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The End of History and the Last Man

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After 9-11, it became easy to make fun of "The End of History and The Last Man". The book's title suggested to some a triumphant valedictory for liberal democracy, and yet the epitome of liberal democratic values -- the West -- was now mired in another seemingly endless struggle. Especially for those who never read the work, the phrase "the end of history" became something one only said with scorn. Cynics felt obligated to point out that one more philosophy of the world had fallen into the meat grinder of history, never to be seen again.

But this book still has relevance in the post 9-11 world. Despite the vulgarization of its title, Fukuyama did not predict an end to conflict. What's more, he also did not cast the future in an unremittingly optimistic light. In some ways his themes -- particularly in the second half of the book when he focuses on the Nietzschean concept of The Last Man -- are decidedly darker than even keen reviewers of the work have noted. Liberal democracy may have triumphed, but its victory had costs for the collective psyche of its denizens.

"The End of History and The Last Man" came out in the wake of the fall and breakup of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of global communism, Fukuyama claimed the fundamental values of liberal democracy and market capitalism were now unchallenged. What's more, no other ideologies on the horizon appeared attractive or effective enough to usurp them -- ever. Yes, some countries or regions might fall under the sway of an ideology (Islamic fundamentalism) or a cultural conceit (Asian values), but too much of the globe now accepted that societies should be organized under the principles of liberal democracy and market capitalism for there ever to be a major reversal in its fortunes around the world. Thus, ideological conflict on a global scale was over. And so history -- in the Hegelian sense of the clash of competing ideologies -- was over as well.

What kind of man would this post-historical world create? Fukuyama explores this in the second half of the book - a section I feel is neglected by too many readers. Here, Fukuyama shifts his conceptual lens from the philosophy of Hegel and its focus on ideological conflict as the motor of history to the psychological insights of Friedrich Nietzsche. Having used Hegel to show how history might be ending, he now uses Nietzsche to show how empty and meaningless this ending might become. We have reached the end of the history, Fukuyama claims, but Nietzsche shows how unsatisfying that endpoint is. What happens when men are all recognized as equal and the struggle for everything except the accumulation of more material goods is over? What will they value?

"The End of History and The Last Man" and its themes will outlast its critics. 9-11 did not restart history, because Islamic fundamentalism does not represent the same serious ideological competitor that was once represented by communism. (It's highly doubtful that even a majority of Muslims desire it, and whatever the case in the Muslim countries, it's certainly true that its attractiveness is strictly limited to those of the Islamic faith.) This beautifully written book weaves different strands of philosophy, international relations, and political science into a brilliant argument that overwhelms simplistic criticisms of it. There are weak points to Fukuyama's arguments in the book - some of which he addressed himself later in his career - but few recognize them. The book still deserves a careful reading. Serious political and social commentators will be dealing with its arguments for some time.

"The End of History and the Last Man" by Francis Fukuyama has an apocalyptic-looking cover and a title that needs explication. But the book is not a doomsday scenario, quite the contrary, as the explanation of the title will show.

Fukuyama, who is Bernard Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, published this work of political philosophy in 1992, and in it, he explains in a logical, well-considered progression why he believes that liberal democracy is the final resting point of progressive history, but that that very liberal democracy can render humanity as less than what it could be - comfort seeking, self-involved, "men without chests."

The book, which could be subtitled "I Love Hegel and Why You Should, Too," builds on Hegel's idea that there is a Universal, progressive History. This is to what Fukuyama is referring when he says that History has reached its end; he doesn't mean that nothing else will happen, but that the progression of History toward a universally beneficial system of government has culminated in liberal democracy. He defines liberalism - "Political liberalism can be defined simply as a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control" and he defines those rights in three classes, civil rights, religious rights and political rights. He defines democracy as "the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote and participate in politics."

His concentration on Hegel arises from Fukuyama's contention that we've been very conditioned by Karl Marx's influence to believe that most social and political problems come from economic and class differences. Fukuyama disagrees, saying that conflict comes from Hegel's theory that some people will risk their lives for prestige, or recognition. He writes that the aristocracy was created by such people - people who risked their lives for prestige and were able to enslave others. He writes that liberal democracy resolves the tension between slave and master because it makes the slaves their own masters.

