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An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (HPC Philosophical Classics Series)

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This is another outstanding edition in the Oxford Philosophical Texts series. This is a first rate book for both students and experts on Hume. It contains an excellent annotated edition of the Enquiry itself, excellent background information on Hume, a very nice introduction to the Enquiry written by Tom Beauchamp, a leading Hume scholar and moral philosopher, an outstanding guide to the Hume literature, and a good glossary. All for a very reasonable price.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM) is one of the cornerstone texts in Western philosophy and is written with Hume's characteristic combination of incisive analysis and charming style. Hume's goal is to describe the bases of human moral conduct. As stated by Tom Beauchamp, EPM is descriptive rather than prescriptive. While Hume clearly has strong opinions about what constitutes appropriate moral conduct, in EPM his focus is really on moral psychology rather than moral direction. This approach is what would now be called metaethical. As with his work on epistemology, Hume is also concerned with establishing the limits of human reason. In Hume's analysis, reason has an important but limited role in moral judgements, crucial for reaching appropriate judgements but does not establish the basic principles for moral judgement. Hume sees morality as based on an interesting interplay of moral sentiments, which he sees as intrinsic to human nature, self-interest, and social utility. The importance of each of these varies with considerably in different social settings. In family life and close personal relationships, moral sentiments dominate but the force of moral sentiment weakens as the range of socieity increases. In more complex social settings, Hume sees a form of utilitarianism as restraining self-interest. For Hume, specific moral systems are variable, somewhat situation dependent, and historically contingent. Thought provoking and very readable.

Hume, for most people, is largely defined by his work in metaphysics and epistemology. There's no doubt that his work in these areas is of signal importance, but I think a tendency to focus on these areas at the expense of his moral thinking suggests a somewhat misleading interpretation of what he's up to. It's really only in his non-moral works that the picture of Hume as a radical skeptic has much plausibility. For here it seems clear that Hume's primary aim in his moral works is to ground his philosophical theses in a careful consideration of human nature; and it's also clear that he doesn't intend this to be a skeptical and debunking account of morality.

Now, it's true that there are ways in which Hume is skeptical about a certain way of thinking about the origin and nature of morality. The fact that he thinks morality is based in human sentiments show that he is, in some sense, a subjectivist about morality. He doesn't think there is any plausible account of our moral thinking as based on reason or empirical inquiry alone. Against the view that our awareness of moral distinctions is based on the exercise of reason, he argues that we do not figure out whether a person is virtuous or vicious, or an action good or bad, simply by thinking about things. And against the view that our awareness of moral distinctions is empirical, he argues that we do not figure out which things possess which moral qualities by going out and looking or by anything else of this sort. Morality, then, is more a matter of feeling than a matter of thinking, observing, and reasoning.

Hume's basic argument for the conclusion that morality is based on human sentiment is that the essential practicality of morality requires us to understand its basis in this way. Morality is about action, and neither reasoning nor ordinary empirical inquiry can be the source of our moral thinking since they are impotent to prompt us to action. Reason does not motivate, and our moral judgments, concerns, sentiments are intimately connected to motivation. Nor does recognition of the empirical facts motivate all on its own. Motivation always requires the existence of certain conative states in addition to the relevant beliefs arrived at through reason and empirical inquiry. So, in order to account for the practicality of morality (i.e. for the connection between morality and motivation), we need something to make us care about moral goodness and badness; and that something is to be found within the emotional part of our nature.

But, importantly, Hume doesn't think this is indicative of some problem with morality, and so he doesn't understand himself to be undermining ordinary morality. His aim is to expose the groundless pretensions of reason in order to make room for a wholly naturalistic account morality; it's not to show that morality doesn't have a firm basis. For he does not think that morality would ideally be based on reason and empirical evidence rather than sentiment. Rather, he thinks there is a sort of philosophical overreaching involved in trying to base morality on reason or empirical evidence as opposed to sentiment.

