Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically [Paperback]

Joseph Rouse (Author)

Product Details

• Paperback: 280 pages
• Publisher: Cornell University Press (January 10, 1996)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801482895
• ISBN-13: 978-0801482892
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.1 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,623,863 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Most philosophical in-depth defense of cultural studies approach to science, July 13, 2008

By 

Rudolph V. Dusek "Val Dusek" (Scarborough ME USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Engaging Science: How to Understand Its Practices Philosophically (Paperback)

Rouse's work develops in detail and depth a justification of an approach to science more similar to the cultural studies approach than to the so-called Science and Technology Studies approach. Rouse uses and reviews his use of Foucault on practices and combines with with use of analytical philosophers such as Arthur Fine and Donald Davidson. Rouse claims that both the traditional philosophy of science and the Science and Technology Studies and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge approaches of recent decades grapple with the issue of a global or abstract general legitimation of science. Traditional philosophy of science does so in a positive manner, attempting to supply such a legitimation, while the latter socially oriented approaches do so in a skeptical manner with respect to intellectual justification but with a non-evaluative approach to accepting science as a craft. Rouse wishes to evaluate particular scientific enterprises, but thinks any sort of attempt to legitimate science in general, as opposed to particular projects and practices is misguided and misleading. Rouse, like Richard Rorty, denies that natural science is a natural kind. He denies the possiblity of any sort of universal demarcation of science in general from non-science, whether of the positivists, of Popper, or of Steve Fuller. This is an excellent work, whether one agrees with Rouse's rejection of legitimation and demarcation or not.