But he cautions that Nietzsche believed in war and conflict as a way for humanity to express its passions, and that without conflict (Fukuyama says that liberal democracies do not attack each other), humans will become soft, meaningless, passionless, "men without chests." Fukuyama does not advocate that people become "last men," even though in this volume, he believes the End of History is being reached.

I read this book because Thomas L. Friedman faulted it for "not going far enough" in "The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization," but I wouldn't agree with that. Friedman clearly owes a lot to Fukuyama, directly or indirectly, and the roots of many of Friedman's ideas are explicated very elegantly here.

I find this book difficult to write about because it contains so many interrelated and complex ideas that are truly fascinating, including Fukuyama's views on the role of science in reaching the End of History. (In fact, in a newer book, "Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution," he writes that the End of History may not have been reached because the End of Science hasn't been reached. So reads a review of this book on the Web.)

I highly recommend this book. It really stretched my mind in new directions and helped me to see the world and our current governmental systems in new ways. His integration of key philosophical work and thought with political history was fascinating and had a ring of truth.

The End Of History And The Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama: A Review

It is seldom that one comes across a book which can hold us spellbound from beginning to end. But this is the case of this masterpiece by Fukuyama. In this book, Fukuyama proposes a return to Hegel's historiosophical concept of a Universal History which has a clear direction, purpose and progress. After having passed through many stages of development, history has finally come to its end. This, of course, does not mean that time has come to an end. Life and death will continue, the season of the year and the passage of the decades go forward. But history is a particular process in which we witness specific changes in the political organization and cultural arrangements of human societies. This process seems to evolve in accordance with specific laws, such as the expansion of the levels of human freedom. The liberal democracies developed in the modern times are the culmination of such a process, because they embody the fullness of the ideal of human freedom. Sure, there are adjustments which can be made to perfect particular democracies, but the concept itself of democracy as the self-determination of peoples cannot be improved upon. Hence, history has reached its end, its goal.

Fukuyama brilliantly developes throughout the book the theme of Plato's tripartite division of the human soul into reason, passion and desire, and its consequences for political science. Political systems are reflections of human yearnings, the attempt of human beings to give full expression to their own humanness. What ultimately matters is how a particular society balances these three elements of human nature. Hegel's thesis is that history begins with the first man who was able to gain mastery over his fellow man and thus achieve a level of recognition as a superior being. Masters come to rule over slaves first and foremost because they are able to face courageously the fear of death, whereas slaves prefer to obey submissively the stronger man than to forfeit their own lives. Fear of death is the primary motivation of the slave. Aristocrats, on the other hand, are driven by the impulse to seek superior recognition through fearless self-sacrifice in battle and war. The element of the human soul which is emphasized in aristocratic societies is passion (thymos).

Modern liberal democracies came into existence as the reslut of a rebellion of the masses of servants who yearned for freedom and recognition of their value as human beings. Theirs too was a search based on thymos, but it is distinguisgable from the thymos of the aristocracy. The masses search for the dignity that comes with the equality of all human beings (isothymia), is contradistinction to the aristocratic dignity which is based on their lordship over other people (megalothymia). A liberal democracy is based on the principle of freedom and equality of all human beings.

But what is the purpose of a liberal democratic system ? Here is where Fukuyama's analysis reaches its peak of subtlety. The end of human life is "the pursuit of happiness", understood as the search for safety, survival, comfort and material well-being. The furtherance of private property to the highest possible degree becomes the ultimate expression of success in a liberal democracy such as the one in the United States. In order to assure the accomplishment of happiness for the largest possible number of people we must restrict the impulse of thymos and allow for the development of the rational side of human nature. Through science, human beings come to subdue nature and are thus capable of fulfilling as well the third part of their souls, "desire". Reason and desire go hand in hand, the former being the means to satisfy the latter. The two of them thrive best in the context of the peaceful coexistence of human beings who show, above all, the virtue of tolerance for the differences of their fellow human beings.

