17 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A philosophical and cultural delight., June 18, 2003
For someone who loves Philosophy and Judaism this book was a real delight. Margalit draws on Jewish and European cultural sources to examine both the nature of ethics as opposed to morality and the meaning and obligations of memory.
Usually cross cultural afficionados are caught in a philosophical world that has no use for religious traditions or vice versa. Here is a unique opportunity to revel in both.
Regardless of ones political or religious background or inclinations this book will resonate and stimulate.
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3 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Ethically Amazing, May 29, 2007
This review is from: The Ethics of Memory (Paperback)
This has been a great book, full of insight and interest, the terms are well defined and easy to pick up at any time on almost any level. An interesting and captivating treatise on how important memory is, and how it relates to engaging in and caring for our world and each other. A great read that captivates and provokes thought on deeper levels.
Amazingly related to the authors heart is humanity and humanitarianism in everyday life, his humanitarianism though, does not detract from his capability but adds to it, as he rationalizes and attempts to make sense of one of the most personally overlooked aspects of life.
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1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
The limits of memory, October 28, 2010
This review is from: The Ethics of Memory (Paperback)
Memory accompanies us on the temporal path: it explains to us imperfectly how we got where we are and, in so doing, informs our choices. Our actions as individuals or members of a group are all strung along the temporal path: if society or a group is to endure, the past has practical implications for the future. Thus contracts endure, laws apply over time - in limiting our choices the past makes the future - and social life - predictable, hence possible. These are all practical issues, and for the good of society. Their justification is essentially rational and consequential.
Prof MARGALIT, however, asks a different kind of question: to what extent, however, do memories obligate us in a deontological way? Do we "owe" something unconditionally to the past, as an individual or member of a group? The question is difficult: for memories are in the realm of the contingent and particular, not the universal. If we accept that deontological obligations arise from memory, we may need to break with universal obligations, or rank them lower. And this notwithstanding the fact that memory is such a weak link to the past - memory is a place where fiction turns to self-serving myth.
The author attempts to demonstrate that next to (or better, higher than) unconditional obligations of a universal character (he calls this "morals") there are also unconditional obligations within a group (he calls this "ethics") - and if anything, they take priority. The reason being, says Prof. MARGALIT, that relations at the universal level are "thin", while relations at the group level are "thick" - like "blood is thicker than water". Shared memories commit those who hold them to each other in ways that shared humanity does not.
In ancient times heroes would sacrifice themselves for the group, asking to be remembered in return, or that their will be respected. How binding are such "contracts" with the dead"? This is no idle question, for the original contract may no longer suit the current context, or may reflect past errors in judgement. Are we to be bound today by the memory - even if the memory is no longer useful? The author's discussion of these questions is often rambling and confused, conflating what are social and personal obligations. It also mixes myth and history, leaving one perplexed as to the scope of such inter-temporal commitments.
The problem with "memory" is that it introduces an element of inconditional obligation into the moral choice. If good memories obligate, so do bad memories - in the latter case memory becomes an obligation for revenge. This, we'd agree, is not permissible.
Values are a blunt instrument: they are beyond rational argument. They brook no comparison among each other (should we save the mother or the child?). They adjust poorly to context (if a hospital has one bed and two critically ill people, who shall get preference?). To add group values to universal values would seems to me overloading the boat - we have enough value conflicts as it is, without adding to them. More pragmatically: "group memory" is inherently subject both to factual and political bias - I'd question its operability. Nationalism - which has roots in "group memories" has been seen, on closer inspection, to be an empty concept. Would memory do? A duck by any other name is still a duck.
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