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Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb

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Strobe Talbot's memoir begins in 1998 when the Vajpayee Government in India shocked the world by conducting the Pokran II nuclear tests. The State Department - Talbot's employer - learned about the tests from CNN, and the CIA learned about them from the State Department. (The CIA used to know things.) The foreign service officer in charge of the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research wryly remarked, " It looks like we're all having a bad government day."

Talbot was the Clinton's Administration's resident expert on Russian-affairs, but after the tests (Pakistan followed with nuclear tests two weeks later), he was immediately reassigned as the point person and crisis manager for South Asia. His assignment was to persuade India to limit the development and deployment of their nuclear weapons; this included the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Talbot and his Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh met fourteen times over the last two and half years of the Clinton administration. This extended dialog between Talbot and Singh ended with Talbot's failure to persuade India to accept any restraints on its nuclear weapons program - which came as no surprise to either Talbot or Singh. The dialog -the engagement of India - brought many unintended benefits.

Treaties such as the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the (CTBT) are, from an Indian perspective, discriminatory and condescending against everyone except the original five nuclear powers. The nuclear option was seen by the Vajpayee Government, and especially by the right-leaning nationalists of the Bharatiya Janata Party, as not only a realistic defense policy, but also a tool for achieving great power status. They never had any intention of signing the CTBT. Talbot, for his part, was dealing with a weak hand because the Republican senators in the US were aslo unwilling to endorse the treaty.

What became valuable was the engagement itself in that it altered the direction of US-Indian relations from one of mutual estrangement to one of trust and cooperation. This was illustrated during the 1999 invasion by Pakistan of the Kargil area of Kashmir. As President Clinton was holding talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan to halt the invasion, he was at the same time consulting Vajpayee and seeking his advice. This so impressed the Indian side that it paved the way for Clinton's historic visit in 2000.

One of the fascinating things about this book is the personality of Jaswant Singh. Singh hails from Rajasthan where his intimate experience with Islamic extremism pushed him toward's the BJP's staunch Hindu idealogy. He had presciently warned Talbot that America did not fully appreciate the dangers of radical Islam. And regarding Pakistan, Singh was opposed to the very idea of Pakistan; the partition that took place more than fifty years ago had been a huge mistake. He noted with characteristic flair that, "Kashmir should be understood as an objectification of Pakistan's predicament as a lost soul among nations, an ersatz country whose founders' only legacy was a permanent reminder of what a tragic mistake partition had been." In the end, Talbot's own views on Islamic extremism and Pakistan had come closer to Singh's.

"Engaging India" is a fascinating account of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that led to the improvement of US-Indian relations after fifty years of mistust. With India's growing economic and military power the Bush Administration has wisely decided to shelve the nuclear dispute and opt for military and strategic cooperation. We can only hope that it continues to be an excellent adventure.

Anyone who has any doubts about Pakistan's involvement in world wide terrorism should read this book. This is not some curious author discovering the facts. This is a powerful ex-official in Clinton administration who has seen it all and describes how Pakistan is responsible for helping terrorists.

Also it throws light at the behind doors world of diplomacy and how it is played out between India and US.

I recommend this book to anyone interested on the subjects of Terrorism, US-India relations, Pakistan, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear bombs.

Clearly Mr. Talbott has a favorable opinion of India and that alone is, I suspect, music to many an Indian's ears. Having said that, this book made me realize how little, in terms of appreciation for India and its core values, I have come to expect out of American leaders and diplomats past and present alike. While Mr.Talbott faithfully presents all the Indian arguments against the NPT, he fails to acknowledge, in spite of his relative security in retirement from public office, that those arguments make sense to ANY fair and balanced person, not necessarily Indian. Mr. Talbott, rather conveniently, switches to his I-was-just-a-state-department-peon hat to steer clear of commentary about the discriminatory and seriously flawed NPT. In the absence of that basic acknowledgement, I am unable to take to heart any of his criticisms, however justified, about India's social structure and body politic.

Mr.Talbott would have us believe that the "hyphenation" of India and Pakistan, that Jaswant Singh takes exception to, is a justifiable association rooted in common sense, while in fact, it is actually a result of a deliberate and successful cold war effort on the US State Department's part to equate the two countries.

Does Mr Talbott expect us to believe that only the purest and most innocent of assessments led to the prevalent notion in much of the western media that India and Pakistan are somehow "rivals", when in fact India is 7 times as populous as Pakistan, has an economy almost 10 times that of Pakistan, and has a system of governance that couldn't contrast any more sharply against Pakistan's?

In fact, so wildly successful has this disinformation campaign been, that any Indian suggestion to the contrary is dismissed as yet another indication of the free flowing cross-border vitriol.

To Mr. Talbott's credit he has made an honest and refreshing attempt to put into perspective the relative importance of India and Pakistan to the global world order. But I am afraid it's not enough. Not enough for the average American who needs a nuanced worldview more and more, and not enough for the average Indian who needs certificates from America less and less.

