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F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers

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While Frank Ramsey only lived for a short time, his philosophical ideas and theories are still having a tremendous impact upon modern philosophy, particularly in the areas of truth and logic. For anyone who desires to know more and critically analyze Ramsey's theories this book is a must-have.

This book is another collection of essays written by F P Ramsey between 1922 and 1929.These essays cover practically all of Ramsey's important contributions to philosophy,logic,universals,pragmatism,mathematics,probability(subjective probability) and decision theory.I recommend the purchase of this volume for the reader who does not yet own any of the earlier published collections of Ramsey's papers.Unfortunately,there are major errors present in essay four,titled"Truth and Probability".These errors have never been corrected and essentially are passed down from one generation of philosophers ,economists and decision theorists to the next.Ramsey's fundamental error is his misinterpretation of the words J M Keynes used to describe his interval estimate approach to probability in chapter 3 of the A Treatise on Probability in 1921.Keynes used the terms "nonnumerical " and "nonmeasurable" to describe the numerical approximation of probabilities( indeterminate probabilities)by means of two numbers,a lower bound and an upper bound.In Keynes's general theory of probability,only a partial ordering is possible.There is no sigma algebra or measure defined on the real numbers between( and including) 0 and 1 so that all conjunctions and disjunctions(unions and intersections) of probabilities, using addition and multiplication operations,results in a unique single number answer.If a complete order can be specified,then Keynes's logical approach to probability will simplify to the special case given by assuming a complete ordering of the probability space.Keynes gave his most general axiomatic presentation on pp.135-138 of the TP;it develops a set theoretic analysis that holds for both unique probabilities as well as intervals.Keynes gave additional axioms that would allow the special cases of statistical frequences and unique numerical probabilities to be calculated in chapters 8(29-31)and 15 of the TP.Unfortunately,Ramsey decided that Keynes was arguing that probabilities ,in general, could not be calculated using numbers at all ,except in the special case of the Principle of Indifference .Similarly,Ramsey came to another strange conclusion-that Keynes was opposed to the idea of basing estimates of probabilities on frequency data.These false and misleading claims by Ramsey simply mean that he had no idea of the generality of Keynes's approach.Ramsey also failed to realize that his approach to probability is in fact a very special case of Keynes's general theory of probability. The same conclusion holds with respect to Ramsey's decision theoretic approach -it is a special case of Keynes's general approach,which applies to all areas of human decision making and probability estimation,such as everyday practical decision making,social science,liberal arts,economics and business,education,and not just to "...Gibbs phase space...". Another reoccurring problem ,in this book as well as in all other books containing collections of Ramsey's papers,is the inaccurate and misleading introduction provided by the editor of this volume,D. H. Mellor.Mellor makes two unsubstantiated claims.First,Mellor claims that"...in his 1922 Review of the Treatise,and in his 1926 paper,"Truth and Probability",Ramsey criticised the idea of partial entailment...so effectively that Keynes himself abandoned it;...(Mellor,p.xiv)".With the exception of some areas of physics,engineering,chemistry,and biology,partial ordering is simply a fact.Nowhere in any of Keynes's published works does Keynes ever state that a complete ordering of probability space is the general case.Second,Mellor claims that"The fact that Keynes did not resent Ramsey's demolition of his Theory of Probability is shown by his getting Ramsey a Fellowship at King's College Cambridge in 1924 at the ripe age of 21..."(Mellor,p.xv).This claim makes no sense at all,since Ramsey fails to present a formal deductive argument with clearly specified premises and a conclusion that follows from them.Ramsey's major "arguments" are the informal fallacies of appeal to authority and argument from ignorance.No where in any of Mellor's publications has he ever shown that Keynes would substitute Ramsey's very special theory for his own general theory.Lastly,the claim made on the back jacket cover of the book that Ramsey was the greatest Cambridge philosopher of all time is highly questionable,since Bertrand Russell is usually considered to be the greatest.

Amazon offers a collection of papers by F.P. Ramsey; Such work has been influential on thinkers such as David K. Lewis of Princeton. These papers are cited, for example, in Lewis's reductionist accounts of causation (see Counterfactuals). Ramsey is also cited in Lewis's work on modal realism (see On the Plurality of Worlds). These philosophical papers can provide good primary source material for what has come to be known as the MRL theory- or the "Mill, Ramsey, Lewis" account- of lawhood. The writing is witty, even with its heavy use of mathematical and symbolic logic. Some consider Ramsey's work seminal in logic and modern philosophy of science.

Frank Ramsey is one of the rarely-mentioned geniuses of the 20th century, and this reissue of the material contained in *Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays* offers a body interested in decision theory a very fine view of the origins of that discipline. Ramsey's sparkling "Truth and Probability" gives the very best case for a theory of probability based in "subjective probability" (probability relative to an individual's beliefs); i.e., Ramsey's presentation of the concept of "ethically neutral choice" (a probability which divides an individual's beliefs and desires in two through their being "of no moment") escapes the problems confronting contemporary Bayesians through its strongly discursive character.

This is to say, we are talking about a gentle introduction to a forgotten giant of science rather than a whiz-bang technical report such as Ramsey was capable of producing; and in this monograph-length piece Ramsey sets a sets a standard forever damning those who crow about intellectual obsolescence as pikers. Thusly, perhaps whether the rest of Ramsey's then-seminal writings are worthy of such consideration turns on "turning", the amount of "work" his views on Russell and Keynes in light of his wider intellectual world can be made to do. Perhaps Hardy fans will already know there is a reason for this season; but to my mind Ramsey's work is as ready as it ever was for a wide readership (this is a book which was once read more, to salutary effects). Also an absolute must for British intellectual historians -- if you were wondering what really happened after a Tripos prize, this should give you a good idea.