Customer Reviews

Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia

5 star:		(6)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

As an American businessman who has spent the last five years in Russia, I thoroughly enjoyed this book. My own experience leads me to fundamentally agree with its basic premise. American policy by its unconditional support of Yelstin's regime has essentially aided and abetted the legalized theft of Russia's most valuable resources, impoverished the country and led to an increasingly virulent anti American sentiment. Whether or not one agrees with the authors assertion that the nature of our economic advice (pure capitalism with minimal government involvement; essentially a copy of ourselves) was wrong for Russia, I can attest from ground level to his point as to the arrogance with which it was often delivered and the resentment it has caused. This combined with the ultimate failure of Yeltsin's economic policy, NATO encroachment and the Kosovo bombing has caused the Russian people to begin to turn away from America. At the same time America seems to be turning away from them. The consequences of this cannot be good and I hope that whoever is making policy today reads and considers the message of this book. As the author points out several times, Russia was a great country and undoubtedly will be great again. When that time comes, their view of how we treated them in their time of difficulty will matter. A lot.

I have thought since the late 1980s that Dr. Cohen's analyses of Russia were closer to being true than those of other Western analysts. This book reinforces that impression for me. Although I found it written in an awkward style because of its general tone, Dr. Cohen's book is thoroughly documented in the footnotes section. I discovered quickly that the reason he couldn't put a specific person's name to a comment in the main text is because so many journalists/analysts had made the same comment.

At first I thought that the "Failed Crusade" meant the one put forward by Yeltsin and his cronies to reform Russia. I was wrong, it is the US's crusade to reform Russia into a US clone. While in theory that may sound like a good idea, in practice it has had disastrous consequences, some of which will last for decades and have serious implications for US-Russian foreign policy. More of us should be aware of the existing bias and arrogant attitude some Western policy-wonks, media reporters, and news analysts have regarding the collapse of the Soviet Union and the aftermath. Dr. Cohen has laid it out for us and it is our responsibility to see past the spin to what is really happening in Russia today.

Stephen Cohen noted that the Soviet Union's self-destruction created `a Russian demographic catastrophe unprecedented in peacetime', `the unprecedented demodernisation of a twentieth century country', `the worst peacetime industrial depression of the 20th century', and `the worst economic and social devastation ever suffered by a modern country in peacetime'.

Between 1991 and 1998, GDP fell by 50 per cent, capital investment by 80 per cent, and livestock herds by 75 per cent. 75 per cent of the population were living at or below subsistence level.

The privatisations of the 1990s sold off a trillion dollars' worth of state assets for just $5 billion. Capital flight between 1992 and 2001 is variously estimated at $150 billion to $350 billion. All the time, the Clinton government backed the authors of this Catastroika, Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Cohen argues that Russia needs a New Deal. It needs to direct investment into industrial and agricultural enterprises, to borrow to invest and to pay (and increase) workers' unpaid wages and pensions, to restore subsidies for education, science and welfare, to impose tariffs on imported goods to protect domestic enterprises, to tighten controls to stop bank malpractices and capital flight, to regulate key prices (especially food prices), and to renationalise at least some privatised enterprises, particularly in oil, gas, timber and strategic metals. (Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz agreed that some renationalisation is necessary.)

Russia should default; its debts should be forgiven, or exchanged for equity - in effect, investment - in Russian enterprises. Restructuring the debt, the usual IMF `remedy', only adds interest due, perpetuating the debt bondage.

Cohen's humane proposals run counter to the vicious policies proposed by the US state and its lackeys. For instance, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote, "it is in our interest that their economy not recover." Britain's International Institute for Strategic Studies agreed. The `young-reformer' and privatiser Alfred Kokh said, "the Russians deserved their miserable fate."

There is no doubt that the basic point of Mr. Cohen's book becomes much belabored (no Nation pun intended) once the first 60 pages are up. In fact, his criticism of the Clinton administration's "free market" mantra turns into a droning mantra itself, and one that is almost as boring. Yet at the same time it is hard to ignore the fundamental truth and importance of Cohen's message, even if the essential unpopularity of his view somehow necessitates its ritualistic repetition. Russia is indeed in a bad way, and U.S. foreign policy is if not entirely to blame then at least significantly complicit. The left and right can argue ad infinitum over the respective merits or vices of capitalism and socialism, but it would certainly behoove both sides of the political spectrum to pause and consider whether specifically American ideology should indeed become the political equivalent of a master race. This book will definitely satisfy those who have been wanting something more than the incessant apologias of those involved in Russia's grab-it-ization (prikhvatizatsia). Read it.

