Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [Paperback]

J. L. Mackie (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 17, 1991

This title presents an insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity.

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About the Author

John Leslie Mackie (1917-1981) was a philosopher who made significant contributions to the fields of ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. A professor of philosophy at the universities of Sydney, Otago, New Zealand, and York, he was elected a fellow of the University of Oxford in 1967 and to the British Academy in 1974.

Product Details

• Paperback: 256 pages
• Publisher: Penguin (Non-Classics) (May 17, 1991)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0140135588
• ISBN-13: 978-0140135589
• Product Dimensions: 7.6 x 5 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 7 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (10 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #290,442 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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43 of 43 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Classic of Contemporary Moral Philosophy, February 16, 2004

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ctdreyer (NY USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Paperback)

The first chapter of Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong is the locus classicus for error theories in contemporary meta-ethics. There he argues that ordinary moral discourse and thought involve an assumption that there are what he calls "objective values," and that this assumption is false. Consequently, ordinary moral thought and language are infected by an error that precludes any ordinary moral claims and thoughts from being true.

Mackie first argues for a cognitivist interpretation of moral language. In other words, he argues that ordinary moral claims purport to describe facts about the world. In particular, ordinary moral language and thought purport to describe facts about objective moral values. What are objective moral values? They have two defining characteristics: (i) mind-independent existence (think of how chairs, trees, people, and electrons exist), and (ii) "intrinsic and categorical prescriptivity": that is, they are such that the mere apprehension of them will motivate a person to act in a certain way. The former characteristic is the source of their objectivity; the latter is the source of their normativity.

But, he claims, we have good reason to think that no such things exist. Mackie's fundamental worry about these putative objective values is that these things are especially "queer," that they are unlike any other things we have good reason to think exist. As I understand Mackie, underlying his worries about the queerness of these putative entities is his perception of a tension in their nature. He appears to believe that the objectivity of these putative entities is in tension with their intrinsic and categorical action-guidingness. That is, it is unclear to Mackie how something that exists as a mind-independent part of reality could have the sort of influence on human behavior that these objective values are supposed to have. It is unclear how something could be both objective and normative. The things that scientists study and that we encounter in the everyday world simply don't have this sort of categorical action-guidingness built into them. So, given the naturalistic conception of the world that Mackie favors, we have good a posteriori reasons to doubt the existence of objective moral values.

But, if Mackie is correct about the nature of ordinary moral thought and language, this commits us to regarding ordinary moral thought and language as involving a very fundamental sort of error, an error of presupposing that objective moral values exist. Mackie then completes his error theory by providing an explanation of our tendency to make this error, to mistakenly suppose that ordinary moral thought and language involve our successfully coming to know about the sorts of things he claims don't exist.

Mackie's book doesn't end here, however. Indeed, this is only the first chapter, and Mackie goes on to cover a wide range of territory in normative ethics and meta-ethics, along with a few issues in metaphysics (the existence of God and freedom of the will) that have some bearing on moral issues. In fact, despite his worries about the objectivity of morality, Mackie goes on to defend a substitute for morality, one that looks quite a bit like a broadly consequentialist moral theory, and he even weighs in on several controversial moral issues that are still with us. In short, in a little over two hundred pages of exceptionally clear prose, Mackie covers just about everything of interest in moral philosophy.

This book is, of course, essential reading for anyone interested in meta-ethics. Understanding some of the material and its importance may require some background knowledge, but enough of the book is more generally accessible that it also constitutes a good wide-ranging introduction to issues in both meta-ethics and normative ethics for a person with some background in philosophy (and perhaps for the general reader). Furthermore, the book, while not a work of history, is sufficiently informed about the history of the issues it discusses to provide the reader with an entry into study of the history of the subject.

If you're especially interested in Mackie's meta-ethical views, you should attempt to track down a copy of Morality and Objectivity (Ted Honderich, ed.), as it includes interesting and important reactions to Mackie's views by some major names (John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, R. M. Hare, Bernard Williams, et al.) in moral philosophy.

14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Classic of 20th Century Ethics Indeed..., August 8, 2006

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IR (Estonia) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Paperback)

It might be read as an introduction to Ethics, but it isn't one. It is rather one of the most important works in 20th century ethics.

Mackie's book was revolutionary since being the first one to combine anti-realism (no objectively prescriptive values in the world) with cognitivism (the meaning of ethical statements can be true or false). Most of the previous anti-realists were anti-realists mostly implicitly, only because of being non-cognitivsts. Mackie has a different view which in my opinion is much more closer to the truth. The book also contains his error theory (people have a disposition to see their value judgments as objective). While the reviewer cdtreyer as the mainstream tradition have concentrated on Mackie's error theory I think it is much less important than the denial of the objective values and the justification of the role of morality in quasi-contractual terms.

Mackie's views on positive morality are justified by quasi-contractual (he discusses Plato's Protagoras, Hobbes and Hume) means and would combine very well with evolutionary perspectives. The discussion on the content of normative views is just a brief sketch, but this isn't really what this book is about anyway. Anyone who claims that the contents of the first part of the book undermine the contents of the second should read chapter 5 again and again and again. That there are no objective values in the world does not mean that there can't be right or wrong - it simply must be (or rather already has largely been) invented and constructed.

If you are interested in ethics you simply need to read this small, but important book which, while not being an introduction is still quite simple and very elegantly written. Besides the main content you will also get to read a great discussion on the meaning of the good (in debate with the classical Geach-Hare discussion found in Philippa Foot's "Theories of Ethics"), discussion on the is-ought problem and its flawed Searlean solution (also found in Foots collection), a chapter on univerzalisability of moral judgments (contra Hare) and on the frontiers of ethics: voluntary actions, determinism, law, politics, religion.

31 of 38 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Classic defense of "moral skepticism.", November 15, 2000

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bryan12603 (Poughkeepsie, NY USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Paperback)

Mackie wants to convince us that objective values are not "part of the fabric of the universe." In other words, there are no moral claims that are objectively true, and no moral rules that are objectively binding on us. He gives three arguments in support of this claim. He argues that the best explanation for the diversity of ethical beliefs is that there is no matter of fact that some of us are getting right, while others are getting it wrong. He argues that the very existence of objective values is "queer" (by which he means "weird"), because they would have to have some strange sort of "intrinsic prescriptivity." And he argues that knowledge of objective values, if there were any, would require some strange, inexplicable form of moral intuition.

I personally am unconvinced by Mackie's arguments. For example, why should our ethical disagreements lead us to believe that there are no ethical facts? People disagree about lots of things that are objective if anything is (e.g., whether UFO's are space aliens). However, this is clearly one of the paradigmatic statements and defenses of "moral anti-realism."

For an alternative perspective to Mackie's, one might read Thomas Nagel's _The View from Nowhere_ (especially the chapters on ethics and value), or Alasdair MacIntyre's _After Virtue_.