36 of 36 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Do the French really surrender regularly?, January 22, 2004
This review is from: The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Modern World S.) (Hardcover)
Much has been written about various aspects of World War II, but books continue to come out. Some do re-evaluations using new information, some take a different look at old information and try to show it in a new light. Julian Jackson has written a very interesting book on the German invasion of France in 1940, called (simply enough) The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. In it, Jackson attempts to show his version of why France fell, and whether or not it was inevitable. Were the Germans just too powerful? Was the new Blitzkrieg warfare just too much for the incompetent French soldiers? Jackson uses personal memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and diaries to provide this vivid account of six weeks of hell. Not only that, but he places the fall in historical context. Put all together, and it's a fascinating book.
First, Jackson tells the story of the invasion. He breaks this down into four narrative chapters that explore this from a different angle. The first one contains the military aspects of the defeat. The second looks at the relations between France and its allies, mainly Britain (though it does examine other countries, such as the support pact with Poland). This examines how the British and French looked at each other, along with how they cooperated in war (and how they fought amongst themselves as well). The third chapter looks at the political aspects of the defeat, while the fourth looks at the French people. Then Jackson brings them all together, looking at how they all relate to each other, and shows how each one can be seen as part of the defeat, but yet none of them can be singled out as the main cause. Finally, Jackson looks at the consequences of the defeat, including how it coloured French thinking for years to come, even reaching as far forward as today. Much of French foreign policy has referred back to this time in their history.
I was really impressed with the way Jackson told the story. His writing is very evocative and his use of sources from memoirs of generals and politicians to the common soldier is extremely well done. I have read a few books on this aspect of the war (or that have included it, anyway), but never have I heard from the soldier's point of view. This is becoming the norm in World War II history books recently (see An Army at Dawn), and I like it. I think it gives us a better picture of warfare and how it affects the soldiers who are fighting it, rather than just dry strategy and tactics. That's not the only thing that's good about it, though. Since Jackson is examining the defeat from multiple sides, it wouldn't have been surprising to see him tell the story of the invasion and then look at the other aspects of it, thus having some narrative repetition. Jackson avoids this, seamlessly linking the chapters so that they tell a continuous story, even as he looks at the different points.
The most interesting part of the book is when Jackson is looking at the different causes of the loss. The standard is to blame the horrible French military, calling them cowards and (as the stereotype goes) saying how easily the French surrender. Mosier's The Blitzkrieg Myth places a large portion of the blame on the British. Jackson shows, however, that the main reason was the bad intelligence that the French had, which caused them to send their best troops against a German feint. He takes pains to point out that there was no one specific cause, however. He agrees with Mosier that the British pulling back didn't help, and he mentions the refusal of the Belgians to coordinate defense strategy with the French and the British until after Germany invaded (they had declared neutrality). The coordination between British and French forces was not the best either. Thus, the situation was more complex then many claim. The French soldier fought with élan when he didn't feel abandoned by his superiors.
I also found the historical context fascinating. Jackson doesn't just tell the reader about what happened, but he examines the next 50 years as well, and how the Fall affected France. French historians still don't talk about it much, and when they do discuss it, it's more of a condemnation of the Third Republic government before the war than anything else. Jackson's book does much to alleviate that problem. To many, the Fall of France was an inevitable result based on the "decadence" of France in the pre-war era. Jackson refutes that brilliantly, saying that the war was actually quite winnable if executed properly.
It's hard to find any real faults with this book. While nothing is perfect, any problems I had with the book are so niggling as to be unmentionable. It is a very short book (only 249 pages, not including notes and bibliography), but it feels deep. I could have hoped for even a bit more depth, but Jackson uses the scale marvelously, packing a lot of information and evaluation into these 249 pages. There is no padding, and little extraneous information included. Between The Fall of France and The Blitzkrieg Myth, I've found some fascinating short history books, and as long as they don't read like summaries, I hope that this is a trend.
