Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) [Hardcover]

David E. Johnson (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 19, 1998 | Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"A powerful book. . . . Johnson convincingly takes aim at the current wishful thinking that a sound defense depends merely on money spent, and that only politicians, not soldiers, are responsible for their lack of preparedness. His powerful and convincing historical analysis offers profound implications for today."-Foreign Affairs

"Johnson . . . has focused with a fine microscope on the introduction and development of the tank and aircraft into the army. . . . Johnson's detailed study . . . is both readable and informative."-Choice

"This book gives great insights into our military's (not just the U.S. Army's) innovative process during the interwar years. As we now find ourselves in a similar interwar period, with similar interwar opportunities for either stagnation or innovation, the book is extremely relevant to today's national defense establishment. There is great insight to be derived from these pages. . . . Johnson has done a superb job of researching his subject. He has written an interesting book based on mountains of documentation. . . . There is much more to Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers than documented history. To the educated reader, this book is a warning for today."-Marine Corps Gazette

"A well-documented and ludicly written book. . . . This book's sound insights into the past provide a cautionary note for the present."-Thomas McNaugher, Key Reporter

"This well documented and convincingly argued book . . . speaks to the follies of extremists in today's airpower versus land power debates."-Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Naval War College Review

"In Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers David Johnson does an excellent job of taking in the big picture, breaking it down into its parts and then tieing it back together to form a cohesive whole of U.S.Army policy during the interwar period. "-Air Power History

"Johnson's nicely researched and well written study is much more than an interesting account of tank and airplane development during the interwar years. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers is a fascinating intellectual and cultural history of the interwar Army with intriguing implications for our own day. "-Lt. Colonel Alan Cate, Parameters

"Johnson's book should be read and his conclusions debated. His work is timely and relevant to the Army and Air Force today."-Col. Gregory Fontenot, Army Magazine

"The subject of Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers is familiar-an interwar army, crippled by austerity and public apathy-fails to modernize and enters the next war unprepared for the challenges it faces. But David E. Johnson departs from traditional interpretations of this scenario. . . . Johnson paints a bleak picture of an Army designed to preserve itself rather than prepare for the next war."-Christopher R. Gabel, Military Review

"Johnson's densely factual volume is elegantly written. . . He successfully demonstrates that the United States Army that entered World War II reflected the biases and resistance to innovation that existed throughout the interwar years."-Arnold Krammer, Journal of American History

"A fine place to get a feel for the enormous task of military transformation-and also get a gritty appreciation of the risks involved-is David Johnson's Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers. The War on Terror and accelerating demands for change in the Pentagon . . . make this book extremely relevant. Every military transformer should read it-and reckon with it."-Austin Bay, Houston Chronicle

"Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers is a superbly researched and tightly argued work that chronicles the period of transformation of the United States Army from a constabulary force to the military instrument of a major world power. It forces the objective reader to reconsider the notion that America's interwar Army was purely the product of social, political, and fiscal indifference. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a poignant reminder that the destiny of the Republic in the twenty-first century will be inextricably bound up with the vision, wisdom, and professional acumen of its military leaders."-Harold R. Winton, author of To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938

"David Johnson has written a must read for anyone following today's Pentagon debates concerning the culture and budgets of the United States military. He has provided one of the most insightful analyses of the development of the U.S. Army and Air Force between the World Wars with a special set of lessons to be learned about how a bureaucratic military system precludes the best decisions for the good of the nation's overall national security missions."-William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Board of Teledesic and CEO of Teledesic Holdings, Ltd.

From the Inside Flap

"Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers is a superbly researched and tightly argued work that chronicles the period of transformation of the United States Army from a constabulary force to the military instrument of a major world power. It forces the objective reader to reconsider the notion that America's interwar Army was purely the product of social, political, and fiscal indifference. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a poignant reminder that the destiny of the Republic in the twenty-first century will be inextricably bound up with the vision, wisdom, and professional acumen of its military leaders."--Harold R. Winton, author of To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938

"David Johnson has written a must read for anyone following today's Pentagon debates concerning the culture and budgets of the United States military. He has provided one of the most insightful analyses of the development of the U.S. Army and Air Force between the World Wars with a special set of lessons to be learned about how a bureaucratic military system precludes the best decisions for the good of the nation's overall national security missions."--William A. Owens, Vice Chairman of the Board of Teledesic and CEO of Teledesic Holdings, Ltd. --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 304 pages
• Publisher: Cornell University Press (November 19, 1998)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801434580
• ISBN-13: 978-0801434587
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6.3 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,705,073 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Absorbing story illuminates future as well as past, November 1, 2001

By 

W. D ONEIL "Will O'Neil" (Falls Church, VA USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Hardcover)

This absorbing history of the U.S. Army between the world wars and on into the Second World War illuminates not only the past but the present and future. As his title indicates, author David Johnson traces two main themes: the Army's responses to the challenges and opportunities presented by the airplane and tank. He shows that these responses, although very different, were both seriously inadequate in ways that proved very costly in the test of war -- and he shows why and how these inadequacies developed. Johnson, a former professional Army officer and National War College instructor, is not dedicated to any theoretical framework. He tells the story very clearly and directly, relying on deep research in primary sources, and draws his lessons from the events as they occurred. He understands the people and the institutions and organizations within which they acted, and he views them sympathetically but dispassionately and objectively.