Stephen Cohen examines the effects of the US' premature and overly optimistic drive to promote free market policies in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. (I concur and conjured up an image in my mind of American mangers handing out copies - at cost - of 'The One Minute Manager' and 'Who MOved My Cheese' to Russian scientists telling them to change). He considers this one of the US main foreign policy failures of the 90's. These policies, he argues have set Russa back to an almost feudal condition comparable to the worse experiences prior to the 1917 Revolution. Somehow, when I meet so many talented Russian scientists, engineers, intellectuals of all sorts I notice that mopst have had to abandon the their careers becasue of lack of investmnet and opportunities. Now many talented people have to become salesmen or business men , programmers and take up jobs that have little use for their talents. In this sense I whleheartedly agree with Prof. Cohen. Cohen lived in Russia and, perhaps due to his efforts to understand the Communist moderste Bukharin, argues that a progressive rollback of the state economy along with democratizing reforms would have provided Russians a better alternative than a cold jump into the market - as Sachs advocated. Cohen describes the corrupt Yeltsin years and the Americans who failed to understand Russian developments in the 1990s. Cohen fears that a change in policy is necessary in order to prevent Russia from becoming a threat.
It seems that the september 11 attacks and the overwhelming Russian support of the US will provide that opportunity.

"Failed Crusade" is a sharply-observed critique of American foreign policy towards post-Soviet Russia. Cohen, and many other Russia specialists like him, are justifiably angry. After all, their advice regarding the best way to ensure a successful transition to democracy and a market economy was largely ignored by Western policymakers, who instead favoured the "transitologists" who thought they knew all about transitions from authoritarian rule based on the experience of Latin America and Southern Europe. For economic advice, they turned to the neoliberal evangelists of the so-called Harvard School. They believed that initial conditions counted for nothing, and that Thatcherite economic policies would soon put Russia on the road to prosperity.

Nowadays all of us - from America's Republicans to Russia's Communists - concur that the last 10 years have marked a "transition" to near-total collapse, poverty and anarchy. This provides the opportunity for Cohen and his long-serving colleagues in the field of Russia studies to hit back, and say "I told you so".

This book sets out to do just that. Cohen seeks to demonstrate that he was right all along, partly by citing entire articles written by him over the last 10 years. Indeed, he can claim quite justifiably that he was largely right on the mark, and even his earlier articles stand the test of time.

However, I have a few minor quibbles with this otherwise fine book. For a start, it gets tiresome to read all these articles, since they tend to include whole passages which have already been used in an earlier article. There's nothing wrong with a writer quoting himself, unless later on in life he's going to draw his articles together into a book and not bother editing out the repetitions. The motif that I grew most annoyed by was the constant mention of Russia's nuclear arsenal as the single most important reason why we can't let the country go down the drain. As if a Russia without nuclear weapons could go to hell.

Still, this is a worthy addition to the recent batch of hand-wringing books on Russia. Let's hope that in this new century Russia will stop having to endure all the stupid experiments it endured in the Twentieth.

This book is a gem, written by a real Russian History scholar. It offers a detailed understanding, context and history of Post Soviet Russia.

- It is also a prophetic study of Russia and predicts the total failure and demise of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia. If you are interested in understanding about how Putin's Russia came about, and the context and background of the brutal invasion of Georgia, then you should read this book.

- When you are reading this book you should keep in mind, and be aware that Strobe Talbott, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, was the architect of U.S. foreign policy for post-Soviet Russia. - When the question is asked, who lost Russia? The answer will be Strobe Talbott.

Part I of the book is pure gem - every word is true about Russia, about the American crusaders, about what's wrong and who is to blame. all the more amazing when you get to Part II, and realize that Dr Cohen has been giving the warnings as early as the early 1990s and on. Unfortunately his sage advice has not been and is not heeded to -- just witness the latest crusade in Iraq. The only post-socialist transitions that have done well are the ones that did not bother to listen to American advisers. Imposition of foreign systems and values, however valid in another national setting, is bound to fail because of the mismatch with local realities and traditions. How can American crusaders so quickly forget the fate of Marxism itself - another wise theory and model imported from abroad and imposed on all countries that became "communist."