If you are at all interested in World War II, this is a book that you should pick up.
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18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Fine and Nuanced Analysis, July 27, 2003
This review is from: The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Modern World S.) (Hardcover)
This is an excellent book by a distinguished scholar of French history. Relatively short at about 250 pages, the book provides a narrative of the fall of France, a thoughtful analysis of the pre-war French politics and society, a very nice concise history of the French Army leading up to the War, an insightful study of Franco-British relations, and a study of the response of the French populace to war. The book concludes with a short section on the consequences for post-war France of the conquest and some historiographic analysis. Jackson is a clear writer and the book is organized well. Jackson is concerned particularly with examining prior explanations for the Fall of France. One is that the Frence Army was overwhelmed by the superior Germans. Jackson provides an excellent analysis of the weaknesses of the French Army, which are shown to be more organizational and doctrinal than technological. It is clear also that the French Army suffered from poor leadership and spectacularly poor communications. The best French formations fought German units to a standstill. It was the French misfortune, a combination of luck for the Germans, bad judgement and intelligence on the part of the French, and excellent German leadership in the field, that the worst French units bore the brunt of the initial German assault. Jackson deals with the question of whether defeat was preordained by the strains and divisions experienced by French society in the 1930s. This is the so-called 'decadence' argument, a favorite of right wing ideologues, both during and after the war. Jackson shows that despite the considerable difficulties imposed by the Depression and an unfavorable international situation, successive French governments did fairly well in re-equiping the French Army. If the Germans had been stalemated in Belgium during the opening months of the war, which was the French plan, and which could have happened if the Germans hadn't altered their plans, French and British military production would have outstripped German armaments production. The fault lines in French society and politics really mattered after the collapse of the French Army, resulting in a collaborationist government composed of reactionaries bent on purging French society of undesirable elements. Jackson makes a series of interesting comparisons with the opening weeks of WWI and shows that, if anything, the government and military of pre-WWII France were better prepared for combat. A combination of poor leadership and the speed of events prevented the French government and military from recovering after the initital setbacks. If anything, Jackson is too- easy on the leadership of the French Army. Not only did the French High Command botch the war, but with defeat looming, General Weygand and his fellows took the line that the Army embodied the real heart of the French nation and put maintaining the Army in some form above the civilian republic. It is interesting to compare this book with Ernest May's Strange Victory, another recent book on this topic. This is a much superior book. May's book is longer, has less actual historical detail, and quite a bit of it is devoted to tendentious theorizing about decision making. Jackson's nuanced account and analysis gives a much better view of the events and their background.
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16 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An interesting thesis, May 10, 2003
This review is from: The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Modern World S.) (Hardcover)
Julian Jackson comes to an interesting thesis in that it was the strategic mistakes and flawed organization of the French army and not the corrupt Third Republic that was reponsible for the French defeat in 1940. Julian supports his point by stating that the British were just as passive as the French in the thirites and the Germans were reluntctant to go to war in 1939, and lacked trucks and ground support planes needed for an modern army. Jackson also compares the French nation's response to the Germans in 1914 with that in 1914, in which the French suffered from similiar poltical problems and had a flawed military strategy, but the French in 1914 were saved by Von Kluck's turn east. Jackson places overall blame on Gamelin's decision to position his forces far north into Holland in order to prevent the Britich from escaping to the sea, but this led to the Ardennes area being poorly manned by third rate divisions. While the French divisions in Holland fought valiantly,the doomed divisons around the Ardennes quickly crumbled. Jackson is also critical about the amount of training received within the French army. The French trained their conscripts for a only a year and that this made the French army loose cohesion and mental flexibality in battle. The only problem with Jackson's arguement is that it was the political divisions in France that prevented the French army from expanding the term of conscription and forming a more effecive army. Despite this flaw, I would reccomend this book to anyone interested in a new and interesting thesis about the fall of France.
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