So far, so good. But what is the relevant sentiment? According to Hume, it is a general sort of benevolence, of concern for others. At least where our own interests do not intrude on this feeling, we can take pleasure in the pleasure of others and we can be disturbed and pained by their pains and difficulties. Our possessing such a feeling does not mean that we'll always set aside our own interest in the interest of others; nor does it mean that we are not largely self-interested. It does, however, mean that we're not wholly self-interested, as we are motivated to do (and not do) certain things even when they do not affect our own interests and desires. Such a feeling, Hume argues, must be the basis for the sort of general and unselfish concern for welfare of others that morality requires of us. And since this sentiment is a common component of human nature, it provides morality with a non-parochial basis. The moral point of view, Hume argues, is one we take up when our sentiments and feelings about people and actions are based on a shared perspective based in human nature. And since we share similar sentiments and sensibilities in virtue of our shared nature, morality possesses a sort of intersubjectivity.

But what inspires these sentiments, and how exactly do they translate into moral judgments? Morality, Hume argues, is based on sentiments of approbation and disapprobation that are prompted by a recognition of the connection between human actions, dispositions, etc. and what is in the best interest of oneself and of mankind in general. What we take to be virtues, Hume argues, are those dispositions that lead a person to perform actions tending to promote his own happiness and the happiness of others, whereas vices are dispositions that do the opposite. And this allows us to see the source of Hume's optimism. For it is his view that being moral is in our own interest, and in the interest of others. The morally good person is one whose actions are for the good of himself and for the good of others, and this is why we approve of such people. This is why we find them pleasant, why we enjoy their company, and why we think it's a good thing to be virtuous. So this is anything but a dark, self-denying account of morality and our moral obligations. Morality is not a set of chains holding us back from realizing ourselves, from expressing our true nature. Given what our nature is actually like, Hume claims, there is no need to understand morality as involving self-abnegation for nothing more than self-abnegation's sake.

If I had to recommend a single book in moral philosophy to the general reader, I suppose it would be this one. There may be greater works of moral philosophy--Kant's works and Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, for instance--but those are works for the philosopher and this is a book for everyone. It's wise, accessible, inspiring, beautifully written, occasionally quite funny, and largely convincing.

Hume treats of morals in two distinct fashions. His major and last contribution is his "Enquiry," which was written late in his life; the other is Part III of his "Treatise on Human Nature," which was written much earlier in life. The two treatments are very different, and of the two, I much prefer the latter, as it is "demonstrated" a posteriori that man has a "natural inclincation" to maximize pleasure and to avoid pain. Besed on this natural inclination, humans endeavor to do those things that produce happiness, pride, joy, etc., because it maximizes pleasure, whereas humans endeavor to avoid those things that produce uneasiness, disturbances, misery, etc., because those things produce pain. From this a posteriori of natural inclinations, Hume explores the reasons why some things count as virtures (because they maximize pleasure), while some things count as vices (because they produce pain).

His "Enquiry," however, takes an altogether different approach, one based on the sentiments of utility and beneficence. Here humans do things that maximize their usefulness to themselves and to society that concomitantly bring beneficence. Those sentiments that are distinguished in natural language such as dexterity, perserverance, chastity, endurance, honesty, etc., count as virtues because they are "useful," while those that produce in natural language such things as sloth, lethargy, dishonesty, misery, etc., count as vice because they are "not useful." Our language itself is the measure of their untility.

The two theories, juxtaposed, are not at odds with each other, but definitely have distinctively different aetiologies. What I prefer about the "Treatise" is that one can infer the logical necessity of "natural inclinations" (dare I say "instinct") to maximize pleasure and avoid pain. This seems indisputably true empirically. Morals are indeed an a posteriori part of the human constitution. All the virtues and vices derived from this single principle have a solid foundation in human nature itself. Conversely, to merely posit that virtues and vices are merely sentiments according to their "utility" is less grounded in the person's natural inclinations, and is something one observes about human behavior in general.

