Customer Reviews

FDR: The War President, 1940-1943: A History

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

I've purchased and enjoyed the four preceding Kenneth Davis studies on Franklin Roosevelt and this volume continues a masterful biographical effort. Davis' books are extremely detailed and if you have a peripheral interest in Roosevelt, he would probably not be the historian of choice. The minutiae he provides is a delight Roosevelt fans who love the slightest tid-bit on their hero. His research methods are sober, industrious and trustworthy, his FDR-bias generally masked.

The strength of this study is the focus upon FDR's masterful manner of maneuvering an isolationist power into war. The chapters on Lend-Lease, while not providing any new information, still make for riveting reading. The Churchill-FDR political and military partnership is also explored in depth, with Churchill justly taking some heavy criticism for some of his decisions and meddlesome efforts into the Allied offense against Hitler.

The only criticism is that Davis does not focus sufficiently on FDR as a human being and the vast importance of Eleanor Roosevelt is somewhat obsfucated. I would have liked to have seen some exploration into Eleanor's relationships with Lorena Hickock and Earl Miller, and a greater emphasis on FDR's relationship with Missy LeHand, his secretary.

Still, Davis' effort is an excellent continuation on his epic Roosevelt biography. I can't wait for the concluding volume.

It was a pleasure to read Kenneth Davis' excellently written, fifth volume of his FDR biography. Starting with the re-election in 1940, Davis takes us through events until the end of 1942. His warm relationship with Churchill is convincingly drawn as is his rather naive perspective on Stalin. His oddities, such as a leaning towards Vichy France in the early days, are not disguised. FDR's brokering of the debate in the US between those who wanted a frontal assault on Fortress Europe and those who preferred a more cautious approach is described in brilliant detail. The president's refusal to do much constructive about the Holocaust is explained by Davis as caution rather than personal anti-semitism. In retrospect, we can see that FDR's achievement was to transform a recession hit US into the arsenal of democracy. More's the pity we shall not get volume six as the author died in 1999 before he had time to write it.

Kenneth Davis (b. 1912) dedicated the last thirty years to his multi-volume biography of FDR. The current volume takes the story up to 1943 and there will be no concluding account, due to the author's death in 1999.

Davis, a skeptical admirer of the elusive FDR, has axes to grind. It is a pet thesis of his throughout the biography that humankind's technical wizardry has run far ahead of his social skills and that the result has been disaster. Humanity creates weaponry (e.g. nuclear weapons), the destructive potential of which exceed its political maturation. This is an historical cliche. Fortunately, such jejune "analysis" does not interfere with the narration: it is just the author's hobby horse.

Davis also believes that the great bane of the 20th century was the growth in private corporate power. He is, in this sense, a real New Dealer. His railings against Big Business would not be out of place at a Ralph Nader rally. He is skeptical of the great industrialists, such as Henry Kaiser, whose organizational skills are often credited with helping to win the war of production. For Davis, the capitalists simply feathered their nests and then extended their stranglehold on the economy into the postwar world. This, too, is pretty much a cliche and one that Davis does little to document.

The author does a good job at catching the president's shifty character and political opportunism. Observers sometimes wondered if there was a real FDR, or if he was all just sleight of hand. Davis also revels in the personal gossip that accompanied FDR's presidency, the most entertaining we ever had except for, perhaps, that of Bill Clinton.

The author grinds a few other axes, as well, in his analysis of Roosevelt's war presidency. He is convinced that the USA could, and should, have intervened earlier in the war. That it did not resulted, he claims, in the extended tragedy of 1939-45. This is unfair. Roosevelt was well-aware of the dangers posed by the Axis. However, he was also well-aware of the fiasco of Woodrow Wilson's postwar leadership and the corrosive skepticism of the public toward European politics. FDR tried, in the famous "Quarantine Speech," to move America toward some sort of collective security -- and the result was a political firestorm. As president of a democracy, FDR held no brief to shoehorn the United States into a war not wanted by its own people. (The subsequent lesson of LBJ should convince us of that.)

