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European Warfare, 1660-1815

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European Warfare fills a critical niche in the attempt to weave together the military/social history of European "dominance" in the Early Modern period. Unfortunately, I believe that the author gets lost pursuing ancillary trails, and he never fully focuses on a topic and nails it down with good argument. But first, what he did right:

There is an excellent chapter on "Decisiveness" that focuses attention on the fact that military historians almost uniformly condemn (or disdain, or shrug off) the 18th century's indecisive warfare. He points out, rightly so I believe, that modern scholarship unfairly criticizes military operations in light of what transpired later, namely the Napoleonic Wars (and the thread that continues through to 1945). Decisiveness can occur at many different levels and in different manners -- the fact that states resorted to armed conflict to settle disputes (or for other reasons) indicates some sort of decision being sought and achieved.

The author's periodization is useful, but he never explained up front why he choose the periods he did, and what sets them apart. If he was trying to show progression or continuity, he failed to make it clear.

Technology is downplayed (with the curious exception of the flintlock and the socket bayonet) and the author emphasizes the fact that the major combatants, though not equipped nor organized in an identical fashion, at least resembled each other enough that technical innovations could be matched or countered. The author makes the seemingly obvious assertion that it is not the technology so much as the usage of technology that meant something. Unfortunately, this line of reason is not followed.

Things that detract: What's the point of the book? From reading the first chapter, it is to refute the "Robert's/Parker" thesis of a military revolution. Way too much time is devoted to this topic, and it is indefensible anyway, because the author only attacks the dating of the revolution, not the "guts" of it. So the argument becomes one of cause or consequence, which is interesting, but the author does not attempt to answer the question, except by listing a litiny of battles and commentary to "prove" his revolution is dated more properly.

The internal organization of the book is also distracting, jumping from thematic to chronological; from military operations to conclusions about society. It is fashionable to connect war with society, but to cover 150 years in 230 pages is doomed to fail.

Finally, there isn't much that will shock or surprise. Just about all the narrative is rehash of what has been written before -- and there is no attempt to draw new conclusions from old evidence. The chief flaw is the lack of focus, which detracts from what could have been an otherwise interesting perspective offered.

Jeremy Black is an accomplished scholar and his abilities are reflected well in European Warfare, 1660-1815. This book is for the serious military historian; the casual "history buff" will probably be disappointed by the solemn nature of the discussion. But for those who seek an in-depth analysis of how European monarchies approached warfare from the mid seventeenth century through Waterloo, this book has much to offer.

Black spends considerable time explaining the "military revolution" theory of historian Michael Roberts, then spends the remainder of his text refuting it. To Black there was no real revolution in military affairs, but rather a gradual transition in application. For every advance made by European nations, there were events that stood in stark contrast. For example, Austria won major victories over the Turks in 1683, 1716, and 1717, but the Turks responded with victories over Austria in 1739 and 1788. Russia expanded its empire to the North American Pacific coast, but in 1802 native Aleuts destroyed a Russian base. Black cites these as evidence there was no unbroken linear pattern of European dominance.

Another indication that military develoment was not revolutionary was the lack of technological innovation. For every visionary who thought outside the box, there were economic reasons not to produce wonder weapons in large volumes. Black attributes this to a non-industrialized economy. Local artisans produced most of the weapons used, and most were unwilling to gamble on radical ideas that may not be widely accepted. Thus rockets (developed in the mid 18th century) and submarines (first used in 1776) remained novelties.

Black carries out his transition vs revolution hypothesis throughout the book, and does it well. The numerous references to lesser know wars (such as the Polish or Bavarian succession wars) or to virtually unknown battles demonstrates a complete familiarity with his subject. Reading is laborious at times but the result achives Black's intent. Europeans transitioned from one period to the next, but military affairs were hardly revolutionary.

Somewhat misleadingly titled, this book argues that the "military revolution" which allowed Europe to extend its power throughout the world occurred mainly in the eighteenth century and not the 1400s through 1600s as others have argued. Black rambles beyond the intent of the book, but that isn't necessarily a bad thing. I'm not necessarily convinced of his argument, and I suspect he is especially enamored with the eighteenth century, but the book gives an excellent view of warfare of the period. Significantly, the author investigates land AND naval warfare and shows that militaries were not as conservative as some historians believe.