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The End of the Bronze Age

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Drews, Robert. The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catostrophe ca. 1200 B.C. Princeton University Press, 1993. 12+252 pp. Ill., maps

Between approximately 1200 and 1150 B.C. a great disaster befell the civilized world of the Ancient Eastern Mediterranean. The cites and fortified places of Crete, Myceneae, Anatolia and upper Mesopotamia were suddenly overrun and burned by a people who left few traces beyond widespread destruction. Lower Mespoamia and Egypt were threatened but escaped devastation Robert Drews, a Professor of Classics at Vanderbilt University, attempts to explain who did this and how.

His balanced book first considers the Bronze Age in general and then systematically surveys the destruction of the various locales during what he terms "The Catastrophe," (the first half of the 12th c. B.C.) He devotes several chapters to surveying the causes of the event that has been proposed in traditional scholarship-earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, systems collapses, mass migrations and the appearance of iron weapons in the early Iron Age. His own explanation is a combination of several of these, plus what might be called innovations in military organization and weaponry.

During much of the Bronze Age, great powers like Egypt and the Hittites relied primarily on the use of chariots on the battlefield, from which charioteers shot arrows at the enemy and broke up mass formations of ground troops. Beyond the movement of "runners" between the chariot lines, there was no real use of infantry as a tactical arm. In fact, the infantry was usually regarded as defensive element. The catastrophe was caused, according to Drew, by the sudden and unexpected appearance of a new military force (called the "Sea People" by the Egyptians) throughout the eastern Mediterranean at the beginning of the 12th century. For about 50 years the invaders roamed the region and ravaged civilizations that has been founded on bronze metallurgy They were equipped with new weapons (thrust and slash swords, javelins, etc.) and defensive armor (helmets, greaves, corselets and small, round shields). In the absence of hard documentary evidence, the author infers that a new military organization accompanied these material advances, resulting in a new type of fighting force, one that relied on the fighting ability of the individual man in infantry formations and the increasing use of iron weapons. In the final analysis, these 12th century fighters bear a striking resemblance to Greek hoplites and their phalanxes in the Heroic Age.

Drew's book is closely reasoned, variously building on or critiquing the work of other important scholars in the field; it is methodically, if not brillantly, written. He provides a detailed bibliography of his sources and a general index that at best can only be termed "thin." He provides passable illustrations of some of the principal visual sources (stelae, tomb inscriptions etc) for his arguments but musters only a single map and, at that, a very poor line drawing of the eastern Mediterranean that shows no real detail. Drew offers no startling new evidence for the mystery of the 12th BC but does review the problem with authority and suggests a solution that relies on a recasting of the known information. His book will be read and commented on by those who have an interest in the effects of warfare, migration and external threats by precivilized peoples on the ancient civilizations of the eastern Mediterranean and upper Mesopotamia. Recommended.

Towards the end of the bronze age in the eastern mediterranean, around 1200 BC, most of the great cities of the region were destroyed. In this excellent book, Robert Drews summarizes the facts of and existing theories for this catastrophe, and proposes a new theory of his own: that new weapons and accompanying military doctrine resulted in the defeat of the agricultural city states and empires of the time. Only when they reached Egypt were the aggressive "sea peoples" finally defeated.

The book opens with a description of the catastrophe at the end of the bronze age, listing 44 cities throughout Greece, Asia Minor, Syria and the Levant that were destroyed - including some very well known ones like Troy and Mycenae - and describing the general pattern of destruction. Drews then continues by summarizing the existing theories for this catastrophe - earthquakes, migrations, ironworking, drought, systems collapse, and raiders - and convincingly demonstrates why none of these explanations is sufficient to explain the scope and details of the catastrophe.

Drews then sets the stage for his own military explanation of the catastrophe by describing both bronze age warfare dominated by elite chariot troops with spear armed infantry in a defensive supporting role, and the later iron age warfare dominated by infantry with mounted cavalry in support. He then presents his own theory: that use of infantry in a more active role, with javelins and heavier slashing swords, enabled "barbarians" to defeat the chariot armies of the great agricultural civilizations in the area and sack their cities.

Drews presents a lot of good evidence and cogent argument in support of his theories. The book does have a few flaws - Drews sometimes uses French and German quotations without translation, and he does not always examine the evidence for his own arguments as critically as he does the evidence for competing explanations - but these flaws are minor and do not really detract from the value of the work. Whether or not one ultimately accepts Drews' explanation as true, the book as a whole is an excellent analysis of the events of this important chapter history.

This is an excellent book on an important and transitional period of history that saw the beginning of a new "dark age" after about 1200 BC. This was a critical period in the history of the ancient world, a time that saw the end of the great, elite city and state civilizations of Greece, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Minoan Crete, and even to some extent of upper Egypt.