But, the Holocaust is the issue on which Davis really gets ahead of his evidence. He is adamant that FDR should have done something about it -- but has no idea what. In fact, the murder of the Jews was a tragedy that the United States was helpless to prevent or even mitigate. Consider, for instance, that nearly half the murdered Jews were killed by roving German killer squads in the vastness of the wartime USSR. What, precisely, could FDR do about that? There are many other such examples. The heart, understandably, cries out against the horror of the crime -- but a cri de coeur is not analysis. Until 1943, the allies were losing the European war. They were not in a position to do much of anything.

Davis has some rare harsh words for George Marshall, whom he accuses at one point of duplicity. Marshall's towering reputation, however, survives intact. Davis is, likewise, hard on Henry Stimson, whose integrity he doubts -- but doesn't tell us why.

The book is extensively detailed and reads well. Some editing would have useful as it simply meanders too much. This, however, may be a function of the writer's death, which may have robbed him of the full editing process.

There is more verve in this extended biography than in the late Frank Freidel's rather wooden account of FDR. There is, as well, less hagiography than in Schlesinger's mutli-volume account of the New Deal. FDR is, perhaps, our most fascinating president and certainly far and away the greatest of the twentieth-century. He is,in fact, the ONLY great one of the past hundred years. And, this is a good account.

Finally, Eleanor recedes somewhat into the shadows here, and that is all to the good. Compassionate, she was. But, FDR was in charge, not Eleanor. She is an icon of the feminist movement and this leads current histories to over-rate her influence. She was an attractive nag -- but not Roosevelt's conscience. He, and he alone, was the soul of the New Deal. The same was true of the war years. Harry Hopkins was the real alter ego. Davis gets this exactly right.

In the first part of this wonderful biography, Davis attempts to go inside FDR's often-elusive personality at the conclusion of the 1940 election, and, amazingly enough, succeeds in giving us a very credible depiction of the inner thoughts of a leader in crisis. Davis then explores Roosevelt's leadership, which often amounted to drift, and what must have been mind-boggling frustration in trying to lead the country, united, into war against Hitler. The mistakes and personal deficiencies of the man are clearly pointed out, including his absurd pro-Vichy policy and animosity for De Gaulle, and his repeated failures in administration, but one is left with a greater understanding of what were perhaps FDR's finest hour and his deepening relationship with Churchill in together saving democracy and destroying one of the two or three worst tyrants of the Century. Neither could have done it alone, and it is hard to see how any other pair could have succeeded as well as they did---certainly not Wendell Wilkie or any other Republican, and not Henry Wallace, despite his considerable talents.

To the layman, FDR's name is associated with Pearl Harbour dilemma and the consequential entry of USA into WWII.

We have read the memoirs of Winston Churchill and seen impassioned appeals (some were even desperate) by the Allied player (France's Reynaud and England's WC) to the American President to interfere. Yet the appeals never effectively addressed the American public opinion.

The French never understood how FDR could be a `leader' in his country and at the same time stood powerless to make decisions.

The French, in the bloody and crowded events that encroached them in first half of 1940, could not fully appreciate the American System.

But the British did.

The public opinion in the USA, during 1939 and 1940, was one that when the allied had an edge in any battle against the Germans `so what, you see anyway they can win without us (USA)' when Germany was winning, the thinking was `Okay, since it's all over we better stay out, there is nothing we can do anymore'.

American public opinion was divided and pacifists regarded the French appeals to `come to their rescue', emotionally hysterical. The French must have known how far was FDR bound by the congressional limits that formulated USA foreign policies.

FDR could not have possibly made his decision apart from the American system, based on personal whims, notably when re-elections were due. FDR was bound to make American voters to see how far he was not missing any opportunity-however small- to prevent an all-out war.

We should remember that before the war FDR had asked the Congress to approve his request for arms embargo to any country in a condition of `aggression' and the Congress refused unless the embargo applied to all countries concerned.

