Customer Reviews

Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51

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I was a automatic rifleman (BAR) in the USMC during the 1st 4 months of the Korean War, wounded at the Chosin Reservoir. Enter the Dragon is a fascinating story told from the Chinese view. It is seldom that anyone in combat ever gets to see his theater of action reported on by his enemy. After 40 years I turned to the books on the war. This one is As Good As it Gets. Anyone interested in the Korean War from the enemy "grunt's" view, this is your book.

Written by a British newspaper reporter who covered the latter stages of the war, this book contains narrative from extensive interviews with particpants in the Korean War, including many Chinese, which differentiates it from most other accounts. A portion of the book is devoted to the political underpinnings of Chinese intervention. The author provides supporting evidence for recent conclusions by figures such as U.S. General Matthew Ridgeway, that the intial N. Korean invasion was carried out without advance knowledge by China, which then hastily sent ill-equipped troops into battle after UN forces defeated North Korea.

But most of the book is comprised of gripping individual experiences of the battlefield from the perspective of the Chinese foot solider. Whether it be destroying tanks by close assault, surviving the ever-present American airstrikes, or the amazing bluff of marching Chinese commandos masquerading as South Koreans directly into a US battalion headquarters, any reader with an interest in wartime accounts will be well rewarded by time spent with this book

The majority of Western literature on the Korean War (1950-53) deals primarily with the Western experience; either that of the Americans, or, if you dig a little deeper, perhaps something on the British or another Commonwealth nation. Little attention is paid to the Koreans hailing from either side of the 38th Parallel, and even less to the hordes of Chinese, at least beyond a "faceless enemy conducting human wave attacks" standpoint. Russell Spurr breaks from that tradition in Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51, bringing us an in-depth point-of-view from the Chinese and North Korean side of the fight at last.

Spurr does not make the mistake of limiting his coverage to one side of the fight, however. The Americans are (of course) also prominent players in the drama, supplemented by cameos of the supporting cast of UN forces, occasionally the South Koreans, and even some vignettes including the Soviets. What we end up with is a fairly comprehensive portrait of the battles as they raged (both on and off the battlefield; military maneuvers are supplemented by political developments and diplomatic intrigue) from August 1950 through January 1951. These are the key months, according to Spurr, that "changed the course of history." (p. 5) It's hard to argue with him: after those fateful months came the long period of competition and suspicion between the US and China in Asia and the Pacific that lasted well into the 1970's and beyond (albeit in a more limited fashion now).

The author states that the Chinese intervention need not have happened if only UN forces had been better aware of the goings-on in Peking; for those not in the business, this means intelligence! US intelligence evaluations of Chinese intentions should have included analysis of high-level political intelligence provided by the CIA, but they did not, largely because the Truman administration had been "blinkered" by General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence monopoly in Asia. By MacArthur's decree, the Central Intelligence Agency was not even allowed to operate in Japan (from where they would have been running source operations in Korea and elsewhere) until 1952! As if the lack of independent intelligence collection was not bad enough, MacArthur's G-2 (chief intelligence officer), Major General Charles A. Willoughby, was seemingly incapable of rendering an independent assessment of the intelligence picture; instead he "matched his master's judgment." (p. 161)

Throughout the book Spurr shows us how poor American intelligence was and how easy it was for the enemy to collect on us. At the strategic level, US Far East Command (FECOM) was negligently dismissive of the North Korean troop and materiel build-up along the 38th Parallel before hostilities commenced. The entire American war effort in Korea was continually hampered by a "failure to gather or evaluate intelligence." (p. 27) US commanders suffered from "an almost complete lack of reliable intelligence about enemy movements and intentions." (p. 31) These are not laudatory remarks, by any means.

