naïve, envisioning the United States leading the way towards a sort of united East Asia by - among other things - helping Japan and China to forsake old enmities. That's not strategy; that's fantasy. Even Kupchan admits as much.

There is a common theme to this book. No matter what the region or area - whether it's to Europe, East Asia, or international institutions - Kupchan's strategy calls for the U.S. giving up power. This seems an odd strategy for what is still by far the most powerful country in the world and what is likely to remain the most powerful country in the world for the foreseeable future. Wouldn't a realist at least call for giving up power in one region where it is less needed so that it could be at least partially redeployed somewhere else where it is more needed? Instead, Kupchan seems to think that U.S. power is a cheap currency to be spent on dubious schemes such as pushing Chinese/Japanese reconciliation.

By showing he has only one general prescription to fit every region's future, Kupchan signals he is less interested in seeing the shifting balance of world power as it is, and putting forth a strategy to deal with it, than he is in pushing an ideology of world power that he feels comfortable with. The final section of the book gives a clue as to why, showing he is highly downbeat about America's future. Interestingly enough, having dismissed Robert Kaplan's vision of a splintering world divided between north and south, he buys into Kaplan's view of the United States as a splintering country. Kupchan believes that even as the U.S. helps the rest of the world come together (Europe and Russia/China and Japan/north and south), regions within the states themselves are destined to grow apart. This ending is a contradictory and absurd coda to an already faltering book.

Everyone interested in world affairs should read Mr. Kupchan's brilliant analysis of America's future challenges to its position and role in the world.

One thing should be clarified based on comments/reviews I have heard or read about this book: in my opinion it is not about what country or set of countries will replace the United States as the only world superpower, it is about how the U.S. should accompany and help shape a more stable world as new world powers rise.

In response to a previous review:

As a European citizen, I believe that the E.U. will be a superpower (but not the only one) once its constitutional foundations have been laid.

Contrary to the author of a previous review full of clichés and misunderstandings about the EU, I know that the EU has the economical, technological and human potential to compete on the world stage with the US (and anybody else in the world). However, I do not see how the EU could replace the US as the only superpower: it has neither the will nor the interest to do so.

Anyway, in 50 years the US will probably have less to worry about the EU than about China, India or, why not, some kind of new pan-Arabic federation ... depending on how it shapes the world today.

The advent of Europe and America's reluctant internationalism (followed by a withdrawal from international affairs) are going to be the defining moments of this century. America ought to be come to grips with this reality and prepare for the inevitable, by ensuring that no major war breaks out as a result of this emerging multipolarity.

That is the image of the future conjured up by Charles Kupchan, a professor at Georgetown University, in the "End of the American Era." The thesis is built on a historical journey, which turns out to be both an asset and a liability -- at times, history captures the reader and elucidates contemporary trends; often, the historical narratives seem irrelevant, over-emphasized or under-analyzed (i.e. distorted to support a hypothesis rather than used to form one). And, the recitation of obvious or familiar points is likely to bore those with a sound background in foreign policy.

If the geopolitical image painted in this book is interesting, the geo-economic one is less so. That is mainly because Professor Kupchan has spent little to no time analyzing economics -- either in their own might, or in their relation to international politics. Where economic analysis is found, it is usually too superficial to impress.

The books' recommendations -- broadly speaking, multilateralism and humility in conducing foreign policy -- are neither novel nor counterintuitive. The highpoint rests in the rationale Professor Kupchan provides for his policies: the inevitability of America's relative decline and the need for the United States to ensure a peaceful transition rather than try hold on to its power indefinitely. Whether anyone in Washington takes these ideas at heart is a whole other story, especially since implementing his ideas could be a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The End of the American Era deals with a crucial and very timely task. It endeavors to find a 'grand strategy' for the United States in an era of power transition in years or decades to come.

