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3.0 out of 5 stars
McClellan Swings into Action (sort of), January 18, 2004
This review is from: Fair Oaks 1862 (Paperback)
Angus Konstam, probably one of the most prolific Osprey authors, turns his attention toward the early days of the American Civil War and in Campaign #124 he hopes, "to reestablish Fair Oaks...as one of the key actions of the war." Certainly Union Major General McClellan's controversial Peninsula campaign of 1862 is one of the more interesting - if futile - operations of the war. Konstam is also correct in his assessment that Fair Oaks, the first major action in a series of battles that doomed the Union offensive, has not received anything like the attention of other battles like Gettysburg, Antietam or Shiloh. According to Konstam, the Confederate counterattack at Fair Oaks on 31 May 1862 - although unsuccessful - introduced doubt into McClellan's mind about his own offensive's chances for success and thus represented a psychological watershed, somewhat akin to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam. However much the author presents this argument, it is not clear that he proves his hypothesis about the battle's historical significance.
Fair Oaks 1862 begins with a rather lengthy 8-page introduction on the origins of the campaign, followed by a campaign chronology. The 6-page section on opposing plans has two sections: campaign plans for each side and tactical battle plans for the Confederate counterattack. The 6-page section on opposing commanders covers the major army and corps level leaders on each side, with photographs of all individuals cited. The 7-page section on opposing armies is built around a detailed regimental-level order of battle, but it actually says little about the strengths and weaknesses of each force. It is also disappointing that the author does not provide details on how much cavalry or artillery each side had. The campaign narrative itself devotes 25 pages to the siege of Yorktown and the battle of Williamsburg, and 23 pages to the battle of Fair Oaks. The author provides five 2-D maps (the eastern theater in spring 1862; the Union landings in April 1862; Yorktown to Williamsburg; McClellan's advance to the Chickahominy; the Confederate advance), three 3-D maps (the battle of Williamsburg; the Confederate assault on 31 May 1862; the Union counterattack on 1 June 1862) and three excellent full color battle scenes (the Confederate withdrawal from Yorktown; the storming of Casey's redoubt; Confederate cavalry looting Tunstall's station). Readers should note the slight pro-Confederate bias in that all the battle scenes are primarily from the Confederate viewpoint. Also, the author's writing style in this volume is onerous, with many paragraphs over one page long and some over two pages in length.
There is some significant bias evident in these pages, and it is clear that the author's sympathies are with the Confederates. Prior to the Peninsula campaign, Konstam describes the Union defeat at Ball's Bluff on 21 October 1861, in which he states that the Union brigade commanded by Colonel Edward Baker was "destroyed" and that "Baker was killed...along with most of his men." Konstam uses this action to suggest the greater tactical prowess of Confederate troops but virtually ignores the fact that the Union unit was conducting a difficult river crossing. Furthermore, although the Union brigade suffered about 54% losses, only 49 troops out of 1,700 engaged were killed and Confederate casualties were nearly as large. Konstam is also somewhat disingenuous about the Battle of Williamsburg in stating that McClellan "allowed Johnston [the Confederate commander] to slip away." Readers should note that the author does not mention casualties at Williamsburg - which were over 1,900 killed and wounded for the Union and over 1,200 for the Confederates - losses comparable to the battle of First Bull Run. Williamsburg was in fact, a successful delaying operation for the Confederates, but the heavy casualties indicate that the Union army did not let them slip away unscathed.
Virtually the author's entire hypothesis about the campaign revolves around the psychology of McClellan and Konstam concludes that, "the battle marked a turning point, as from that moment on, McClellan lost his nerve." Although Konstam criticizes McClellan's over-caution throughout the text, he is also quick to blame President Lincoln's retention of McDowell's command near Washington as undermining McClellan's determination to push on to Richmond. However, there is little to suggest that McClellan was ever really serious about smashing his way into Richmond, given his perennial search for reasons to waste time and the non-availability of McDowell's corps might have been a convenient excuse for grinding to a virtual halt within sight of Richmond. Konstam never raises the possibility that McClellan may never have been serious about storming Richmond and that his offensive may have been designed merely to give the Union a strong hand at the bargaining table; Konstam should have mentioned that two years later, McClellan ran for the presidency on a platform that called for a negotiated settlement to end the war. Whether or not McClellan was thinking along these lines in 1862, it is clear that he was not thinking along Lincoln's lines and in a republic where military commanders are subordinate to politicians, this is taboo. Given "Stonewall" Jackson's rampage in the Shenandoah Valley, Lincoln's decision to retain strong forces near the capital was prudent.
If McClellan was truly committed to an offensive strategy, it is hard to see how a botched Confederate counterattack at Fair Oaks - which cost the rebels heavier losses - could have shaken him for his plan of action. Between 1 June and the start of the Seven Days fighting on 26 June, McClellan had almost four weeks in which he neither attacked or retreated - this was far more than indecision, since if he had truly lost his nerve as Konstam suggests, he should have ordered a retreat to defensible lines before Lee struck. Konstam's account also suggests that the Union army was tactically inferior to the Confederates, but the fact is that of the ten actions fought between April-July 1862 in the Peninsula the Confederates only achieved one tactical success (Gaine's Mill).
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