Further, instead of gathering intelligence by conducting reconnaissance patrols, as the Chinese did (producing detailed intelligence reports on US defensive schemes and lazy, lackadaisical troops), the Americans instead relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance assets (perhaps a dangerous foreshadowing of what in the US intelligence community today seems to be a "love affair" with high-tech collection assets). Full faith and confidence was placed in the "reconnaissance power of the U.S. Far East Air Force." (p. 158) If Chinese troops entered the conflict, the Americans thought, there was no way that the planes would miss them. More recently, Americans have certainly got the gathering part of the intelligence equation down, but some would argue that we still haven't learned the lesson about analysis. Even now, it is likely that much of the intelligence history of the Korean War remains classified, some 50-plus years on.

While the Americans floundered, the North Koreans used open-source intelligence (OSINT) to track troop movements from the US mainland, "reading all about it" in newspapers and magazines. Chinese signals intelligence (SIGINT) teams monitored American radio traffic and discovered that US forces mistakenly believed that the unexpected resistance they were meeting close to the Yalu River was from NKPA units, testimony to the effectiveness of Chinese deception measures, such as moving only at night and extensive use of camouflage. The Chinese easily determined the customary times of day when American recon flights passed above (in the mornings); they simply made sure to be in a covered position obscured from observation when that happened.

After the intelligence "backdrop" to the situation, the book starts out set in a North Korean command post outside the Pusan Perimeter. The Korean People's Army (KPA) is trying to close the deal on unifying the Korean peninsula after running roughshod over the hapless Republic of Korea (ROK) forces arrayed across from it on the 38th Parallel. Despite starting off with the North Koreans, most of the book is spent looking in on either the Americans or the Chinese. Indeed, when Koreans make an appearance in the book they are either inept (ROK Army forces) or only marginally important (like the North Koreans looking on from the sidelines as the Chinese do the vast majority of the heavy fighting). As the caricature goes, the South Koreans are American "puppets" and the North Koreans are propaganda-addicted Comrades.

It goes on to cover all the major events of the war from August 1950 to January 1951, the "meatiest" portion of the war in terms of fighting. MacArthur's risky Inchon amphibious assault by the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division enables the breakout of UN forces from Pusan. As "victory disease" infects UN forces and "home by Christmas" becomes the de-facto motto of American troops, one American regimental commander is determined to urinate in the Yalu River. He did so on November 21, 1950.

As US troops begin to encounter sterner resistance closer to Manchuria, more and more Chinese troops were turning up as prisoners of war. Elements of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force (CPVF) were making their way into North Korea to fight the Americans as early as October, but US intelligence knew nothing of it. Soon, there was no way they could not know. Lead elements of the UN advance were crushed by enemy units of unimaginable strength. Before long the retreat south is on as the Chinese enter the fight en masse and push UN forces back well past Seoul before outrunning their supply lines and stalling their advance. This was the longest and most humiliating retreat in US military history. The US Marines appear again, too: their orderly withdrawal under fire from the frozen Changjin Reservoir in northeastern Korea is clearly contrasted with the haphazard, every-man-for-himself circus of a retreat that took place in the west.

The book ends as General Matthew Ridgway assumes command following MacArthur's relief by President Truman. UN forces are just starting to get back in the fight, applying Ridgway's "meatgrinder" combined-arms approach, trying to move beyond the road-bound, vehicle-borne myopia that passed for tactics to that point. "A line in the snow" is drawn south of Seoul and UN forces stiffen their resistance on the frozen terrain, at last beginning to push the Chinese back to the north.

The book reads very fast, like a Tom Clancy novel. It is written in a comfortable narrative style, taking you right into the action, be it on the battlefield alongside a Chinese commando squad infiltrating US defensive positions, inside the fantasy-land UN command center at Dai Ichi in Tokyo, or sitting in on the deliberations of the Chinese Revolutionary Council in Peking. In fact, the front matter of the book includes a list of "major narrative characters," which seemed a bit odd for a purported book of history. This approach to telling the story of history may not be entirely run-of-the-mill, but it works. Spurr is able to weave the tale, derived from interviews with survivors, in a convincing fashion. It is certainly an interesting way to present both sides of the conflict. The author, a Brit who served in the Royal Indian Navy and was a journalist (he died in 2002) also wrote several other books, one of which, A Glorious Way to Die: The Kamikaze Mission of the Battleship Yamato, April 1945, was also written in the same narrative style as this book.