One might think that such an ideal picture would be easily supported by all people. But the nature of thymos is not to be restricted without its devastating consequences. Its elimination carries with it the trivialization of human pursuits. The modern liberal man finds himself suffocated under the weight of unbearably petty pursuits and wants which diminish his sense of meaningfulness in life. He wastes his life away in the meaningless search for comfort and lives constantly with the crippling fear of loosing his security, safety and comfort. He becomes sub-human. He looses all the ideals for which his ancestors were willing to risk their lives.

Democracy may have built into itself a contradiction which may become its nemesis. The last man, having achieved physical security and material well-being under the protection of the peaceful coexistence of liberal democracies, may find a gnawing sense of dis-satisfaction that could drive him, in his pursuit of meaning for himself and the world surrounding him, to renewed conflict with his fellow human beings.

In the wake of an incredible wave of democratization in the world, following the collapse of communism and authoritarianism, we must face the question of whether we are in some sense approaching the end of history. Are we coming to the culmination of a linear process that once fulfilled may usher in a new era a peaceful coexistence, or will we experience a rebellion of the human soul against a system that imposes the imprint of shallow materialism across all borders ? This question is one which remains yet to be answered. Fukuyama has brought us, in an impeccably lucid and compelling way, to the edge of our historical journey, and he provided us with tools to understand and appreciate the ultimate existential dilemma which we now face. His work has unquestionably earned its rightful place as a classic in contemporary political theory.

What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. -"X" (Francis Fukuyama), The End of History? (The National Interest)

One assumes that only George F. Kennan's "Containment" memo, likewise published under the pseudonym "X", can rival Francis Fukuyama's essay "The End of History"--first published in 1989, in The National Interest--in terms of impact on the public consciousness of a foreign policy brief. Fukuyama's essential argument was not that history, in terms of events and conflicts and the like, had actually come to and end, rather that liberal capitalist democracy represented the final step in Man's political evolution. With its overtones of Cold War triumphalism, the piece set off a huge kerfuffle and turned a State Department cypher into a significant political philosopher almost overnight.

In this book, Fukuyama expands on the ideas in his original essay and introduces several new ones, the most important of which, embodied by the idea of "thymos", is that the greatest threat to the End of History is the fact that people demand recognition. By recognition, he means something fairly broad, but which we all intuitively recognize :

...that part of man which feels the need to place value on things--himself in the first instance, but on the people, actions, or things around him as well. It is the part of the personality which is the fundamental source of the emotions of pride, anger, and shame, and is not reducible to desire, on the one hand, or reason on the other. The desire for recognition is the most specifically political part of the human personality because it is what drives men to want to assert themselves over other men... .

Liberal democracy succeeds brilliantly at fulfilling Man's basic desires--food, clothing, shelter--but it raises several questions. Will Man, once satiated, still have the kind of thymos which has driven the species to achieve technologically and culturally ? Will the most able in society be content to be treated equally with those they consider their inferiors, or will they demand a level of political recognition commensurate with their contributions to society ? Will those at the bottom of the social scale--and liberal democracy does, undeniably, produce a hierarchy from poor to rich--be content to have less than those at the top of the scale, or will they demand that the high be brought low ? Fukuyama seeks to provide answers to these questions, drawing upon thinkers like Plato, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Alexandre Kojeve, and upon the experiences of modern times.

The book is always fascinating, sometimes wrongheaded and frequently brilliant. In the end, the question that animates the discussion is the same that mankind always faces ; which will ultimately triumph, the desire for security or the urge to freedom. There is no more important issue in human history and the ways in which we answer it will, as always, determine our future. Even if he does not arrive at any final answers, Fukuyama adds immeasurably to our understanding of the question and its importance.

GRADE : A+

One of the most thought provoking books I have read in a long time. Contrary to the claims of the right, Fukuyama does not conclude that western liberal democray and economic liberalism are the highest form of evolution. He explores this question and in doing so embarks on a fascinating journey though history and political philosophy. There is no airtight conclusion or doctrine being espoused here, which may trouble some. However, the questions raised are critical to understanding modern society, where we have come from and where we may or may not be going. Some have criticized the book for being wordy and repetitive. Though the same themes do appear over and over, they are always to look at new questions. On the contrary, I wish I could have read on.