Many American felt the Nazi had been forced to fight a war they never wanted.

British propaganda machines were able to convince a big chuck of the public opinion in the USA that the Nazi had actually betrayed the Versailles Treaty (Post WWI). Wall Street and money mongers were also supporting this thesis. When Germany signed non-belligerent pact with USSR, many pacifists in America claimed that the war between the Europeans was imperialist in nature and urged FDR not to enter forcibly into it. FDR was even accused by the very few American Communists that he was indeed planning to do this.

Although the French wanted them to come sooner than later, Churchill was convinced that in the end America would go to war, and he knew how far FDR depended on the public opinions at home.

In his memoirs WC recounted that Lord Lothian (British Ambassador to USA) saw FDR and discussed `among other things, the danger facing America if a) some part of the British fleet fell to the Germans hand in the event of Nazi victory and 2) what are the chances of USA `being at war with Hitler' 3) FDR reiterated that `much depended not only on American Public Opinion but also on whether before that time dictators had taken some action which compelled the USA to go to war in self-defence' 4) only Congress could make commitments to war.

Was FDR aware of the Japanese attack (`sudden attack' as the world was led to believe at all times) before it happened?

Or had someone held from him the intelligence, which was then available that an air strike was forthcoming?

Pearl harbour was the real casus belli that justified to the American public opinion the urgency of their country to enter the war, after all this was the highly coveted compelling opportunity for USA to fight in self-defence.

When will historians be able to access the documents to sort out this inscrutable mystery?

It may remain a mystery though because the worst thing for any leader is to hurt the intelligent minds of his people.

It's a shame that Professor Davis did not live to complete his massive biography of FDR. But what he left is a most thoughtful and provocative account of how Roosevelt steered a reluctant country into a war it had to wage. Davis is skeptical of FDR's management of the war effort -- the president's compulsive manipulation of his staff, his over-reliance on self-interested industrialists for war production, and, above all, the woeful lack of response to the Holocaust. But Professor Davis is not a revisionist -- he makes it clear that the Americans had to fight World War II to stop Nazi-fascism and preserve Western civilization, and that no one else on the American scene could have taken the country in that direction. In "The War President," Professor Davis builds on the strengths of his previous volumes with his enlightening commentary on the impact of modernity and technology on presidential leadership. And he adds to his sketches of the figures who played a role in FDR's life -- Churchill, Harry Hopkins, Wendell Willkie and many others. I hated to see the book end, but the final scene is very poignant, with the President spending a New Year's Eve watching the film Casablanca as he is sending Americans to fight in North Africa.

Although Davis' book runs 757 pages, it only covers about 4 years real time. If you take the plunge, you will learn much about FDR, the War, and Davis (the author). I have read many books about the military conduct of WWII, from all sides. This was my first book about Great Leaders, Diplomacy, and World War strategy from the "Top." Most of this was new to me and most of the main points in the book don't show Roosevelt in a favorable light. Here are some of the big sins Davis reveals:

1. FDR was clearly deceptive in his 1940 Campaign. He promised American mothers that he would keep us out of the War but he was already anxious to get us into the European War.

2. FDR sold out most of his liberal principles in fighting the War. For instance, he placed industrialists in top positions, he put republicans in the cabinet, looked the other way when large firms ignored labor laws during the war, refused to embrace Henry Wallace's "Century of the Common Man." etc. Worst of all, large firms made money on their contracts! There is a long list
of FDRs actions that show that the FDR's approach to the War effectively ended the New Deal program.

3. There was much more tension between Americans and English than I realized. As far as military strategy, the Americans wanted to attack the Germans directly, ASAP, whereas the English
preferred to attack the Germans indirecty, sometime later....
The English were afraid of the Germans, who had just recently kicked them out of France, Greece, North Africa, etc. At one point in 1942, General Marshall was ready to jettison the English approach, the Torch invasion, and shift US resources to the Pacific. Roosevelt agreed to English strategies....