It is by and large about peaceful change of international order, which is highly going to be shaped by American policies. Kupchan's work is remarkable as it makes an effort to bridge theory, history and present time. It draws attention to power or balance of power in international politics. This realist base, however, is also complemented by liberal notions of strategic restrain and the need for international cooperation. In this sense, Kupchan's analysis is based upon a mixture of realist-liberal framework. Moreover, Kupchan makes several policy recommendations for current American foreign policy. He criticizes unilateralist drives of the Bush administration, which lead to counter-balancing behavior against the United States by major powers in international system. For this reason, the author recommends American foreign policy elites to follow strategic restrain for the sake of peaceful change of international order as well as the on behalf of American interests.

This book is a well-written and timely one on American foreign policy and it is highly recommended for students of international relations and American foreign policy. Alike, this book is recommended for the informed public. No doubt, Kupchan's work seems to remain as an important key to understand the potential implications of the current Iraqi crisis on the relations between the United States and other major powers.

We all know the first, most basic lesson from history - civilizations rise and fall. There are several parameters that will ensure that a powerful nation secures its supremacy for a prolonged period of time - but the key is enlightened leadership. How is it that one of our leading accounting firms whose founder worked to the highest ethical standards fell during the Enron era? How is that just one American President could turn the world's biggest creditor nation into the world's biggest debtor nation in just eight short years. How is it that Japan lost its supremacy in a decade? Surely the answer lies in having enlightened leadership and a system that ensures that a steady succession of enlightened leaders take the helm and are ready in the wings whenever the call arises. Our present system of electing the leader who can blow his own trumpet the loudest has the seeds of self-destruction. My hero in this respect is Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, the Roman General who tilled the land in retirement until the empire was threatened and he was twice called to the dictatorship of Rome in 458 and 439 BC. In 458 BC he defeated the Aequians in a single day, and after entering Rome in triumph and with large spoils returned to his farm. No blowing his own trumpet and holding onto power by this general!

A wise nation does a simple SWOT analysis - strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats - and formulates a strategy to ensure that it holds on to power. Kupchan reminds us of Churchill's policy in response to the German threat prior to the First World War when, over much opposition, he brought the British fleet back to defend the homeland. But the British leadership was not so enlightened prior to the Second World War; fortunately Churchill was there waiting in the wings. "The End of the American Era" is primarily about the lessons from history applied to present day America and as you might imagine from the title the author gives a thumbs down on the degree of enlightenment of the American leadership today. The author points out that there are already signs that American preponderance and the stability it breeds are slipping away. American internationalism was at its high-water mark during the last decade but is now on the wane despite that fact that today's problems require a multilateral approach and reliance on international institutions. Terrorism poses a collective threat and requires a collective response. The tragic events of September 2001 served as a wake up call to America, alerting the country that the homeland is no longer inviolable and that the US would be wise to take greater interest in crucial foreign policy issues. The central challenge of the future will be the same as the past - managing relations between contending centers of power. Other concerns will pale in comparison to the dangers that will emerge if America believes that its primacy is here to stay. The US has unparalleled potential to shape what comes next but lacks a grand strategy; America is a great power adrift. Unfortunately, the intellectual initiative and institutional creativity of 1815, 1919 and 1945 are missing in Washington today. In addition, we do not have a clearly identified enemy but a much more elusive enemy in terrorism - an enemy schooled in guerrilla tactics where patience and tact are more useful weapons than military power.

Think tanks turn out work with a short shelf life while universities generate scholarship of little relevance to policy. What should America's new map look like? Is Fukuyama in The End of History right in that liberal democracy is taking the world by storm? Is Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order right that a struggle among Judeo-Christian, Islamic and Confucian civilizations is in the offing? Is Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and the Olive Tree right that globalization has changed the rules for good? In Kupchan's opinion each vision has its merits but all are wrong. The defining element of the global system is the distribution of power, not democracy, culture, globalization, or anything else. As the US withdraws from multilateral institutions in favor of unilateralism the vacuum will be filled by a new era of geopolitical rivalry. If history is a guide, the end of US primacy will bring with it a more unpredictable and unpleasant world.

