Customer Reviews

The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War

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4 star:		(3)
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this took me,a 14 year old inside the cold war iself. it not only explains the events,strategies and so on but it takes you step by step through the cold war and really gives you an understanding of "why" this happend and why this strategy, a must. this book should not be looked upon lower due to my words as a fouteen yera old.

This book does a good job of laying out all the foreign policy, strategic, and military moves, as well as providing context -- although I sometimes found the level of detail to be overwhelming. Some parts read like a political-psychological thriller (who thought what about whom, whether their premises were correct, and how they acted on those premises); other parts resemble a technical manual for various weapons. It will probably be interesting to both political junkies as well as military buffs. Due to the great level of detail, bring patience if you you're new to Cold War history, as I was.

This is an impressive foray into a field of study that probably won't come into its own for another ten years. Through superb use of primary sources, Friedman provides an excellent narrative of fifty years of remarkably complex history. Yes, there are gaps, but that is to be expected only ten years on. Overall, the work is very thorough.

In particular, Friedman does a superb job of removing some of the mythology associated with the Cold War. For example, we come to recognize that Eisenhower, behind his benign facade, was an iron-willed president who kept tight reins on the military and foreign policy. In addition, the most cherished of baby-boomer myths, JFK's presidency, is revealed for the farce it really was. And finally, we see the real Gorbachev: a pragmatic technocrat whose hands were tied.

All in all this is an excellent work of history. I would have given it five stars, but the editing is truly appalling, I've never seen so many typos in a major hardcover release.

In this study of the Cold War, Norman Friedman combines a unique perspective of history, politics, and technology to examine the actions and reactions on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Drawing on many new sources that were previously unavailable, Friedman portrays the dilemma of two opposing political ideologies armed with weapons of destruction, each distrustful and unsure of the other's intentions. Many decisions are now understood to have been made based on erroneous assumptions about capabilities, behaviors, and reactions. Friedman's strength is his mastery of the details of weapon system development, and he skillfully interweaves the policies, politics, and personalities from 1945 onward with the rapid advances in technology that rapidly changed the ideas around waging conflicts. The political and social challenges for both sides in such regional confrontations as Germany, the Mid East, Vietnam, and Cuba are examined throughout the book. Regional wars in the Middle East, Vietnam, and elsewhere allow both sides to assess weaponry and tactics.

Taking a chronological approach, he begins with events in the Soviet Union prior to World War II. The harsh realities of Stalin's terror were largely unappreciated outside of Russia, and during WWII, it became important for the US administration to portray Stalin and the Soviet Union as allies, and much more similar to the US than to the Fascist regimes. Stalin's postwar seizure of Eastern Europe was viewed by the US public as a bitter betrayal, and fueled the rapid rise of the Soviets to enemy status. The advent of the atomic bomb offered the US a way to counter the massive Red Army, as atomic weapons were viewed as "cheap", leading to wholesale destruction. Friedman reveals the surprisingly poor state of the US nuclear weapon stockpile and delivery system in the postwar period. The evolving US doctrine on nuclear weapons and the decision to develop the "Super" (hydrogen bomb) are examined as a reaction to the aggressive Soviet development of their own nuclear arms. Early development of nuclear policy under Truman and Eisenhower demonstrates how decisions made in that period were propagated forward into future administrations. The rise of SAC and development of the fleet of bombers to deliver massive nuclear weaponry into Russia is detailed. The misperceptions and mistakes on both sides are examined; for example the buildup of US air defenses to counter a perceived Soviet bomber threat based on overestimates of bomber numbers. Interceptor aircraft, missiles and an integrated air defense computer system (SAGE) were developed at great expense to deal with large numbers of nonexistent bombers. Another watershed that is examined is the Killian Committee and its' assessment of the problem of ICBMs. The response was to move American ICBM programs to high priority. Eisenhower approved not only a first generation of missiles (Atlas and Titan I), but also funded the second generation of rapid response missiles with stored propellant, such as Titan II and Minuteman. As well, he approved the Navy's Polaris program for submarine based missiles. With a paucity of internal intelligence about the Soviets, he also instituted the development of reconnaissance satellites (WS-117) for the long term, and the interim U-2 spy plane to permit monitoring of Soviet capabilities.

