To End a War (Modern Library Paperbacks) [Paperback]

Richard Holbrooke (Author)

Book Description

Release date: May 25, 1999 | Series: Modern Library Paperbacks

When President Clinton sent Richard Holbrooke to Bosnia as America's chief negotiator in late 1995, he took a gamble that would eventually redefine his presidency. But there was no saying then, at the height of the war, that Holbrooke's mission would succeed. The odds were strongly against it.
        As passionate as he was controversial, Holbrooke believed that the only way to bring peace to the Balkans was through a complex blend of American leadership, aggressive and creative diplomacy, and a willingness to use force, if necessary, in the cause for peace. This was not a universally popular view. Resistance was fierce within the United Nations and the chronically divided Contact Group, and in Washington, where many argued that the United States should not get more deeply involved. This book is Holbrooke's gripping inside account of his mission, of the decisive months when, belatedly and reluctantly but ultimately decisively, the United States reasserted its moral authority and leadership and ended Europe's worst war in over half a century. To End a War reveals many important new details of how America made this historic decision.
        What George F. Kennan has called Holbrooke's "heroic efforts" were shaped by the enormous tragedy with which the mission began, when three of his four team members were killed during their first attempt to reach Sarajevo. In Belgrade, Sarajevo, Zagreb, Paris, Athens, and Ankara, and throughout the dramatic roller-coaster ride at Dayton, he tirelessly imposed, cajoled, and threatened in the quest to stop the killing and forge a peace agreement. Holbrooke's portraits of the key actors, from officials in the White House and the Élysée Palace to the leaders in the Balkans, are sharp and unforgiving. His explanation of how the United States was finally forced to intervene breaks important new ground, as does his discussion of the near disaster in the early period of the implementation of the Dayton agreement.
        To End a War is a brilliant portrayal of high-wire, high-stakes diplomacy in one of the toughest negotiations of modern times. A classic account of the uses and misuses of American power, its lessons go far beyond the boundaries of the Balkans and provide a powerful argument for continued American leadership in the modern world.


From the Hardcover edition.

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

Between 1991 and 1995 over a quarter million people died during the conflict in the Balkan states. Meanwhile, the rest of Europe did not understand--or chose not to understand--what this war was about. The U.N. sent peacekeeping forces to aid the helpless, but would not assert its will to bring a peaceful end to the atrocities.

In a bold, contentious move by Clinton's first administration, a peace delegation was sent to Bosnia to secure an accord at any cost. A vocal proponent of this was Richard Holbrooke, then assistant secretary of state, who believed in hawkish diplomacy and a willingness to impose the moral will of America, if necessary. Holbrooke's belligerent pursuit of peace can be attributed in part to the tragedy of losing three of his team on the way through Sarajevo, making his quest for peace purposeful and passionate. In To End a War, an honest assessment and account of the events that followed, Holbrooke walks us through the complexities of the Dayton Accord from the perspective of the politicians and military men involved. It provides a fascinating insight into modern political diplomacy and the role of America in the international arena.

Without being a crusader, Holbrooke stresses throughout the need for responsible public service, subtly attacking some modern-day diplomats who use their positions irresponsibly. Ultimately he concludes that this peace process demonstrates the need for countries of power, such as the U.S., to take their of leadership roles seriously. To End a War is the definitive account of the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, important to anyone who wishes to understand the conflict in its entirety. --Jeremy Storey --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Publishers Weekly

American negotiator Holbrooke offers a fast-paced, first-person account of the American-led diplomatic initiative that ended the bloodshed of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia in 1995. A veteran of the Vietnam peace talks, one-time ambassador to Germany and assistant secretary of state, Holbrooke guides readers through "fourteen weeks... filled with conflict, confusion, and tragedy before... success." This is a penetrating portrait of modern diplomacyAwhat the author describes as "something like a combination of chess and mountain climbing." Spurred on by the deaths of three colleagues on his negotiating team (their armored personnel carrier toppled over a cliff on a treacherous approach to Sarajevo), Holbrooke hammers out a cease-fire in an intensive shuttle among the three Balkan presidents, and then presides over the three-week cloistered peace conference in Dayton, Ohio. He covers the elements of crafting effective foreign policy: coordination among various agencies and personalities in Washington; dealing with European allies; ensuring that military and diplomatic efforts work in concert; negotiating with ethnic nationalist leaders; "spinning" the press; and selling the peace plan to a skeptical Congress and public. While he provides scant background into the historical roots of the Balkan conflict, Holbrooke details the various stages of the negotiating process and vividly describes the Balkan leaders: the arrogant Tudjman, the sly Milosevic and the bickering and disorganized Bosnian Muslims. Although often self-justifying, Holbrooke acknowledges several errors, such as allowing the Bosnian Serb entity to retain the "blood-soaked name" of Republika Srpska. Still, his achievement in forging peace in Bosnia is beyond question, and his account of that process is essential for understanding how American power can be brought to bear on the course of history.
Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 464 pages
• Publisher: Modern Library; Revised edition (May 25, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0375753605
• ISBN-13: 978-0375753602
• Product Dimensions: 6.2 x 0.9 x 9.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (40 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #202,735 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #11 in Books > History > Europe > Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

29 of 35 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Useful, Has a Place on the Balkan Shelf February 13, 2000

