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Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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This absorbing history of the U.S. Army between the world wars and on into the Second World War illuminates not only the past but the present and future. As his title indicates, author David Johnson traces two main themes: the Army's responses to the challenges and opportunities presented by the airplane and tank. He shows that these responses, although very different, were both seriously inadequate in ways that proved very costly in the test of war -- and he shows why and how these inadequacies developed. Johnson, a former professional Army officer and National War College instructor, is not dedicated to any theoretical framework. He tells the story very clearly and directly, relying on deep research in primary sources, and draws his lessons from the events as they occurred. He understands the people and the institutions and organizations within which they acted, and he views them sympathetically but dispassionately and objectively.

The story Johnson tells is not one of inevitable historical forces but of human decisions. The decisions were made under the influence of institutions and events, but were not determined by them. They were not catastrophic, but they were well short of optimum. Many Americans died as a result of deficiencies that could well have been avoided.

Because it does not tie the story up in a neat theoretical package, Johnson's book offers no canned recipe for success in responding to present and future challenges and opportunities. Instead, it provides a rich source of inspiration and caution, and a stimulus to thought.

There are a few disappointments, although minor in comparison to the book's strengths: (1) I would have liked to have seen a deeper analysis of the part played by technological factors. While we are too often treated to on-dimensional purely technological approaches to such questions, I feel Johnson goes a bit too far in the other direction. (2) Johnson's citation system for sources, while adequate for a brief article, becomes frustratingly cumbersome at book length. It is too often a real struggle to unearth exactly what his source for a given point is.

Another book that can profitably be read as a complement to this one is William O. Odom's _After the Trenches: The Tranformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939_ (Texas A&M U. Press, 1999).

Will O'Neil

This book provides a compelling and well researched account of how the U.S. Army interpreted its experiences in WWI and how it attempted to transform itself from an internal security force into a modern army ready for an other world war. The author does so by reviewing how the Army reacted to the new weapons systems that emerged from World War I (WWI) and were to dominate military operations for the rest of in the 20th Century. He wisely concentrates on two specific weapons systems: armored fighting vehicles (tanks and armored cars), and by extension mechanization in general; and military aircraft (bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft). The author discusses how U.S. Army attempted to further develop these systems and integrate them into its force structure and force planning. It quickly becomes clear that the unprepared state of the U.S. Army at the start of World War II was the direct result of misunderstanding the implications of these weapon systems for modern warfare and the faulty tactical doctrines that resulted form this misunderstanding. The author demonstrates that the extreme austerity imposed on the Army between the wars exacerbated this unprepared condition, but it was not the sole cause of it. In the end, lack of well thought out doctrines impeded not only the Army's efforts to prepare for modern war, but the development of the weapon systems with which to fight it.

This reviewer would suggest that anyone interested in this book would be well advised to also read a second book, "Beyond the Trenches" by General William E. Odom (ret). In it Odom traces the development of U.S. Army doctrine between the wars and the factors preventing the emergence of a really sound set of doctrines and plans.

Words cannot do this book justice. This is one of the finest studies of military bureaucracies rejecting change and protecting the old order that has ever been written. Anyone who wants to know how big Rumsfeld's challenge is in trying to transform the Pentagon must read this book.

Johnson was a career soldier before going to RAND. He has a deep sense of how military cultures operate. His portrait of the cavalry wing rejecting modernity is humorous and tragic simultaneously. It is a case study in how large bureaucracies protect themselves and their caste system from being threatened by new developments.

Equally, if not more fascinating, is his conclusion that the Air Corps was equally one sided in favoring its theory of big bombers. While the cavalry drove out officers who believed the time of the horse was past, the Air Corps drove out officers who believed fighter planes were powerful opponents for bombers. In some ways the Air Corps self-blindness was as dangerous as the cavalry's total identification with an obsolete past. The refusal to recognize the vulnerability of the bomber meant that bomber crews in Europe would have the greatest risk of dying of any elements of the American military.

Johnson also reports on the tankers fixation with lighter, less powerful "fast tanks" rather than the heavier, more powerfully armed versions the Germans settled on. The American fixation was on a fast tank that could break through and run amok behind enemy lines but was incapable of standing up to German tanks in one on one fights. The result was a tank that led to many more American casualties than necessary. Interestingly, all post World War II American tank designs have been based on the German model of heavy armor and heavy guns.

This is a very thoughtful book filled with quotes from sincere, serious professional military men who were dead wrong but determined to protect their views and to use their position in the hierarchy to get the job done.

It is a sobering story for anyone who would modernize a large, complex military bureaucracy.

When this book first came out in 1998 it addressed arguably the top priority in national defense planning - how can we ensure that this "peace dividend" is used to develop truly innovative military technology and doctrine? With the events of September 11th and the ushering in of the War on Terror the issue of technology innovation - often covered by the umbrella term "Revolution in Military Affairs" - has certainly slipped down the priority scale, but it would be unwise to suggest that it has lost any of its core relevance.