Which approach will the reader prefer? That's difficult to determine, which is a good reason to read both the "Treatise" and the "Enquiry." As I already mentioned, they are not at odds with each other, they just have different starting points. Personally, the approach in the "Treatise" appeals because it starts with a intrinsic feature of what it is to be human, i.e., it seems to have a stronger foundation and logically inferred consequences from observances. Yet, the approach in the "Enquiry" is more vivacious, but is less grounded, because it is merely posits observances of ephemeral conditions that continually change from time to time and from culture to culture. If one wants to affirm that morals do have a solid foundation in human nature, you'll probably prefer the "Treatise," but if one wants to affirm that morals are merely "preferences" built into our natural language that differ from culture to culture and from time to time, you'll probably prefer the "Enquiry." Either way, however, they take us away from pie-in-the-sky metaphysical speculations!

I've always been conflicted about reviewing "classic" books on Amazon. Do I give Plato 3 stars because parts of "The Republic" are goofy? Is Marx "dry and boring" because long stretches of "Capital" are difficult? Is it necessary to point out that Dostoyevsky is a powerful writer? It all seems crazy -- but then isn't it crazy for a middle-aged bureaucrat who reads books in his spare time to be "reviewing" the giants at all? Of course it is.

Accordingly, I'll keep these comments short. The bottomline about "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" is that it's a great place to begin a study of philosophical ethics. It's short, clear, and droll. It analyzes key ethical concepts such as utility, sympathy, justice, and altruism. Most importantly, its argument can be followed by the average reader without extra commentary or exegesis. (I almost called it "smart," too -- but surely we can take that for granted. Everything Hume wrote was smart.)

Hume's approach to ethics is naturalistic, not metaphysical or religious. He sees ethical beliefs as rooted in utility and instinctive sympathy. These beliefs aren't "true" like the truths of math, and they don't bind people in any logical sense. Yet they are inescapable in personal life, necessary for social peace, and as natural as sex. There are other ways to see ethics, but Hume's way at least avoids jargon and recondite arguments. He gets his readers to think -- and that's why his book is such a great entry point. It's also a great read!

'Nuff said.

If you are looking for a non-superstitious, non-mystical guide to moral living, you can do no better than this classic by one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived. Elegantly written. Simple and yet profound. It is just what I was looking for a few years ago and it has served me well ever since.

I expected more from the production of the book. Yes, it contains the complete text of "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," but:
1. There is nothing else, not even a page giving the year in which David Hume first published it.
2. There are numerous formatting errors. For example, in several places a paragraph is broken in the middle of a sentence.
3. Footnotes are put in the body of the text rather than at the bottom of the page.

On the other hand:
1. A decent sized font has been used, so the text is easy to read.
2. The book is printed on high quality paper.

In retrospect, I wish I had bought a book with an editor's introduction.

I read this book for a graduate seminar on ethics. Hume's An Enquiry Concerning The Principles Of Morals (EPM) along with his staunch empirical approach to epistemology, has garnered him recognition as a "great skeptic" of the rationalist tradition in philosophy and recognition as the greatest philosopher to write in English. Hume's ethical project is concerned with discovering how people's nature dictates moral behavior and in discovering the moral virtues that society deems useful. Hume separates himself from the classical Greek notion of how an agent acts virtuously when he posits his thesis that people are incapable of using reason to sway their emotions or substantially influence their wills. Hume's theory regarding the process that agents use to act is a departure from the classical Greek model in that it relies on passion and is devoid of the idea of using practical reasoning to overcome feelings of fear to accomplish a noble end. For Hume, only a person's passions can choose their ends, and he denies that reason has the ability to evaluate their ends. Hume's notions on reason vastly contradicts the vast majority of ancient and modern philosophers' beliefs, regarding the amalgamation of human emotion and reason producing the practical reasoning to guide an agent to act.