The main problem with Fukiyama's End of History is simply that it is badly written; Fukiyama's prose is verbose and redundant - the reader ends up reading the same points three or four times.

That said, much of the criticism that the book has received is, in my opinion, misplaced. Fukiyama is not claiming that the capitalist system is some sort nirvana, but simply that history is a directional force that has delivered us to a point in which free market economies have reached a state of efficiency and harmony with human nature and therefore in large part won't be replaced by competing systems. This is not a value judgement, as has been accused by many critics; it's simply a matter of natural selection.

Is Fukiyama saying that a free market economy is *better* than competing systems? Well what he's saying that it is better at *doing certain things*, and this is an important distinction. Fukiyama claims not a moral superiority ("best of all possible worlds") but a functional superiority in which the occasional backtrack (a military coup here, a revolution there) will be shown to be mere blips. History, according to Fukiyama, is asymptotic, and we're approaching the end state.

Much of Fukiyama's argument is philosophical and at such lacks empirical data. So be it; I see this book as more than anything a discussion piece and many of its claims are essentially can't be proved (or will be proved or disproved over the next century or so).

This is a flawed work, but one which makes some interesting points. Fukiyama's discussion on Thymos and the "desire for recognition" as the dividing line between slaves and masters is interesting, but in that I'm not a scholar on Hegel and haven't read the original works I don't know if they've simply been lifted from previous writings.

In the end, reading this book is a lot of work for a little insight, therefore it is with a degree of reluctance that I recommend it. On second thought, a better idea would be to go to your local library and dig up the original 1989 National Interest article; you'll get essentially the same main ideas without having to slog through hundreds of pages of wordy and repetitive text. In some ways this book has changed the way I look at the world, but some of the conclusions I've taken with a grain of salt.

Contrary to the common interpretation, Fukuyama, in fact, predicts the implosion of liberal democracy because of its inherent contradiction between liberty and democracy. Liberty encourages differentiation among people, while democracy is predicated on equality. Understanding the implications of this contradiction is critical for all of us living in the end of History.

I suspect that many have skipped reading this book because they believe it advances a simplistic, triumphalist thesis: the fall of the Soviet Union proves that the USA is the greatest country of all time and will be so forever. In fact Fukuyama first presented a paper with the book's basic arguments many months before the fall of the USSR and before just about anyone thought that fall was imminent. But beyond that, Fukyama made perfectly clear in this book that a very large part of the world (the Islamic part) had not yet accepted democracy. No great insight, you might say, but my point is that he is not so stupid as to try to pound square pegs into round holes. Most importantly, he has an extremely interesting discussion of "recognition," something many have said plays an enormous role in politics without explaining what the demand for recognition IS. Even Huntington says that people are more attached to cultural identities than to anything else, but you won't find such a thoughtful extended discussion of the topic in his book or anywhere else, including books on multiculturalism. Fukuyama's book is worth reading even if only for that lengthy part.

This book is an easy read, but is extremely thought provoking. Francis Fukuyama is one of few economists who is actually a clear and interesting writer. This book is important because, although first published in 1992, it has influenced U.S. Foreign and Defense policies into the 21st Century. It is intellectually engaging because in it Fukuyama presents nothing less than a universal theory of human history.

Interestingly, the philosophical basis for this theory comes from Fukuyama's interpretation of the writings of the early 19th Century German historicist and idealist philosopher, Friedich Hegel. Specifically, Fukuyama accepts Hegel's belief in the inevitability of dialectical progression in the development of human societies or to put it another way, historical determinism. Fukuyama uses Hegel's dialectical progression to explain the historical development of human society and attempts to show in several examples how internal contradictions invariably lead to social change. He also attempts to prove that any society that has eliminated internal contradictions represents in his words the `end of history' in the sense that no further social change will occur.

