Of all recent French intellectuals, Foucault is the most perspicacious and daring (and intelligible). His critique of Reiff's Triumph of the Therapeutic (psychiatry/psychology/penology) is brilliant, whether "Civilization & Madness," "Discipline & Punish," or his newly-translated-into-English "History of Madness." Whether one embraces his homoerotic S&M disposition, or not, his assault on the Cult of Therapy/Imprisonment and Powerful must speak to liberals everywhere.
Of Foucault's many writings, this collection of essays seems to represent his broadest range of ideas. I continue to find his historical, psychological, hermeneutic, and philosophical discourse problematic, but one cannot mistake his thrusts -- the making of an authentic self against the forces that would limit human freedom, but recognizing that freedom is not synonymous with libertinism. His indictments of the Therapeutic, the Penal, the Authority, etc. are all here. When he focuses on the "hermeneutic of the self (and subject)," one understands he is addressing how we "make ourselves into who we are," interpreting our different modes, in an almost technological (e.g., artificial) sense, but then decides against such constructs unless they "write truth of subjectivity." In scientific parlance, he's writing on the "phase transition" of his Cartesian inheritance between choas and stasis.
While associated with Nietzsche and post-modernism, Foucault was an Enlightenment Liberal to the core, and his chief interest was in "relations," including relations of power, viz., relations with the State, relations with Authorities, relations with Authoritarians, relations with Corporate Hegemons, etc. Given this focus, one would expect him to confront relations with others as person-to-person, the subject of morals and ethics. His embedded in Cartesian dualism, notwithstanding (a fault on most French thinkers), and despite exaggerating the apotheosis of the "self," he makes perennial contributions to relations between individuals and "others." Power may be thrilling, but only if one submits to it voluntarily, not if it is imposed from without.
Unfortunately, he has not reached deep enough into history to bring the ethical/moral debate into brightest focus. He fails to distinguish between morality (deontological proscriptions) and ethics (teleological prescriptiveness). Rather, he often conflates the two, or confuses them. Nietzsche, of course, heralded a return to an ethics-based civilization, overthrowing deontologically-based Judeo-Christianity, which prizes humility, injustice, and weakness. Foucault suggests as much, but lacks the typical brilliance and clarity in doing so. He also skirts the sole deontological moral imperative (the Harm Principle, articulated by Hippocrates and J.S. Mill), which, of course, the Bible never "reveals." Ethos, for Foucault, is human freedom, and while freedom is necessary, it's insufficient. Alas, Foucault neglects the "sufficient conditions," deferring to self-making.
One has the sense that "indeterminancy" is its own reward, for Foucault. In the Parmenides-Heraclitus debate, he refuses to take a stand, except to "hang" in the phrase transition, between binaries of opposition, between all the dualities of French structuralism.
This deficit notwithstanding, and for reasons that are altogether unclear, his discussion of "interpersonal relations" still offers salience, just not the brilliance Foucault is capable of. Recapturing the Greek ideal of eudaimonia (human flourishing) by avoiding excess and deficiency (vice) in pursuit of moderation (virtue) would have been a stunning achievement in Foucault's relational analysis. As a liberal, he should have also elaborated on the Harm Principle ("do no harm"), which is the foundation of our modern justice, scrapping all the Bible-talk of nonsense and power-relations of Imperialists and Totalitarians.
But if the reader presumes both the ethical and the moral principles above, Foucault's "relational" insights make both principles even more stellar, compelling, and eminently practical in a world that has lost its relational bearings, except for the Will to Power (which he repeatedly and rightly assails). Governments, Corporations, Religions, Autocrats should fear Foucault's exposure, and hopefully we can learn to be ethical and just once again. Recommended.