By richard_t

Format:Hardcover

Holbrooke's book is a must-read for anyone closely interested in the wars following the breakup of Yugoslavia. It is a chronology with, at its core, a blow-by-blow and sometimes hour-by-hour description of the summer and autumn of 1995 when the Dayton accords took shape. The book is oft-criticized as Holbrooke's attempts to win back the swarms of people he alienated with his abrasive personality during his return to public service. If that was his intent, he probably failed, because his much-publicized anti-social behavior continues unabated to this day. In the unlikely event that any of his enemies were gullible enough to be flattered by the book, Holbrooke has no doubt subsequently given them fresh reason to dislike him. However, the book is still important, and, while self-aggrandizing, Holbrooke is possessed of a certain clarity of vision regarding the balkan wars. His list of five reasons, in chapter 2, for the West's failure to intervene in Yugoslavia is perceptive, especially his remarks about "Bad History, or the Rebecca West factor". The depiction of Milosevic is consistently interesting. Milosevic's own sorry history of losing four wars in the space of nine years, and the undeniable ruin he has visited on his own people, tend to paint him in broad and inaccurate colors. Holbrooke's account of his many sessions with Milosevic show the Serbian dictator as ruthless and cunning, and ultimately without any passion or vision. Milosevic was never interested in "greater Serbia", he sold the Croatian Serbs in a heartbeat. His betrayal of the Bosnain Serbs at Dayton, and the utter contempt he felt for them, marks him as a ruthless machiavelli rather than a true Serb nationalist. The book is useful, but not without minor blemishes: some explanations reek of hindsight, such as the decision (p.166) not to allow Croatian forces to conquer Banja Luka in 1995. Holbrooke's pasted-on humanitarian concerns ring hollow. The strategic implications of such an attack, and its effect on Dayton, are much more credible as reasons to insist that the Croatian offensive stop short of the city. Holbrooke's attempts at concern for humanitarian principles and his constant pats on the back for his colleagues often sound over-done and smarmy. He did a good job at Dayton, but he ain't gonna be canonized. (A nitpick: the map on p. 25 incorrectly places Russia on Slovakia's border.)

19 of 26 people found the following review helpful

1.0 out of 5 stars Much Ado About Nothing March 20, 2000

By Edward Bosnar

Format:Paperback

Any diplomatic memoir written so recently after the events in question will actually shed little light on the political motives and decision-making at the highest levels, since most of the documents and decisions involved are subject to confidentiality. Thus, their primary value is in revealing details about the actual personalities involved: the politicians, war leaders and diplomats whose actions shape events. Here Holbrooke's account falls short. There's very little he says in this book that hasn't been recounted previously in any number of news reports and documentaries on the shuttle diplomacy and diplomatic negotiations that eventually led to the Dayton Accords which ended the actual fighting in Bosnia. "To End a War" tells the reader more about Holbrooke than anything else, for this is a very vain man who is attempting to secure his place in history by retelling the story of his astounding negotiating efforts. Therefore, his observations of the personalities and behavior of various Balkan politicians (with the possible exception of Slobodan Milosevic) are often superficial, although we do learn which ones Holbrooke seemed to dislike on a personal level. We also learn that Holbrooke was usually treated to tasty meals of roast lamb whenever he visited Belgrade or the Serbian strongholds in Bosnia-altogether useless facts, unless I'm misinterpreting some incredibly subtle metaphorical symbolism. The only good thing about Holbrooke's account is that the writing style is straightforward and easy to read, so if you need to read this book for some minor details on the American aspect of Balkan diplomacy in the mid-1990s, it won't take long to get through it. Otherwise, even David Owen's dry and tedious "Balkan Odyssey" is more informative, while Warren Zimmermann's "Origins of a Catastrophe" provides the most lucid and perceptive (not to mention revealing) observations of the major Balkan leaders by a high-level foreign diplomat (he was the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia). The most revealing aspect of Holbrooke's book is that it highlights the arrogance of U.S. foreign policy: Holbrooke continuously jabs at the U.N. and European diplomats for their failure in the Balkans, while stressing how America stepped in to single-handedly save the day. Not that I think the UN and the EU didn't bungle pretty aimlessly in the Balkans, but the "success" of the U.S. diplomatic initiative is subject to question. After all, Holbrooke himself notes that almost all signatories of the Dayton Accords were generally dissatisfied with the agreement--and this is reflected in the ongoing political problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars A good book with several drawbacks July 27, 2009

By Vitaly Rugalev

Format:Paperback

Virtues:
- detailed, day-to-day description of activites in preparation for Dayton and its implementation;
- thorough analysis of the US posture on Bosnia, inter-governmental debates and military-civil cooperation (or - quite often - disagreements);

Drawbacks:
- the book lacks overall analysis of resolution of the conflict in Bosnia in the wider context of international politics; the description of the European position seems to be rather biased;
- R.Holbrooke's posture on the Bosnian issue is obviously (though sometimes on reasonable grounds)anti-Serb;
- "To end a war" understandably lags behind the post-1998 ground-breaking developments on the Balkans;
- while reading the book one may feel that the author's principal aim was to promote his own achievements, but not to present clear description of the situation.

For whom is this book best suited: excellent guide for Bosnia's (and in general - former Yugoslavia's) recent history researchers, biographers of the key decision-makers of that time.
For those "ordinary readers", interested in the Bosnia conflict, it may seem rather boring. Look for better - i.e. more analytical and not descriptive - works.