This book has a single point to drive home. Since the fall of communism US spent a lot of efforts to remake Russia "as a copy of itself" - and blew it. It is written from the perspective of a left-wing academic. Mr. Cohen personal preferences are obvious, and very subjective - in particular passionate dislike of Yeltsin and a total admiration of Gorbachev - the darling of American liberal intelligentsia.

Some of the author's inconsistencies are obvious. For example, he blasts IMF-prescribed policy of shock therapy. But in one of the 1993 articles, which is part of the book, he castigates then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin for - guess what? - mentioning the IMF program in less than beacon-of-light terms. One could find dozens of other similar examples.

Was there actually a "crusade"? As they say on Wall Street - "Don't confuse intelligence with a bull market". A free-for-all gold rush of hordes of consultants, advisers, and "transitionologists" (in author's words) shouldn't be mistaken for a consistent policy, based on clear principles and firm economic foundations. What appeared to be a bonanza to thousands of consultants was actually miniscule in macroeconomic terms. Some of the western advice in early 90's was helpful, some - clearly counterproductive.

Contrary to the widespread perception about "billions of US taxpayers money wasted on Russia" the amount of American aid was very small (and with a lot of strings attached) - a fraction of, for example, the amount steadily going to Israel and Egypt. Most of the reputed billions were either earlier debt rescheduling or interest-bearing IMF or World Bank credits, which Russia never failed to pay back. A couple of billions went into disarmament and counter-proliferation efforts - issues just as vital to US as to Russia itself. Some long-term agricultural export credits looked more like subsidies to American farmers, which only hurt Russian producers.

Mr. Cohen claims that throughout the Yeltsin presidency US media was constantly overoptimistic, overlooking huge problems and deteriorating situation. Oh, really? Here is the representative list of about 70% of Russia-related headlines from the Time Magazine - typical of the mainstream media and well aligned with Clinton administration foreign policy views - in the first 10 months of 1994. This period was relatively quiet - no major scandals, coups, or catastrophes, less economic turmoil than in previous 2 years, and before the start of the Chechen war. Surely the headlines must be full of glossing over and cheerful optimism as claimed by the author? Let's have a look:

Jan 31, "Interview: A U.S. economist says hyperinflation may be next". March 7, "Relations between cold-war rivals threaten to devolve into a cold peace". March 14, "What happens when big bad bear awakes? Moscow's neighbors fear they may fall prey to a new post-Soviet empire". April 11, "Headache of the state: rumors about Boris Yeltsin's health and alcohol problems are giving the Kremlin a hangover". July 4, "Russia: Moscow's Identity Crisis. Buffeted by change, the once proud capital seems adrift". August 8, "The Great Crash: The country's largest investment fund collapses". August 29, Cover story. "Formula for terror: the former Soviet arsenal is leaking into the West, igniting fears of a new brand of nuclear horror". October 24, "Ruble Run: The problems underlying the currency panic". November 7, "A huge oil spill fouls Russia's far north, raising specters of Alaska's Exxon Valdez disaster".

Does all of this seem like glossy, rose-colored reporting? More like sneering and poking accusing finger at every spot. In fact it is not easy to find any positive headline related to Russia in any of American publication. Sometimes it gets simply ridiculous. From one of those 1994 Time articles describing then Russian PM: "Chernomyrdin is handicapped by a biography ... a proletarian turned technocrat from the Russian hinterlands works his way to the top in Moscow". Hello? Isn't in US such upward mobility a perennial stuff of mushy, hand-on-the-heart, drenched-in-patriotic-tears incantations about "only in America such dream can come true"? But for Russia - where everything must be bad - such thing means "handicapped"! The only thing looking handicapped here is the logic of the author of this passage.