The best diplomatic memoir in recent times. Mr Talbott's has given a honest opinion about the Indian political system. This book is beyond the Talbott-Singh dialogue but also about India as a mature nuclear power nation with its leaders having a modern and modest outlook about the world. This includes Indian Politicians belonging to both ruling as well as opposition parties.

There are also ominous references to Pakistan being a dangerous place for westerners, whether they are Politicians, diplomats or journalist. This book confirms the fear that "South Asia, in particular Pakistan is the most dangerous place on Earth"

The most redeeming quality of this title is its readability. Talbott is able to convey all the drama and excitment of life in international politics.

That said, this certainly isn't a title which will help you get a complete understanding of India, Pakistan and nuclear weapons. I read this book to supplement required reading for a course on War in South Asia and it greatly helped in terms of reinforcing key events and players.

I reccomend this to those who already have a reasonable understanding of the situation in South Asia and want a bit of light reading and would like to see the soap opera aspect of the affair.

It is a wonderful narration of "behind the scenes" diplomacy between India and US, after the Pokran bomb blast. Readers would get to know how the long impasse between India and US came to an end. Author's recollection of various Indian leader's viewpoint on this nuclear pursuit is very interesting.

If the author's view on pakistan is any indication of the current US govt, its very puzzling how pakistan ended up as an ally of US in fighting terrorism.

All in all, the book is a very good read for anyone who wants to know about India's nuclear dreams/pursuits and American views on the same.

This memoir is a lucid account of one of the most important diplomatic episodes in recent history - the dialogue that opened between the U.S. and India subsequent to India's atomic weapons test in 1998. Author Strobe Talbot, a lifelong diplomat, recaps the history of the India-Pakistan dispute, explains why Indian-U.S. relations were in deplorable condition, and leaves readers in no doubt about the importance of resolving the situation or about the difficulty of doing so. Talbot's direct involvement in the diplomacy that restored U.S.-Indian relations was relatively brief, but it laid the foundation for a new level of cooperation and dialogue. We commend his deft portrait of high-level diplomacy in action.

The scene that epitomises US India relationship best is narrated in this book. Jaswant Singh, India's Foreign Minister, steps in to meet Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State. As he enters, Albrights gives him a dressing down. "You lied to us (about the bombs). Friends dont do that to each other". Jaswant Singh remains silent for a minute; takes his seat and says "Madame, there is a difference between a lie and a secret".

This difference between an expectation and its infeasibility epitomizes the strains in the engagement.

If the World is a country and the individual countries its citizens, the World is not a democracy. There is no one law for all countries. Some seem above/beyond the law. This line of reasoning and the feeling that if "others" have it, we should have it too forms the core of India's arguments for its bomb.

The US is not trying to introduce NPT to bolster its power. The US is doing this to reduce the probability of rogue nations destroying civilization as we know it. Yet, it does not want to subject its own self to the regime it advocates for everyone else.

Rejecting a cherished friend's conflicting view is difficult. Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh seem to have handled this well.

Strobe Talbott gives an "inside the ring" view of the attempt to rope India into NPT and the human side of it. His friendship and regard for Jaswant Singh is visible in the book.

Unfortunately, neither Strobe nor Jaswant, seem to recokon the public opinion in India that would eventually shape its policy. There are a billion Indians. They are not having the highest GDP per capita. But they have a habit of deciding what is right for them. The reasoning that would appeal to this billion to support the NPT is not evident in the book. The mission, to Strobe, was probably more important than its rationale.

Yet, a fair and balanced view of several precious moments in the engagement by US and India.

Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, And The Bomb by Strobe Talbott (President of the Brookings Institute and the American Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001) is the fascinating true story of diplomatic relations between United States, India, and Pakistan in 1998 and 1999 - a time marked by India's underground testing of nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh met fourteen times, striving with urgent issues of arms control and nonproliferation as well as visions for a U.S.-India relationship and the possibility of both economic and strategic cooperation between both nations. Even though India and Pakistan disputed the territory of Kashmir in the summer of 199, the conflict did not escalate to war or nuclear conflagration - perhaps due at least in part to the mediating influence of the U.S. A true story with a positive message, Engaging India is a raply engrossing work and a welcome addition to modern world history shelves.

Strobe Talbott was Deputy Secretary of State in the Clinton administration. May 11, 1998 started off like any other, the usual meetings, then CNN announced that India had set off a nuclear device. In that instant India moved many steps up the priority level.

Over the next couple of years Mr. Talbott and Jaswant Singh the Indian Minister of External Affairs met fourteen times in seven countries. These meetings discussed not only the nuclear issue but the wider visions of the U.S. - Indian relationship. This ultimately lead the groundwork for Bill Clinton's trip to India in March of 2000.

This is a classic example of why you have to wait for the books to come out before you have any idea of what's really going on. The daily newscasts, even the weekly talking heads and news magazines do not cover the depth and analysis that the actual participants can give to a story after they have had a year or two to think about what happened.

In this case the story is about a historical moment little known to the general public. Yet it is a moment that could have flared into something much more serious. Just two weeks after the Indian test Pakistan responded with its own test. And the countries were in the midst of a border dispute over Kashmir.