Hume's anti-rationalist assertion that reason cannot be the major factor producing moral action provides the foundation for his entire ethical theory. In essence, Hume uses a causality argument to explain virtues and vices and what motivates people to make moral choices. Hume argues that what moves people are sentiments of pleasure, such as, pride or love, or pain, such as humility or hatred, as they either observe actions by others or contemplate performing acts of their own. Hume adopts a subjective view to morality. He argues that one cannot use reason or science to deduce "truths" in ethics. Actions are deemed virtuous by a particular society through judgments of approval or distaste of people's sentiments when observing or contemplating a particular action. With this ethical model, Hume posits the notion that there are only two types of virtues, "natural" and "artificial," and that courage is a natural virtue since it brings the pleasurable sentiment of praise and pride to the one who acts courageously. Hume leaves very little if any room for reason to either direct the people will, or even work in conjunction with people passions or emotions to form any kind of practical reasoning a person can rely on to guide them on a path to ethical behavior.

Hume presents a four-point catalogue of sentiments in his EPM that he thinks comprise virtues, and they are similar to Descartes' list of passions. In fact, like Descartes' descriptions of his passions, Hume's descriptions of the virtues are done in a similar vain and take up the bulk of the book. Hume's virtue of courage is found in section seven of the EPM under his third category entitled, Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves. Hume describes this third category of sentiments as a list of personal merits, "...which is useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others, communicates a pleasure to the spectators, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit." (EPM, 2. 1. 9. 12). Hume states that, "The utility of COURAGE, both to the public and to the person possessed of it, is an obvious foundation of merit." This opening line in Hume's description is not counter to the classical Greek ideal of courage. (EPM, 2. 1. 7. 11). Hume goes on to state, "But to anyone who duly considers of the matter, it will appear, that this quality has a peculiar luster, which it derives wholly from itself, and from that noble elevation inseparable from it." (EPM, 2. 1. 7. 11). This line in Hume's description describes courage more in line with the ancient Greek notion of courage as depicted in Homer's Iliad. This is borne out in Hume's last line of his description wherein he writes, "Its (courage) figure, drawn by painters and by poets, displays, in each feature, a sublimity and daring confidence; which catches the eye, engages the affections, and diffuses, by sympathy, a like sublimity of sentiment over every spectator." (EPM, 2. 1. 7. 11).

I find it interesting that Hume is the first philosopher since the classical Greeks to recognize, whether for good or bad, the influence the arts play on people's passions and its effects on their actions; particularly in regards to the virtue of courage. In addition, Hume, who during his lifetime enjoyed a reputation as a historian of great renown, uses examples from history to explain in his EPM how the virtue of courage has favorably worked on people's passions. For example, he writes that, "The martial temper of the Romans, enflamed by continual wars, had raised their esteem of courage so high, that, in their language, it was called virtue, by way of excellence and distinction from all other moral qualities." (EPM, 2. 1. 7. 13). Once again, Hume addresses artistic influence in undeveloped cultures, including the Homeric era in Greece, "...who have not, as yet, had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence, justice, and the social virtues, courage is the predominant excellence; what is most celebrated by poets, recommended by parents, and instructors, and admired by the public in general." EPM, 134, (EPM, 2. 1. 7. 15). Even classical Greek philosophers commented on this phenomenon. Aristotle in his Poetics, observes and accepts the notion that the depiction of tragic heroes on stage greatly influences the Greek understanding of courage. On the other hand, Plato, in his Republic, railed against Greek tragedy as a pernicious influence arguing that Greeks should be influenced by reason and not their passions. This is why Plato was so careful to point out that the Guardians of the city had to be taught the right type of literature to develop their courage.

Hume's historically rich description of the virtue of courage and how it is a virtue of passion with little if any influence from reason, shows the evolutionary change for the virtue of courage is a stark break from all the previous philosophers.'. Hume leaves very little if any room for reason to either direct the people will, or even work in conjunction with people passions or emotions to form any kind of practical reasoning a person can rely on to guide them on a path to ethical behavior.

David Hume is a genius philosopher. His basic principle-- knowledge can only come from experience. His ideas on morality are indicative of a rich understanding of the mind and its surrounding world. This book should be read by anybody interested in morality, religion (its viability) and experience. He is a fascinating thinker.