4. FDR thought he could charm Stalin, "uncle joe." What a colossal miscalculation of Stalin's character.

5. FDR did not worry much about civil liberties, authorizing the "evacuation" of the West Coast Japanese, letting the FBI run rampant with wire-tapping, etc.

6. FDR was an unprincipled man, devious, back-stabbing, disloyal to people who had backed him for decades, such as Hillman, and Farley. Davis claims FDR could turn his emotions on and off to serve practical requirements. He could not be trusted.

7. And the final, greatest sin; FDR knew much about the Holocaust by 1942 and he refused to shout it from the rooftops.
FDR was not anti-semitic, but he did not want his legion of enemies to label it "A War to Save Jews" because FDR knew that many American (voters) were anti-semitic.........

Somehow, Davis is willing to look past all these sins to
claim that FDR still deserves to be classified as a great president. Apparently FDRs unwavering focus on winning the War can offset even the largest sins.I'm not so sure.

As for Davis, his absolute hatred for capitalism and big business is reiterated on every other page. He also puts forth
a vague theory about technology and human welfare that readers can safely ignore. Davis prefers some kind of socialist state.

All in all, it made me curious to read more about FDR.

This last of five great volumes continues to look at Roosevelt and his times from the progressive Left. Davis was a liberal New Dealer (with the AAA) and he surveys FDR's third term with a view to what might-have-been through the eyes of one of many who welcomed a more fundamental shift from "selfish materialism" to "selfless ideology" in America. What better perspective to measure this century's greatest Democrat?

Ignore Michael Lind's NY Times review -- except to get a taste of the reactionary manifesto FDR was up against; he simply trashes Davis's liberalism with a neo-con, op-ed spin piece on commies and big business, and concludes the book to be historical fiction. And why the accusation of "calumny" when Davis posits psychology as one of several possible explanations for FDR's inaction to the final solution? Only last year did we learn of John McCloy's discussion with an irate President about bombing Auschwitz ("Why, the idea! I won't have anything to do with it. We'll be accused of participating in this horrible business."), which was insight kept secret for forty years. With such precious little information about the motives of an aging, instinctive President who was always reluctant to espouse the ideological over the pragmatic, why is it unethical to suppose that he "may" have felt the politics of rescue to be personally overwhelming?

Don't let one review deter you from a great history and a great story. From the Grand Alliance to Pearl Harbor to Casablanca and the Darlan Deal, the book presents a magnificent frieze. I give it four stars only because, alas, it ends prematurely.

I purchased this book in the hopes of finding insight into FDR's disability. This huge volume discusses everything and includes about one page total (if that) about it, providing a look into how FDR did and did not discuss his disability. Interesting how the history books and buffs don't talk about it much, but disappointing also so I only gave it 3. If you're a history buff and reading it to find out about the politics of the day and such, you would like it more.

I had picked up this book at a local bookstore out of the respect I felt for FDR, but I found this book extremely disappointing, sketchy in facts, and to top it all Davis is an attrocious writer.

But what shattered me the most was page 466 of this book. On this page, the elegant sophisticated westernized and secular Mr Jinnah the founder of Pakistan is portrayed as a fanatical Muslim Leader. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Mr Jinnah was called the best ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity by none other Mr Gandhi. Indeed, he had struggled the most to keep religion out of politics. Mr Gandhi's Hindu Revivalism was what forced Mr Jinnah to opt for a seperate homeland. Obstinacy of Mr Nehru, and out and out fanaticism of Veersavarkar didnot help either. Nevertheless point stands, Mr Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was a secular Minded man, and a leader free of communal bias. To read more about this topic, I suggest Stanley Wolpert's Jinnah of Pakistan and Hector Bolitho's Jinnah.

Now here is quote from Mr Jinnah's inaugural speech to Pakistan's constituent assembley. Judge for yourself how stupid Davis's absurd claim is :

You are FREE- You are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or anyother place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion caste or creed- That has nothing to do with the business of the state.