The book includes maps (absent is a scale to relate distances to the ground), a chronology of events from 1945 - 1953 (but it is only detailed during August 1950 - January 1951, the focus of the book), a bibliography, and an index, but no footnotes or endnotes, which is its biggest weakness as a work of historical value. The lack of citations has led to some criticism of the book, assessed to be valid by this reviewer, that it is largely based on hearsay. Absent documentation, there is little way to tell.

In the end, the book is worth reading if for no other reason than to put the reader in Korea, China, or Japan in 1950-51 as the events of the Korean War unfold, something that this work is able to do in a way that the majority of non-narrative history books are far less capable of. At least for this reviewer, it whets the appetite to learn more about this "forgotten war" and especially about the people who lost the most from it, namely the Koreans. After certain points in 1950 (June 25 for the South Koreans; October 14 for the North Koreans), the locals became only bit players in the whole tragic sequence of events. Once the Americans and the Chinese got involved, conduct of the war was largely out of the Koreans' hands. Koreans on both sides of the 38th Parallel were driven from their homes and saw their lands ravaged as ground changed hands again and again. Certainly, the Chinese and the Americans suffered mightily as they fought up and down the Korean peninsula, but in the end were able to go back to their respective countries and lick their wounds. For the Koreans who were fortunate enough to survive the conflict, many had nothing to return to.

Very interesting and full of eye opening strategy on both the parts of the Chinese and the UN, well I should just say the US really, after all as usual in UN operations, it was America who born the brunt of the bloody battles...not to mention the tab too!

Usually History is told by the victors. There were no victors in the Korean War, but because of the long and sometimes self imposed isolation of China in the post Korean War period, most histories concentrate on the American participation. This excellent book views the all important first year from the Chinese and the American sides. The incredible courage of both armies is recreated, along with the terrible hardship. The mistakes tactical and strategic , of leaders on both sides are described . It is almost painful to read , as you know that these mistakes will cause the deaths of thousands of foot soldiers simply following orders. Many histories of the first year revolve around the Marines at Chosin, [a saga that stands out in the annals of war] but Spurr goes beyond this. He describes the bravery and collapse of the US Army in Western Korea , and the equally amazing story of the Chinese infantry. The most moving and terrifying passages in this book show a Chinese officer moving through the North Korean winter to reach the front and seeing snowmen standing along the sides of rural roads. He slowly realizes that they are Chinese Soldiers who froze in place. If you ever doubted that war is hell read this book. Neither MacArthur or Mao is spared from intense criticism. Both planned elaborate and amazing victories and then lost all sight of reality forcing their soldiers into untenable positions and ultimate disaster.

Enter the Dragon purports to tell the story of the opening stages of Chinese involvement in the Korean War from the Chinese perspective. It is really amazing to read about how they were able to move masses of men into Korea, largely undetected, without the support of a developed transportation system. You can't help but admire, if grudgingly, the toughness and dedication of the Chinese whose stories are told in the book. The author writes in a first person style, and almost makes you feel you were there. The style was highly readable. I found this book to be a fascinating if painful read. It is fascinating to get a glimpse into the "enemies'" perspective on a war, but painful to read their tales of success in killing your own countrymen. There were several points in this book where I just had to put it down and take a break.