Incidentally, practically all of these panicky and mean-spirited headlines turned out to be wrong. Inflation was much less than in 1992-93, relations with US were cooling but smooth, not a single time in a decade Russia threatened force against any East European or Baltic countries, the oil spill in the Arctic was tiny relative to Exxon-Valdez catastrophe. Despite countless Hollywood flicks in which a stolen Russian atomic bomb was a latest status symbol of every self-respecting terrorist, there is no evidence that even a small amount of weapon-grade nuclear materials was ever smuggled out.

Yet the mood of majority American media was nearly unanimous - nothing positive could ever happen in Russia. At times it could be reluctantly dragged along with the "civilized world", but otherwise was bound to remain inscrutable, backward and dangerous. I don't believe in some orchestrated media or policy conspiracy (although professional Russia-haters like Brzezinsky were always influential in foreign policy circles). More like the inertia of decades-long Cold War stereotypes, and a simple understandable desire to gloat about seeing a long-time rival down.

At the same time a collective stereotype appeared in relation to other post-Soviet countries. Just freed from Russian domination and though temporarily struggling, most of them happily march towards democracy and prosperity under the wise fatherly guidance of America and other western countries. Reality is quite different. Transition was excruciatingly painful for all former communist block countries. It is telling, for example, that in 1993-95 most of E. European countries former communist parties (under new names) were voted back to power. Today the economic situation in most of the former Soviet Union and some E. European countries is far worse than in Russia - an issue totally ignored in Cohen's book.

Mr. Cohen in his sharp and insightful book argues that American overenthusiastic attitude in the 1990's actually weakened Russian camp of liberal reformers. Russian reforms stalled and the danger of nuclear proliferation increased because of American policy of the unconditional support of Boris Yelstin's regime. Crusade failed. However, for me the question is - was it a Crusade? To my point of view Mr. Cohen spends too much time citing himself instead of analyzing the realities of the US policy vis-à-vis Russia in the 90's. And these realities were created by people; and mostly by three powerful American policy makers: M. Albright, J. Helms and B. Clinton. Lets do a quick reality check.

Powerful Secretary of State in the 90's, Madeline Albright was the most likely crusader out of three. Straightforward and hawkish, she was suspicious of any regime that didn't have a hallmark of American market democracy. However her crusade was siphoned out (luckily for Russia) to the Balkans. That was partially because of her personal attachments to the region. Escaping Nazis, as a daughter of the Jewish refugees from Czechoslovakia, Madeline Korbel for some time found home in Belgrade, capital of Serbia.

Jesse Helms was a chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a sponsor of legislation that tightened the American embargo against Cuba and withheld US dues to the United Nations. Mr. Cohen didn't even mention him in the book, but Mr. Helms was one of the most prominent figures in American foreign policy in the 90's. Actually Ms. Albright was not only Mr. Helms' personal friend and a soul mate, but also pretty much his protégée for the Secretary of State position, as she was a Clinton's choice. A man of integrity, Mr. Helms however was a conservative Cold War "warrior", who didn't trust anybody (besides probably North Carolina farmers), let along Russia. Isolationist who kept blocking dispatching of the American troops, he was an unlikely supporter of any crusade.

Bill Clinton despite his friendship with "Tsar" Boris and few good laughs together didn't trust Russia either. Educated in Georgetown University he used to be fascinated by the lectures of the late professor Carroll Quigley. Irish Catholic from Boston and a genius, Mr. Quigley was very suspicious of Anglo-American Establishment, but every bit as much conservative. His main idea about Russia (unfortunately erroneous one) was that Russia is a separate and alien civilization, Russian "Orthodox" Civilization. He borrowed, but modified the ideas of Arnold J. Toynbee who thought that Russia was just a branch of the Western Christian Civilization.

Ironically, with new Bush administration in the office Christian tradition may have found a new role to play in the relationship between two countries. Most ethnic Russians are Christians and that may be one single fact that brings Russia closer to the White House. However lets not forget the sad lessons of the history. Sacking of the Christian Constantinople by the Forth Crusade (and the fellow Christians) in 1204 arguably contributed to the eventual demise of the Christian Byzantium and conquest of the Byzantine Empire by the Muslim Ottoman Turks. Started out as a grand enterprise with a moral dimension the medieval crusade ran out of steam and ended up being pure conquest and looting. To tell you the truth, I am awfully glad that the 1990's Russia Crusade has failed if ever happened. May be we finally learned something from the sad story called history.