Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem [Paperback]

Jonathan Shear (Editor)

Book Description

Series: Bradford Books | Publication Date: January 30, 1999

At the 1994 landmark conference "Toward a Scientific Basis for Consciousness", philosopher David Chalmers distinguished between the "easy" problems and the "hard" problem of consciousness research. According to Chalmers, the easy problems are to explain cognitive functions such as discrimination, integration, and the control of behavior; the hard problem is to explain why these functions should be associated with phenomenal experience. Why doesnt all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark", without any consciousness at all? In this book, philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies. Some take issue with Chalmers' distinction, arguing that the hard problem is a non-problem, or that the explanatory gap is too wide to be bridged. Others offer alternative suggestions as to how the problem might be solved, whether through cognitive science, fundamental physics, empirical phenomenology, or with theories that take consciousness as irreducible.Contributors : Bernard J. Baars, Douglas J. Bilodeau, David Chalmers, Patricia S. Churchland, Thomas Clark, C. J. S. Clarke, Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Stuart Hameroff, Valerie Hardcastle, David Hodgson, Piet Hut, Christof Koch, Benjamin Libet, E. J. Lowe, Bruce MacLennan, Colin McGinn, Eugene Mills, Kieron OHara, Roger Penrose, Mark C. Price, William S. Robinson, Gregg Rosenberg, Tom Scott, William Seager, Jonathan Shear, Roger N. Shepard, Henry Stapp, Francisco J. Varela, Max Velmans, Richard Warner

Editorial Reviews

Review

"The volume is determinedly interdisciplinary, with a fair sprinkling of physicists and physiologists, alongside philosophers and psychologists of all denominations... this is a useful survey of the kind of work that has been spawned by the boom in consciousness studies." -- David Papineau, The Times Higher Education Supplement, October 23, 1998

About the Author

Why doesn't all this cognitive processing go on "in the dark," without any consciousness at all? In this book philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline of consciousness studies.

Product Details

• Paperback: 430 pages
• Publisher: A Bradford Book (January 30, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 026269221X
• ISBN-13: 978-0262692212
• Product Dimensions: 9.9 x 7 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #593,613 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A great introduction, a great collection, BUY IT!, April 20, 2007

By 

Daniel Dickson-LaPrade (Pittsburgh) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem (Paperback)

This collection begins with an essay by David Chalmers defending the view that no reductive, materialistic account of consciousness can ever be successful.

The rest of the book is made up of over two dozen responses to Chalmers's essay--some supportive, some critical, and some derisive. These responses are written by some of the biggest names in the field, and are followed by a concluding essay, again by Chalmers, in which he tries to defend his own views against what has gone before.

Because of the variety of viewpoints (materialism, dualism, mysterianism) and approaches (neurophysiology, analytical philosophy, quantum mechanics), this collection provides a wonderful introduction to some of the most important aspects of recent work in consciounsess studies. Just check out the table of contents.

As a reductionist myself, I found Patricia Churchland's argument particularly hard to counter, and I think that anyone, regardless of their perspective, will find food for thought in Mark C. Price's wonderful piece.

All in all, the best introduction I have ever encountered to the philosophical study of consciousness.

6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent Overview of the "Hard" Problem of Consciousness, September 7, 2005

By 

J.B. (San Francisco, CA) - See all my reviews

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem (Paperback)

Daniel Dennett's physicalist model of the mind (having its basis in Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and Neural Networks) claims to explain everything about the working of the mind. Can everything mental be explained by this model? i.e, can all mental properties be reduced to the four entities that constitute the physical: (1) Mass (2) Space (3) Time (4) Electric Charge ?

Not everything has been explained by this model, sayeth David Chalmers. In a famous paper published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1995, Chalmers argued that the "Hard" problem of consciousness remains untouched by physicalist models of the mind --

"Why does the performance of [brain] functions result in experience?"

In other words, why do experiences such as the "sweetness of sugar", or "smell of mothballs", or "blueness of the sky" arise out of the firing of neurons? Why should "experience" arise out of a physical system at all?

Chalmers got 26 responses for his paper, and he even responded to all the responses in a subsequent paper. This book contains all these papers on the subject.

The "Hard" problem of consciousness has been around for a long time. Frank Jackson, Sydney Shoemaker, Joseph Levine have all pointed this out before, and Chalmers has merely highlighted the problem. But he has done a pretty good job of it, for even Daniel Dennett is having a "hard" problem being able to sleep nowadays!

I dropped a star because Chalmers' idea of including "experience" as a fundamental entity is not covered well or convincingly.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Diverse and heaps of fun, September 23, 2009

By 

Nathan S (Tasmania, Australia) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem (Paperback)

To get the most out of this book you probably want to read Chalmer's "The conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory". That's the book which sparked this collection of essays. You will find a diverse and interesting bunch of opinions on the mystery of consciousness in this collection. At least one of the views should appeal to you whatever your own preference and there is much food for thought, A classic addition to any serious philosophers shelf.