During this time the Mycenaean civilization was attacked from the north by an unknown race, and The Sea Peoples attacked and defeated Crete, Minos, cities of the coastal Levant, the Hittites, and as I mentioned, even upper Egypt and Mesopotamia suffered somewhat, although the Sea Peoples were stopped and defeated by Egypt. They might even have been responsible for the fall of Mycenaean Greece. They were originally thought to have come from further north in Europe, but it seems more likely now that they were from the area around the Black Sea.

Drew's theory is that the Sea Peoples use of better equipped infantry with more modern iron weapons, including better swords but also better armor shields and helmets for defense, instead of Bronze Age metal weapons and battle chariots, allowed them to defeat their seemingly stronger and more powerful opponents.

Another important facet of the book is the author discusses the important technological innovations of the period and how that affected military tactics, strategy, and technology, such as the widespread use of the battle chariot, and how that ultimately may have contributed to the fall of the region's great civilizations at the hands of the Sea Peoples. The author also does an excellent job of discussing the other competing theories of the fall and overall, this is a well-researched and well-written account of this important period in ancient history.

This is a great book that anyone interested in ancient history should have and be familiar with. Drews fills in a long neglected area of study on ancient warfare during the 16th to 12th centuries BCE. Most books simply explain what happened. Drews shows "why" it happened. He shows how and why the Bronze Age civilizations came to an end, and in the process opens a new window into the ancient world.

Warfare during this time was based on the chariot. Drews presents a wide range of ancient records (including Egyptian) with solid reasoning to show how chariots were used. He covers their advantages and consequent limitations. His presentation of the development of infantry weapons and tactics is most significant. The Bronze Age civilizations depended too much upon the chariot. When new infantry weapons and tactics became widespread, the shift in power brought about their downfall.

It is clear the empires during this time period (i.e. the Egyptian New Kingdom and the Hittites), were on a precarious balance. They were not as strong or powerful as historians have suggested, nor did they collapse because of drought or catastrophe.

This book is an excellent look at the collapse of Bronze Age civilization around 1200 BC. It should be noted that this book is not intended as an introduction. If you don't know who the Hittites are you will be hard-pressed to understand them afterward, although you would be able to explain their fall. This book is basically an argument about the cause of the collapse. His argument is compelling but he doesn't skip on the other theories just because they disagree with him. While he points out their various flaws he gives them a chapter each to give their points of view. At no point does he seem pretentious and he's never boring. Although he pushes his views he doesn't deny the others their points. So if you want to understand how the Bronze Age ended this is an excellent book to read. I don't think that he's convinced me, but at no point did I feel he was insulting me for being so stupid as to disagree with him.

This review refers to the paperback edition ISBN 0-691-02591-6.
First of all the book is great, and I really love it, still reading it. But I have serious issue with it. None of the reviewers seems to mention it. This is an example

"..one Egyptologist recently remarked that although some things are unclear, "eins ist aber sicher: Nach den agyptischen Texten haben wir es nicht mit einer `Volkerwanderung' zu tun". Thus the migrations hypothesis is based not on the inscriptions themselves but on their interpretation."

Nowhere in the book can you find translation for this sentence. On page 34 two paragraphs in French with only reference to origin "Schaeffer, Commentaries, 755-56." You can see examples like this all throughout the book. Am I supposed to know French and German to completely enjoy this book? Because Author never bothers to include translation. Including original text is fine, but I need translation. On the page 14 there is a dramatic translation of the clay tables of the last king of Ugarit, imagine author including only original text of the clay tablet and arguing how important and dramatic this text is, without ever bothering including translation.
Once again I love this book, and maybe this is just paperback edition that suffers form it.

This book first gives a broad overview of the catastrophic end to the Bronze Age. The author walks the reader through several alternative explanations for the simulataneous fall of many great civilizations along the eastern coast of the Mediteranean, from Mycenae through Troy, Hatti, Emar, Ugarit, south through Caanan and down to the Nile delta. Then, with the other explantions before us, the author presents a military explanation that seems compelling, at the very least. This book is well written, properly moving the interesting "rabbit trails" and credits to footnotes, thus keeping the reader engaged.

It is very rare that I enjoy a book that is so academic: the author has a novel interpretation to make, which he constructs from a combination of written sources, archaeological evidence, and interpretation of art. Unlike many such studies that are exceedingly dry and eccentrically partisan, the author is a truly fine writer. It sustained my interest the whole way through, for a delightful reading experience.

About 1200 BCE, the Bronze Age ended in what the author calls "the Catastrophe". A relatively peaceful and stable way of life, with an extraordinarily rich culture that had lasted for centuries across the entire eastern Mediterranean, was swept away, initiating a dark age of several centuries. The causes of this have never been completely explained, hence the purpose of the book.

First, he eliminates the causes that have been proposed and found wanting: massive earthquake, migration, global draught or climate shift, system failure based on class tensions, and raids. In many ways, this is a wonderful introduction to the way academics think: they find evidence to demolish popular hypotheses, complete with asides on the errors of their authors. TO his credit, the author does so convincingly with humor and without the petty oneupsmanship that plagues the humanities.