It is impossible to predict your opponent's next move in chess, let alone predict moves and counter moves on the international scene. However, Kupchan has presented a convincing argument of how the future might unfold. Homeland security must not stand in the way of efforts to address the more dangerous challenge of the return to rivalry between the world's power centers. All this comes together in the final chapter with the closing sentence "It is now the task of those convinced by the warnings to get on with the difficult, but essential, duty of preparing for the end of the American era." This book has as its prime audience policy makers and decision-makers. Personally, I think every American voter should read this book and understand that voting for the person who blows his trumpet loudest is not going to put the most enlightened leader in the White House and without enlightened leadership we will most certainly see the end of the American era soon. Then it is likely to be a very ugly world.

Many US foreign policy experts have advanced their theses on the great power decline syndrome and more speciically their relevance in the American case. Two factors complicate the issue. Never in history was there any power that had the near absolute supremacy in the economic and miitary spheres as the United States, not even Rome. Charles Kupchan's book 'The end of the American era' is a bold attempt to present the issue in its proper perspective. He sides with the inevitable historical law that great powers must deline until a new power center/s arise either to replace it or to create a sort of cooperative arrangement that makes way for a multipolar world order. He rather opts for enlightened leadership that can truly guide the course of future international relations. His ingenuity lies in the fact that he takes into account some qualitiative changes in international politics that can create regimes suitable for multipolar management of the world order. The seed has long been laid by the American political perception by its founding fathers that precludes American hegemony in any form. That means that a unipolar domination is at variance with the march of democracy on a global scale. the need for other players is a sine-qua-non born of prevalent strategic realities.

Gautam Maitra
Author of 'Tracing the Eagle's Orbit: Illuminating Insights into Major US Foreign Policies since Independence'.

I just finished reading this book and I think its a fairly elaborate thesis on Kupchan's vision of what the future will look like and what it should look like (if the US follows his grand strategy as the epicentre of its foriegn policy). Kupchan heavily draws from historical comparisons and parallels, despite himself making clear the fact that history cycles but moves forward at the same time. This shortcoming notwithtanding, I think his predictions are as rational and have as much a probability of occurence as any reasonable assumption by an intelligent human. I agree with Kupchan that Europe will increasingly posture itself as a rival pole to US supremacy. Clearly the emergence of France, Germany and Russia as a rival pole in the Iraq situation highlights this fact. With homegrown and Russian military help coupled with economic might of a united Europe, it is not inconceivable to think that European military can rival that of the US by 2010. I also agree with Kupchan that US hegemony is but temporary and like all civilizations before it, will come to an end. The emergence of East Asia as yet another pole is another prediction of Kupchan. This is where I disagree with Kupchan. I think China and Japan will not forge an alliance to establish their collective might. The big question is - Will there develop an India-Russia-China axis or will Russia align itself more with Europe. In effect, I think the direction Russia will tilt in, will be the eventual deciding factor in the development of the main adversarial pole to the US. I think Japan will at best be a player in the sidelines. Geopolitics aside I think Kupchan makes some interesting points about economics and culture. I think most American people do not realize the fragility of the world economy, where is everything is based on speculative forces in the market. With huge deficits, China (and the rest of the world) is in effect financing the US government for now. The moment Asian and European countries stop investing in US treasuries and bonds, it will lead to very bad times for the US economy. And nobody knows if Europe will be there to pick up the pieces and establish hegemony. In any case I would have liked Kupchan to elaborate more on this aspect. I also disagree with his premise of the motivations of the terrorists. I think increasingly the term "terrorism" will be misapplied and used to quell legitimate democratic aspirations of non-state actors by professed nation states. As the distiction gets increasingly murkier, I think the impact and power of non-state actors will rise and increase the chaos that already exists in the world. In any case, I think this book is a valuable addition to any collection on contemporary foriegn policy.

Kupchan was about 2 years ahead of his time in publishing this book. When I say this I don't mean he was right in his predictions, but more that he beat the competition in writing a "Europe is next..." book. With so many text now bearing such titles as "United States of Europe" etc., it is easy to dismiss Kupchan as needless reading.

