An Essay on Metaphysics [Paperback]

R. G. Collingwood (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0819133159 | ISBN-13: 978-0819133151 | Publication Date: February 1, 1984 0

One of the great Oxford philosopher's finest works, Essay on Metaphysics considers the nature of philosophy, and puts forward Collingwood's original and influential theories of causation, presuppositions, and the logic of question and answer. This new edition includes three fascinating unpublished pieces that illuminate and amplify the Essay.

--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Editorial Reviews

Review

`This skilfully-edited and handsomely-produced book... Nearly sixty years after its first publication An Essay on Metaphysics retains its philosophical value.' James Connelly, British Journal for the History of Philosophy --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

About the Author

R. G. Collingwood was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford from 1935 to 1941. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 366 pages
• Publisher: Univ Pr of Amer (February 1, 1984)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0819133159
• ISBN-13: 978-0819133151
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #9,531,021 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A logical look at key philosophical ideas, February 17, 2004

By 

Bruce P. Barten (Saint Paul, MN United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: An Essay on Metaphysics (Paperback)

It is time to leave ontology behind. Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943) took a year leave of absence on medical grounds from the University of Oxford, produced a first draft of this book during a voyage from England to Java, and explained the purpose of this book in a Preface dated 2 April 1939. Early in the book, he backs up his views with the ideas about metaphysics of Berkeley, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Chapter 3, Metaphysics without Ontology, proposes that "Ontology will be my name for a mistake which people have made, Aristotle first and foremost, about metaphysics." Nietzsche and Heidegger are not discussed in this book. To the extent that particular individuals have been gripped by philosophical questions, their thinking is not considered important in the way in which it was important to them personally, but only insofar as their thinking was capable of producing a natural science.

Chapter 5, The Science of Absolute Presuppositions, must be understood as a product of Definition 6 in Chapter 4, "An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer." This might work perfectly in fields like mathematics, in which consensus is easy to arrive at among people who have some skill at sticking to a particular method, but it runs headlong into confusion when it is explained with "Prop. 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions." This approaches the level of obscurity with which Richard Rorty discusses pragmatism when Collingwood points out the distinction, "the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being (see def. 1) peculiar to propositions."

Chapter 6, "Metaphysics An Historical Science" makes clear that the form of science determines what is considered a cause.

"(a) In Newtonian physics . . . Events not due to the operation of causes are supposed to be due to the operation of laws."

"(b) . . . The peculiarity of Kantian physics is that it uses the notion of cause and the notion of law, one might almost say, interchangeably : it regards all laws of nature as laws according to which causes in nature operate, and all causes in nature as operating according to law."

"(c) In modern physics the notion of cause has disappeared. Nothing happens according to causes; everything happens according to laws."

Metaphysics can note such changes in the history of science by maintaining, "It is a mistake, therefore, to fancy that by investigating the truth of their absolute presuppositions a metaphysician could show that one school of science was fundamentally right and another fundamentally wrong." By sticking to history to evaluate metaphysical propositions, we can allow for the possibility "These are historical questions." Those who lack historical consciousness are more likely to "present a piece of purely historical research as if it were a research into the universal nature of understanding. But their mistaking it for something else does not alter the fact that it is history."

Part II of this book is called "Anti-Metaphysics," beginning with Chapter 8, "What Anti-Metaphysics Is." Since the world is constantly changing, the three major categories are "1. Progressive Anti-Metaphysics." "2. Reactionary Anti-Metaphysics." and a more complex case, "3. Irrationalist Anti-Metaphysics." After explaining the progressive and reactionary cases, we get Chapter 9, "Psychology as Anti-Metaphysics." Here is another science which tells us how we think. This gets us to Chapter 10, "Psychology as the Science of Feeling" and Chapter 11, "Psychology as the Pseudo-Science of Thought." At the cutting edge of critical thought, Collingwood cast a glance at a few contemporaries. "To plead that a criticism of TOTEM AND TABOO does not touch Freud's real position is to say that his views on religion, magic, and civilization are not grounded in his work as a scientist but are the mere opinions of a man whose reputation as a scientist has won for them a consideration they do not deserve."

Chapter 13, "The Propaganda of Irrationalism" expresses concern for civilization, religion, politics, education, social structure, and economic life. In a world in which common ideas depend mostly upon "the status of psychology as the pseudo-science of thought which claims to usurp the field of logic and ethics in all their various branches, including political science, aesthetics, economics, and whatever other criteriological sciences there may be," Collingwood suspects "it is an attempt to discredit the very idea of science." More complicated philosophical considerations crop up in Chapter 14, "Positivistic Metaphysics." This is getting close to the middle of this book.

Part III consists of examples. Chapters 18 through 21 consider "The Existence of God." Chapters 22 through 28 explain "The Metaphysics of Kant." Chapters 29 to 33, on causation, conclude with "Causation in Kantian Philosophy." Chapter 34, the "Epilogue," considers the views of other professors, Cook Wilson, H. A. Prichard, J. M. Keynes, John Wisdom, and A. J. Ayer, who "are a group of neo-Kantians whose reverence for the master has induced them to accept" what is now dubious. "To quote the bitter words of Earl Russell: `The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm'." I am not aware of the historical event pictured at the end of this book:

"When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professional goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed at a college table ; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will."

1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Fantastic, December 20, 2007

By 

Raphael Rosen "Reviewer" - See all my reviews
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This review is from: An Essay on Metaphysics (Paperback)

This is one of the best books I have ever read, philosophy or otherwise. I highly recommend it.