Second, he builds a new hypothesis: that it was a change in the nature of warfare: the end of the age of the chariot, as brought down by the re-equipped foot soldier. To prove his point, he offers a dazzling overview of the forces at work during the period, from developments in weaponry to the sociology of elites of the period and commerce. To be sure, there are some points that are too labored, such as the interpretation of relevant examples of political art in Egypt or the archaeology of swords North of the Danube. But his writing is so clear, his ideas so interesting, and his vision so comprehensive that it fascinates from page 1. The entire book unfolds like an intricate tapestry, whose intersections of overlap fit into a coherent interpretation.

In my reading, the cultures of the Mediterranean Bronze Age had reached a kind of apogee. Elites ruled from citadels, engaging with eachother over great distances through rarified and accepted forms of communication and fealty. Controlling resources and the means of warfare, they had far more in common with eachother than with their linguistic and ethnic compatriots. Because of the requirements of bronzemaking (to unite copper and tin), an extensive trade network existed. Warfare, the author argues, had evolved into a somewhat static form: huge arrays of chariots - pulled by two horses and carrying a driver and archer - were the principal weapons of assault, with foot soldiers supporting them and unable alone to oppose them effectively. The apparatus was extremely costly, requiring technology, spare parts, highly specialized training, and craftsmanship. This is similar to the knights of the medieval chivalric age, with their armour, mores, and rituals governing very real armed conflicts. The author makes a solid argument for such an interpretation, which I cannot evaluate but I remain skeptical.

Then about 1200 BCE, the chariot suddenly lost its central place. The means to challenge the chariot came from newly armed foot soliders, who gained specialized javelins to attack chariot horses (stopping them for assault by foot); swords designed for slashing rather than thrusting; and a variety of innovations such as better balanced circular shields and new body armor designs. These soldiers apparently worked first as mercenaries to the chariot-based empires, but learned they could disable their employers and sack their palaces to plunder their wealth; the empires proved largely unable to train their forces to face these new invaders or remained stubbornly reluctant to adapt to new kinds of warfare that were emerging with iron and steel. The foot soldiers then became marauding hordes that destroyed virtually all of the Bronze Age empires, with the exceptions of Egypt and Mesopotamia, which repulsed attacks but were permanently reduced in power and reach.

While the argument certainly captures some of the truth, he does not explain why it happened at that moment, 1200 BCE. Even the identity of the invaders is uncertain. Finally, I would have liked more on the Iron Age culture that emerged as well as the elements of the Bronze Age cultures.

Warmly recommended. This is one of the best academic studies I have read in years.

I have one concern with this book, that I will state at the outset: it is more than ten years old. I'd be fascinated to know what the author thinks of advances in our knowledge of the bronze age in the interval between publication and the present time.
That said, this is one of the most we reasoned and best supported books arguments about the end of the bronze age I have come across. Virtually every assertion the author makes is footnoted, so that you can follow the references, though often these are in German or French (note: with on-line translators available today, this is not so big a problem as it was in the past, if you are really determined to see what is being said in other languages). Basically, the author makes the point that he does indeed know the material that he is dealing with.
Interestingly, he is prepared to turn the "heroic" (or Homeric) tradition of warfare on its head. Rather than the heros we are used to from the Illiad using chariots as "battle taxi's" to get into combat and then fighting man to man, Drews posits the idea that in fact bronze age warfare between established kingdoms was largely a case of hundreds, even thousands, of chariots being used as archery platforms, with small groups of "chariot runners" finishing off crews who are incapcitated. He does a good job of suggesting that in this sort of warfare, massed infantry played little part offensively. The battles between the great kingdoms where won or lost by the chariotry, mass infantry was only of use where chariots could not operate, or in sieges.
While all historians marshal their arguments to make their point, I have to confess that the details that Drews goes into in studying the records of Mycene, Hittites, Egypt and Nuzi, does make for a convincing idea that the chariotry was considered the arm of decision in these kingdoms prior to the end of the bronze age.
Drews then studies the weaponry of the times, and the battle tactics of the "barbarians" (being largely the places we have only archeological records, rather than written records from) and puts forth the conclusion that the weapons they had (small javelins that would have been good for targeting horse teams and slashing swords that would have been more than a match for some of the clubs or short daggers and swords carried by chariot runners) would, in association with offensive infantry tactics provided a recipe that would have overthrown in short time the antiquated military theories of the great kingdoms.
The exception, in the area, he points out, is Assyria, which did have large infantry forces.
Equally telling, is the way that infantry subsequent to the catastophe that saw the end of so many great civilisations, DOES become the main combat arm.
Overall, the book is very readable and very well reasoned. The only cause for four stars instead of five, is, as noted at the outset, the age of the work.

This is a great book, built on common sense and fact. Drews is extremely convincing in bringing forward his new theory. No disasters needed, no big conspiracies, nor huge migrations of nations - only simple fact finding leads to a theory that is both fundamental and cogent.