Although this may be so, his book gains more of its worth in his criticisms of past theorist of "grand strategy" then it is for his dubious prediction of the "next" superpower (the EU). I picked this book up around Christmas/New Years 2002. I was away from school and I had nothing to do, so I thought some light reading was in order.

Kupchan first discusses the "grand strategies" of past years, covering over all the favorites, from Nye, Fukuuyama, and Huntington. Of course, all these visions have something wrong with them and Kupchan points out some token things durring his first chapter. The United State will not have the ability to behave in a 'hegemonic' manner forever, thus, why not shape the world in a manner we would like it to be run when we're old feeble men (and women).

This is essentially Kupchan's theme throughout the entire text. It may very well be a wise course, however, I fail to see how Kupchan can determine accurately, in which manner the US is to lead its declining hegemonic power. It seems a bit absurd to criticize past grand strategies and then toute one yourself.

The grand strategy is really one thing, that is state planning. However, whereas we know state planning of the economy is a bad thing, it seems state planning of politics is not. Many times Kupchan discusses the "confusion" of the Clinton adminstration and then the even greater confusion of the Bush 2nd adminstration. This is all well and good, but confusion presumes that these administrations were behaving in some sort of grand strategic manner.

It would seem more likelly that these administrations behaved on a case by case basis. Kupchan points out how Bush 2nd at one point demanded Israeli withdrawl from the West bank, only to then state some time later that Ariel Sharon was a man of peace (p. 17).

Well, although what precise event Dr. Kupchan is referring to I am unsure, it seems that Bush's second response was prompted by some lack of resolve on the Palestinians side to prevent suicide bombing. This pattern is familiar to anyone who observes middle east politics.

Getting back to the main critique, one should observe that no wonderfully pre-planned grand strategy united the US, USSR, China, UK, and France. Certanily, if one were to ask a political "scientist" of the 1920s or 30s, I doubt he would have envisioned that such a grand alliance of nations would have ever formed.

The same goes for NATO, these institutions were reactions to events (many cases unforseen) and were not engineered institutions. If we look at history of certain planned institutions/agreements, we see that such entities rarely work properly and ultimitly fail. A good example is the Gold Standard/Bretton Woods peg systems. The Gold standard cease to work almost immediatly after it was implemented...,and the Bretton Woods system did not even last 30 years.

It seems that men rarely possess the facaulty to forsee all the possible changes that may occur in 10 year, much less 30 - 40 years. Thus, these grand strategies almost become inconsequential after several years their published.

Anyways, although Kupchan falls into this trap, one should not ignore some of the keen observations he makes in this book. He was one of the first that predicted the tran-atlantic rift would become more or less permenant. He was stating this at a time when Neo-cons were stating the "europeans will fall in line if we push hard enough."

Also, Kupchan's historical deconstruction and analysis is very intresting. Kupchan seems to believe we can use past events in history and sort of "graft" them onto contemporary politics. Although I doubt this is true, it makes for great reading. A wonderful analogy Dr. Kupchan makes is comparing the trans-atlantic rift to the split between Rome and Constantinople. I thought that his historical analogy was at the very least insightful as a paradigm if not in policy use.

Ultimitly, I don't agree with Kupchan's views on Europe (recent events with regards to the EU constitution lays credence to the skeptics), yet I can't say taht the book is horrible, thus, I give it 3/5. Its most certainly better then reading some of the ideological garbage comming out of some authors these days.

OK I will grant that Mr. Kupchan has a lot more experience than I. However, speaking as someone who travels frequently to Europe and spends a lot of time reading local newspapers and the IHT, and talking to both common folk and businesspeople, I just don't buy the proposition that the EU will join or displace the USA as a global superpower anytime soon.