The story Johnson tells is not one of inevitable historical forces but of human decisions. The decisions were made under the influence of institutions and events, but were not determined by them. They were not catastrophic, but they were well short of optimum. Many Americans died as a result of deficiencies that could well have been avoided.

Because it does not tie the story up in a neat theoretical package, Johnson's book offers no canned recipe for success in responding to present and future challenges and opportunities. Instead, it provides a rich source of inspiration and caution, and a stimulus to thought.

There are a few disappointments, although minor in comparison to the book's strengths: (1) I would have liked to have seen a deeper analysis of the part played by technological factors. While we are too often treated to on-dimensional purely technological approaches to such questions, I feel Johnson goes a bit too far in the other direction. (2) Johnson's citation system for sources, while adequate for a brief article, becomes frustratingly cumbersome at book length. It is too often a real struggle to unearth exactly what his source for a given point is.

Another book that can profitably be read as a complement to this one is William O. Odom's _After the Trenches: The Tranformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939_ (Texas A&M U. Press, 1999).

Will O'Neil

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Failed Transformation, January 3, 2007

By 

Retired Reader (New Mexico) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Paperback)

This book provides a compelling and well researched account of how the U.S. Army interpreted its experiences in WWI and how it attempted to transform itself from an internal security force into a modern army ready for an other world war. The author does so by reviewing how the Army reacted to the new weapons systems that emerged from World War I (WWI) and were to dominate military operations for the rest of in the 20th Century. He wisely concentrates on two specific weapons systems: armored fighting vehicles (tanks and armored cars), and by extension mechanization in general; and military aircraft (bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft). The author discusses how U.S. Army attempted to further develop these systems and integrate them into its force structure and force planning. It quickly becomes clear that the unprepared state of the U.S. Army at the start of World War II was the direct result of misunderstanding the implications of these weapon systems for modern warfare and the faulty tactical doctrines that resulted form this misunderstanding. The author demonstrates that the extreme austerity imposed on the Army between the wars exacerbated this unprepared condition, but it was not the sole cause of it. In the end, lack of well thought out doctrines impeded not only the Army's efforts to prepare for modern war, but the development of the weapon systems with which to fight it.

This reviewer would suggest that anyone interested in this book would be well advised to also read a second book, "Beyond the Trenches" by General William E. Odom (ret). In it Odom traces the development of U.S. Army doctrine between the wars and the factors preventing the emergence of a really sound set of doctrines and plans.

11 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Study in Military Transformation, May 9, 2002

By 

Newt Gingrich (Washington, DC United States) - See all my reviews
("THE")   

This review is from: Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Hardcover)

Words cannot do this book justice. This is one of the finest studies of military bureaucracies rejecting change and protecting the old order that has ever been written. Anyone who wants to know how big Rumsfeld's challenge is in trying to transform the Pentagon must read this book.

Johnson was a career soldier before going to RAND. He has a deep sense of how military cultures operate. His portrait of the cavalry wing rejecting modernity is humorous and tragic simultaneously. It is a case study in how large bureaucracies protect themselves and their caste system from being threatened by new developments.

Equally, if not more fascinating, is his conclusion that the Air Corps was equally one sided in favoring its theory of big bombers. While the cavalry drove out officers who believed the time of the horse was past, the Air Corps drove out officers who believed fighter planes were powerful opponents for bombers. In some ways the Air Corps self-blindness was as dangerous as the cavalry's total identification with an obsolete past. The refusal to recognize the vulnerability of the bomber meant that bomber crews in Europe would have the greatest risk of dying of any elements of the American military.

Johnson also reports on the tankers fixation with lighter, less powerful "fast tanks" rather than the heavier, more powerfully armed versions the Germans settled on. The American fixation was on a fast tank that could break through and run amok behind enemy lines but was incapable of standing up to German tanks in one on one fights. The result was a tank that led to many more American casualties than necessary. Interestingly, all post World War II American tank designs have been based on the German model of heavy armor and heavy guns.

This is a very thoughtful book filled with quotes from sincere, serious professional military men who were dead wrong but determined to protect their views and to use their position in the hierarchy to get the job done.

It is a sobering story for anyone who would modernize a large, complex military bureaucracy.