The author does make some curious mistakes. For instance he refers to General Matthew Ridgeway as being Deputy Chief of Staff of 8th Army when he was appointed to replace General Walker after general Walker was killed in a jeep accident. At the time Ridgeway was Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army not just of 8th Army; a significant difference. It was also interesting to contrast the author's views on General Walker's performance as commander of 8th Army with those of John Toland in his book In Mortal Combat; Korea 1950-1953. Toland gives Walker credit for studying both his North Korean and Chinese opponents, divining their strengths and weaknesses, and adopting his strategy and tactics accordingly. Toland suggests that Walker's decision not to defend Pyongyang against the Chinese offensive was a calculated decision to allow the Chinese to overextend their supply lines. Spurr suggests that Walker's retreat was nothing more than a product of blind panic. This brings me to one other thing about enter the Dragon. It is often impossible to separate the author's viewpoints from those of the Chinese veterans he interviewed for the book.

I read the Kindle edition of this book. Man! I love my kindle. The one drawback is that it is hard to read the maps that are in the book, and the quality of the pictures is not nearly as good as it could be. I hope in future versions of the kindle they are able to improve upon this.

It is difficult to believe that such a volume as this took so disgracefully long to appear. The recentness of its availability gives so very much insight into what can be described as most brutal, relentless, savage fighting and acts of unbelievable HEROISM and unquantifiable sacrifice, especially of the intrepidity and determination of the men of THE U.S. FIRST MARINE DIVISION to fight to the proverbial, last ROUND of the weapon of the very 'LAST MAN' (some historians equate its savagery and ferocity with the Battle of IWO JIMA!) and disgracefully, which continues to this Day to be known as "THE FORGOTTEN WAR"; both IN DEED and IN FACT, that is exactly what it remained UNTIL this BOOK, a precious, indispensible history of insights into the KOREAN WAR! Read this BOOK and you will better understand how the men who endured the un-Godly hell of War against men unleashed by naked EVIL protagonists all while barely enduring the most severe 'elements of NATURE', conceivable. The intricacies of the international collusion involving the Chinese many ARMIES entering the field of cambat will shock many readers. It will come as shock also to learn that if the Chinese had not suffered not, the brutal, devastating, battered losses of lives, that TAIWON was looming on their AGENDA for invasion. If one wishes, honestly, to explore in depth, the entirety of the KOREAN WAR, this BOOK, "ENTER THE DRAGON", must not only be read but thoroughly digested; I guarantee, anyone reading this BOOK may be understandably shamed by AMERICA'S total unreadiness to prosecute that WAR and as usual, politics was not only in the proverbial wings BUT actually on 'CENTER STAGE'. The FREE WORLD again, owes an unredeemable debt to AMERICA AND THE ALLIES who fought so heroically and I must add, The BRITISH ROYAL MARINES.

Jim Girzone

I purchased this book as I was intrigued to read how my mortal enemies in Korea percieved their point of view in this war...I served two [2] volunteered tours of duty in Korea in close combat vs both Communists Armies from Red North Korea and Red China...I know my enemies from that bestial war...it was easy reading as the Red Chinese Captain put pen to paper...I do not doubt one word of his text and was not surprised of the lack of security of US Army and ROK units up on the Yalu, [especially at nite]....his 'famed long knives' unit was well trained in stealth, I grant him that...the author rambles on about his unit's successful assaults vs US Army elements from the Yalu to Wonju which is a distant south of Seoul in the Red Chinese offensive from late Nov/50 to Feb/51 when the attrition of logistics finally render their breakthrough expendable and his detailed account of how the US Eighth Army under Gen Matt Ridgeway drove the Red Chinese back up into North Korea territory for good...in this undertaking the good Captain sadly relates all of his 'long knives' unit was completely wiped out by US Army troops...I LIKED THAT PART THE BEST....in summation, a good read from the eyes of a cunning and skillful enemy...allow me to say this, the Red Chinese soldier in the field was NOT superior to American forces, the Red Chinese won their battles with suicidal frontal attacks [mostly at nite] by means of thousands upon thousands of troops, alot of them unarmed, were cut to ribbons by withering firepower from US and ROK troops...other times, the United Nation Forces were overrun or made a withdrawl to survive...the American fighting man in Korea was the better warrior not the Communist hordes...."stay warm".....SEMPER FIDELIS...SSGT CHRIS SARNO-USMC FMF