First and foremost, Europe is almost permanently hobbled by the social welfare state and overregulation of business. It is expensive to hire workers and almost impossible to get rid of them when business turns down. As a result many large businesses are often reluctant to take on new business because unless they know it will sustain itself over time, they will be in a real pickle if that business goes away and they are stuck with unneeded employees, which are either impossible or at the very least, expensive to fire.

As a result, Europe has hobbled itself with its well-meaning social benefits and protections for workers. This is why you see chronic unemployment rates near or over 10%, even during the boom that ended in 2000. Unless Europe is willing to 'liberalize' its regulation of business, it simply will not have the economic vitality which in turn helps generate the influence and fortune it takes to turn an important world power into a superpower. It would take tremendous effort to change these laws and so far, while Europeans wish for a better economy, they are not willing to pay the price of giving up their protections and their generous welfare state. Any politician who attempts to do so, pays a heavy price - vigorous and determined opposition from labor and the left, who refuse to give an inch.

Beyond that, the EU simply is nowhere near the US in terms of military power and the ability to project it worldwide, and they are not going to make it up in 10 years or so even if they want to. Military power is of course one of the essential pillars of a superpower. It would take money, lots of it, for the EU to even begin to compete with the US. If the EU is unwilling to have more capitalism and less socialism, if it is determined to continue to devote so much of its resources to regulation and social welfare, I don't understand how the EU can ever afford to be an equal of the USA on the world stage.

I am not writing this as a laissez-faire capitalist or right-winger. I actually support the EU's values wholeheartedly. I wish the US had socialized medicine and a more comprehensive protection of society and of individual and worker's rights. But all this comes at a cost. I think the US has gone too far with individualism, and the EU has gone too far with statism and socialism.

Though I agree that all great powers eventually depart the world stage and that it's inevitable that someday this fate will befall the USA, and I agree that the current administration's determination to pursue unilateralism will surely backfire on us, I do not at all agree that the EU will supplant or stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the US anytime soon. The EU will be an economic power by virtue of its size but it is hobbled by over-regulation, over-taxation and too much socialism and for some time now it has shown that it does not have the will to change this course. If it ever does, then I will reconsider my assessment.

Kupchan boldly predicts the decline of Americanism - the passing of an era of America as the only superpower. He predicts the rise of Europe to counterweigh the United States in a bi-polar world.

Predicting the future is a risky business. Luckily, whereas those who made the right predictions are anxious to remind others, as for those who were way off, hardly anybody remembers or cares. This book, in my judgment, belongs to the latter heap.

It is true that America will not forever be far stronger than the rest of the world economically, militarily, technologically, and culturally. Not only is this unsustainable, it is simply not good for the America and for the world to have such an permanent and pronounced imbalance. But unless we screw up big time (and there are barbarians within the gate who try very hard to screw ourselves up!), America will be a strong leader for many generations. American should welcome a strong Europe, a strong Asia, and America should welcome any country or groups of country to be strong, as long as they are peaceful. That said, Europe can never be integrated like America, people who speak different languages and have deep differences in their culture will not function well under the same political and legal system except sustained by force, nor will they trust each other enough to give up their own defenses. On the other hand, the English-speaking world will always be a reliable alliance in times of crisis.

Drawing parallel from history to make future predictions surely sounds rational. However, historic parallels are more often than not superficial. The Roman Empire fell chiefly because of the rot from within, but also because the empire was an overextension of an empire covering disparate people and cultures. The decline of the British Empire was also inevitable because of the same reasons. America has never built an empire with our military might and we should be vigilant not to allow politicians to do that. We do have a large contingent of liberals who are intent on weakening those institutions that make our country and our people strong. What do they do? They creatively interpret our Constitution; they appoint judges who make laws at the bench; they encourage immigrants to not learn English; they teach our children to equivocate right and wrong; they fan class envy; they agitate the race and gender divides, and they intimidate and silence their critics, they even hijacked the term "liberal" to describe themselves. These liberals are the barbarians I alluded to earlier. America's decline, when and if it irrevocably happens, would be due to the liberal's good work, and NOT the rise of Europe.