RAND analyst David Johnson hammers home on a few themes in "Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers." First, he stresses that the primary lesson learned coming out of WWI, at least from the perspective of the top Army brass, was the central importance of mass mobilization of personnel and efficient, large-scale production of supplies and machinery, which to, among other things, the establishment of the Army Industrial College in 1924. Technology was viewed as important, but clearly auxiliary to men and manpower. In the 1920s a deep sense of isolationism and then in the 1930s the economic impact of the Depression kept Army budgets low. The Army chose to allocate its limited resources to maintaining their manpower, which was less than 50% of the limits set by the 1920 National Defense Act. As Army budgets dropped 20%, personnel never slipped more than 5%. Johnson's central argument is that the Army slipped behind in tank technology and doctrine primarily because the Army leadership made a conscious decision to not invest resources in those areas. In the end, it was wrong of them to point a finger at a stingy Congress or an ungrateful American public. They could have invested more in technology and experimentation; they just chose not to.

Second, the tank and the bomber were developed under starkly different organizational and cultural conditions. The tank was developed in parallel in the 1930s by the infantry and cavalry. Each sub-service saw the tank as an instrument to aid in their strategic mission, not as a fundamentally new way to fight. The cavalry likely missed the greatest opportunity with the tank. It is shocking to read to what lengths many went to defend the horse cavalry, first holding up Poland as an example of a great modern cavalry force and then arguing that German armored success in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 didn't prove anything. Johnson's book is populated with a number of well-meaning senior Army officers that come off as real boobs in hindsight, but none more so than Major General John Herr, the chief of cavalry in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The armor doctrine created in this environment, where radical ideas were shunned if not outright prohibited, thus reflected traditional missions and tactics. As last as 1938, Johnson notes, there were more hours in the Command and General Staff College curriculum dedicated to horseback riding than to either armor warfare or air power.

The bomber, on the other hand, developed under a much more permissive intellectual environment and one that put a premium on technology over manpower. The story of US airpower during the interwar period is one of a small, elite renegade cadre of officers fighting for independence. In many ways, it was the example of the air corps that prevented a separate armor force from emerging in the infantry. The end result was a dedicated and highly professional core of officers with top technology and a coherent strategy and doctrine for their service, albeit not without serious shortcomings.

Third, despite great differences in organization and culture, both the armor and air forces made similarly disastrous assumptions about how their weapons would be engaged in the next war. The US tanks - greatly inferior to the German tanks, which were designed to fight other tanks - were in fact precisely what the US military asked for. One of the crucial differences in US armor doctrine was the view that the Armor Force (only created in July 1940) was to exploit gaps in the enemies line, not create the gaps themselves. In this sense, US tanks were seen as rather akin to the traditional horse cavalry - a lightly armed and highly mobile force used to harass rear areas and reconnoiter the battle space. The US focused on tanks of high speed, relative light-weight (to allow the crossing of temporary pontoon bridges) and great reliability; firepower and armor were readily sacrificed to achieve these design objectives. The result when going head-to-head with the Panzer Corps - an eventuality the US Army did not see as the prime role for armor units - was slaughter. The key message is that the US Army was NOT supplied with inferior machines, but rather they did not appreciate the looming nature of modern armored warfare and thus entered the war with the "wrong weapons" but they were the weapons they asked for. Moreover, the US Army was convinced that the best way to fight an armored attack was with anti-tank guns. Tank-on-tank battles were seen as wasteful and never really wargamed.

For their part, the Air Corps doctrine and strategy rested on several key assumptions that turned out to be false in practice. First, it was believed that the B-17 and B-24 could defend themselves from fighter attacks because of their rich complement of .50 caliber machine guns. At first this proved to be the case. However, the German Luftwaffe quickly developed new standoff weapons, such as a .37mm cannon that could hit bomber formations outside the range of the bombers' .50 calibers, and the effective use of dive-bombing tactics on unescorted bombing formations. By late 1943, the odds of a US air corps bomber crewmember surviving a 25 run tour were about 35%. Second, it was presumed that the bombers would be able to accurately bomb their targets in daylight hours. By and large, that was not the case. Finally, the strategic air power theory posited that massive bomber formations could cripple a country's ability to make war by knocking out key industrial nodes, such as the production of ball bearings. Again, that thesis turned out to be far from accurate.

In the end, Johnson makes a convincing case that the failures of tank and bomber technology and doctrine in the Second World War were not a product of limited resources or support, but rather the unwillingness of the Army to invest scarce resources into those technologies and reluctance to engage in spirited and realistic experimentation. Thus Johnston concludes: "The Army, in short, was responsible for its own unprepared ness."

This was the first book that ever read about a war and military strategy. It was actually a lot better than I thought it would be. I figured that it would be excruciatingly boring, but it was actually entertaining (for me, which says a lot). I would recommend this product to others who are interested in military history, and very specifically, tanks and bombers.