Escaping the Trap: The Us Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950 (Texas a and M University Military History Series, 14) [Hardcover]

Roy Edgar Appleman (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 1990 | Series: Texas a and M University Military History Series, 14

After its successful landing at Inchon and capture of Seoul in September 1950, the U.S. X Corps was joined by Eighth Army, and many people expected the two commands to be combined into one. Instead, General MacArthur ordered the X Corps to load onto ships and travel around the peninsula to northeastern Korea and the port city of Wonsan, which the South Korean I Corps had captured. Major elements of X Corps were to move west from their positions in northeast Korea and cut the supply lines of Chinese troops expected to cross the Yalu and confront Eighth Army. Other parts of X Corps would push north toward the border and thus control all of Korea. Neither goal was met.Escaping the Trap tells what happened when X Corps discovered that the Chinese had crossed the Yalu unseen and marched rapidly to Chosin Reservoir, where they landed a surprise attack against the 1st Marine Division and the army's 31st Regimental Combat Team of the 7th Infantry Division. The Chinese attack in late November 1950 virtually annihilated the 31st RCT east of Chosin, while the 1st Marine Division made an escape through treacherous terrain and a forty-mile roadblock, pushing on to the coast and the monumental evacuation of X Corps from North Korea.Roy E. Appleman's study of the day-to-day records of X Corps and of published material and his interviews and correspondence with survivors make the whole story of this portion of the Korean War available for the first time.

--This text refers to the Audio CD edition.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

With the exception of Appleman's East of Chosin, the growing body of literature about the 1950 campaign in northeast Korea has concentrated on the breakout of the 1st Marine Division from encirclement by Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) at the Chosin Reservoir, with little attention to the two American army divisions of X Corps, the 3rd and 7th, which contributed significantly. Here the author presents the first inclusive study of the overall campaign, and his skills as a historian and the richness of documentation supporting the text make it likely to be the definitive account. Appleman has uncovered new material on the CCF units involved and argues that the decision of the Chinese high command to counterattack the strongest element in X Corps, the 1st Marine Division, was a sound one. He disputes the long-held view that the Marines were heavily outnumbered and that the Chinese employed "human wave" tactics. These are controversial conclusions, especially for Marine partisans who maintain that the Army let them down at the Chosin Reservoir. Photos.
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.

About the Author

The late Roy E. Appleman wrote several military history studies, among them South to Naktong, North to the Yalu; Okinawa: The Last Battle; and Ridgway Duels for Korea, which won the Truman Library Book Award. During the Korean War, he served as an army historian, interviewing troops shortly after combat. He left his papers, including all interviews related to the Chosin campaign research, to the Army History Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Kevin Foley has over thirty years' experience in radio and television broadcasting, commercial voice-overs, and audiobook narration. He has recorded over 150 audiobooks, including Storm Rising by Gary Naiman, 100 Ways to Bring Out Your Best by Roger Fritz, The Last Witness by Joel Goldman, and River Thunder by Gary McCarthy, for which he earned a Spur Award for Best Audiobook from the Western Writers of America.

--This text refers to the Audio CD edition.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 411 pages
• Publisher: Texas a & M Univ Pr; 1st edition (January 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0890963959
• ISBN-13: 978-0890963951
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 5.9 x 1.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 3.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,615,786 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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31 of 31 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A good synthesis of battlefield action and command decisions, November 19, 1997

By A Customer

This review is from: Escaping the Trap: The Us Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950 (Texas a and M University Military History Series, 14) (Hardcover)

This is the larger story that contains in part East of Chosin, also by the author. The book talks about the roles of Marine and Army ground units, as well as Naval air support in the entire reservoir area and the MSR to evacuation at Hungnam. Despite the disaster east of the reservoir, the final evacuation to Hungnam occurred in a most professional mannner and in no way resembled a Dunkirk, despite US news media hysteria cooed on by their communist sympathizers.
On the other hand Appleman makes clear that while the Chinese had a manpower advantage (and even that was not as overwhelming as many thought), they had no artillery, tanks, air support or motor transit. Their largest weapons were small mortars.

Appleman is a powerful writer who elegantly weaves battlefield action, command decisions, and military analysis into a cogent text. Among his insights:

*** The 'gap' between 8th army and X corps (occupied by the savage peaks of the Taebek range) was of no military significance and had no bearing on the outcome of operations in North Korea/Chosin.

*** General Almond did have reservations about pushing deeply into the reservoir area. However, after the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills, McArthur insisted they move forward and Almond complied.

*** The book has good summary coverage of the 37th RCT east of Chosin ['task force Faith']. Ironically, it was the Chinese 80th division encounter with TFF, rather than proceeding directly to Hagaru-ri, that may have cost the Chinese a crucial victory at the southern tip of Chosin, on their first night attack at Hagaru-ri.

*** Often overlooked in the successful breakout was the role of the Far East Cargo command, providing ammunition and medical supplies by the ton to the escaping convoy.

*** Task Force Dryesdale, a tank-led column from Koto-ri NORTH to reinforce Hagaru, suffered heavy losses; but those who did make it provided vitally needed, experienced reinforcements.

*** The 2nd Chinese attack at Hagaru-ri, although better organized, had lost the 'element of surprise', so the Chinese suffered massive losses. In fact, this defeat turned the tides in favor of the Army and Marines at Chosin.

*** Armchair analysts and military brats should compare Faith's verbal orders to his task force at the Pyongnuri-gang Inlet with the far more coordinated USMC air-ground withdrawal from Yudam-ni and beyond.

*** Still, Appleman gives a far better account of the performance of Army units in the march south of Hagaru-ri than Donald Knox and others have. This is especially true on hill 1081 near Funchilin pass, with frequent praise of Captains Rasula and Kitz and Lt. Colonel Page.

Especially useful is the last chapter where Appleman evaluates Chinese and X corps command and field decisions. Appleman feels the Chinese were correct to attack UN forces directly at Chosin. An attack further north would have left Hungnam open for evacuation or reinforcement. An attack further south would not be a surprise since X-corps knew Chinese were in the area.

Appleman feels the Chinese attack at Chosin failed for several reasons. First, their manpower advantage was not as overwhelming as many writers suggest. 'Human Wave' tactics were largely a myth, though the Chinese often massed attacks on one spot. Perhaps most important, the US Marines did not panic: they remained and fought in their perimeters (no better example than Fox company at Toktong pass) as they moved south.

Appleman slips into military jargon--"element of surprise"; "mass of forces"; still, at Hagaru the Chinese lost the former and didn't capitalize on the latter. He also is stretching military journalism a bit in his references to "Xenophon's retreat from Asia Minor." But the fact remains that the Marines knew they had to control the higher ground in order to retreat. The Army did not: neither east of Chosin, nor in the west at Kunu-ri.