Rather controversially, Fukuyama maintains that those states (societies) that have established democratic political systems, free market economies, and the rule of law are entirely free from internal contradictions. They thus are at the top of the evolutionary chain and are at the end of history because they require no further social change. He further maintains that all states or societies aspire to this condition.

Right or wrong, Fukuyama has significantly influenced U.S. post Cold War strategic thinking and his characterization of those societies enjoying democratic government and free market economies have become for U.S. policy makers, the model that all societies should aspire to and emulate regardless of other factors. For a look at how this concept is influencing such things as U.S. Military Force Transformation read the unclassified version of a Rand Corporation paper titled "A Framework for Strategy Development" that was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2001 and is available through Amazon.com.

Anyone looking to load your arsenal with talking points about the virtues democracy and capitalism, or looking to unearth the secret, zealous neo-con conspiracy behind President Bush's foreign policy should NOT read this book. However, if you want to encounter a challenging thesis on the nature of man, and the way that he orders his social life, this should be right up your alley.

The book begins in taking on our 20th century (or at least pre-89) pessimistic belief that man does not progress. He might be capable of build new toys, but his social existence is static, that is to say, violent. This outlook, of course, is the product of the 20th century tragdies that proceeded 19th century exuberance. Fukuyama argues that now is the time to reevaluate our pessimism. He then argues that the invention of the scientific method has set in motion a series of events, and changed our way of thought in such a way that we can never go back. Thus, History was born. He then argues that inevitable improvments in science, in turn, improve technology. The state will then seek to utilize that technology to its benefit on the battlefield. Those technologies will soon spill over to the nation's entire economic system where it stimulates economic growth. Thus, this economic mechanism eventually drives society to industrialization.

But industrialization only gets man rich, not democratic. Man has a built-in need for recognition, an irrational need to prove himself, his "glory", to humanity. In what we know as the "state of nature", man did this violently, or else he was enslaved. This arrangment of masters and slave, or kings and serfs, was secure until economic progress fundementally and irreversable changed our societal make up. Man is not satisfied with merely become rich, he wants have dignity, or rather, he wants to be equal. While other economic systems can provide certain levels prosperity (his comments on communism might surpise some), unless man is provided a place to compete and be "recognized" as man, money isn't enough. A liberal democracy is the end point of that demand and best provides for that outlet in man. Thus, the economic mechanism of capitalism grafts onto mans desire for "recognition" and, voila, we have Democratic Capitalism.

Beyond this linear arguement, there are many other interesting discussions on how our new view of history affects foriegn policy and how man may settle into this final stage. And while liberal democracy achieves a philosophical coherence that cannot be surpassed, there are causes for concern. Fukuyama's discussion of these are sobering. There is an inherent tension between mans desire for recognition (that is, to be distinguished) and society's emphasis on equality. Fukuyama presents the "last man" as exhausted, not triumphant.

One would think that a book where Hegel, Plato, and Nietzche are the stars of the show might be a bit dry. Not at all. I found the book both informative and enjoyable. Fukuyama's prose and organization are tight, readable, and sometimes witty.

Those who argue that this book is a work of "American triumphalism" in the wake of the fall of 1989 either has not read the book, or willfully misrepresents it. The same goes for those who sneeringly dismiss it after 9/11. He bends over backwards to emphasize that historical events will not end. He even shows how a liberal democracy might even slip back into some previous form of government. Howevever, what is central to this book, is that our system won't evolve philosophically. A different government will always be one from the past (Islamic facism is no philosophical progression, but rather a throwback to earlier thought that we evove from because of its blaring conradiction). Further, the triumphalist charge is particularly weird being that this is a Hegelian argument liberal democracy was inevitable for mankind. America was the result, not the cause of History. Sorry, but Reagan is never even mentioned.

Essentially this book forces you to ask yourself, if liberal democracy isn't for everyone, or isn't the best, what would a perferable political order look like? I have yet to hear someone argue for an altogether new system (Fukuyama points out that he hasn't either), no matter the length of one's list of liberal democracies' shortcomings. The End of History gives an answer for why this is the case.