Khrushchev's bluffing on his missile capabilities was to protect his country in light of vast Western missile superiority in both numbers and quality. He ordered space spectaculars (Sputniks) to cover for the lag in effective ICBM development. The first generation ICBM, the R-7, was unwieldy, taking hours to prepare and fuel. Further, the lack of Soviet industrial capabilities meant the missiles could not be turned out "like sausages", as he had claimed. US experts were astonished to find only four "soft" launch pads for the R-7 in early space-based photos. This eventually forced Khrushchev to attempt to station intermediate range missiles in Cuba, leading to the disastrous Missile Crisis. After Khrushchev's removal, Brezhnev's very real buildup in missile numbers and types led Nixon to negotiate the SALT treaty and détente to slow the Soviet buildup. The US military is in relatively poor shape after the Vietnam War, and many of the arms systems are aging. The confrontation in the 1980's, when Reagan continues and accelerates the renewed buildup and modernization of the US military begun under Carter, forces the Soviet military to attempt to respond. Reagan's optimism that the Cold War could be "won" by the West in the short term was the stimulus behind his deficit spending. After Brezhnev's death, the rapid succession of "old guard " Soviet leaders (Andropov, Chernenko) is followed by the dynamic Gorbachev in 1985. Initially, Gorbachev is initially perceived by the West as dangerous, and devoted to modernization of Soviet miltary technology, most notably computers and computer operated machine tools. The emphasis on military technology over consumer products eventually led to the fall. Friedman postulates that a component of the sudden victory by the West and collapse of the Soviet Union was brought about by the inability to produce weapons that matched the new generation of US "smart" weapons. He believes that the mass production and application of computer technology by the West, most notably the incorporation of microprocessors into virtually all of the new systems, was a key development. In the end, Gorbachev emerges as a man "one could do business with", as Reagan is told by Margaret Thatcher. The inability of the Soviet economy to match the West in producing an array of sophisticated products led to the downfall.

While much has already been written about the Cold War, and undoubtedly much remains to be uncovered, Friedman's book deserves to be on the A list of anyone interested in this period of history. His broad sweep of events, and the recognition that the history of governments and their policies in this period cannot be separated from the technology marks this book as a seminal contribution. In the end, the Soviet system collapsed without the horrific exchange of nuclear warheads. This book can also be profitably viewed from the standpoint of today's world, and begs the question about current political misperceptions of intent by others.

This book has many strong points. Firstly, Friedman's analysis of the Cold War's military strategy is first rate. His synthesis of military technology and its relationship to strategy is incredible. This should not be surprising, as Friedman is a notable military analst. His critique of McNamara and the Vietnam War is very clear and well done. However, Friedman's coverage of political events is somewhat journalistic. The author seems to have drawn an imaginary line between the West (the good guys) and communism (the proverbial black hats). At some points, the book falls into a simplistic description of this division that blinds itself to considerable criticism of "the good guys." For example, if the U.S. represents freedom, is it not a contradiction that it also covertly influenced postwar Italian elections? Coverage of the Reagan years displays similar problems. Despite these problems, I happen to agree with the substance of Friedman's history. It could, however, have been more balanced.

I've read quite a few Cold-War books, and this is the best of the lot.

Friedman gives much more analysis and detail than most of the others go into. Notably lacking in other texts, but making up the first several chapters of this one, Friedman discusses and dissects the Stalinist society of pre- to post-WW2; this is an important foundation for understanding the Soviets, and the other books (mostly liberal-apoligist) can't bear to admit the evils perpetuated in Stalin's name.

As a second example, Friedman also covers quite well the horrible, but often glossed-over, mistakes of the Kennedy-Johnson-McNamara years, especially the fallacies of Johnson's Vietnam policy.

This book covers, in both depth and breadth, more than the others, and is not afraid to say what needs to be said.

The book is good, from what I could read. There are several whole pages of text missing from the first five chapters. The missing pages are 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45. SInce this is a text book for a history class, the missing pages severely degrade my overall leaning of the Cold War.

This contains tons of information about the Cold War now available from Soviet and declassified American sources that the revisionist (i.e., anti-American) historians have chosen to ignore. There is particularly useful detail about weapons technology and its relation to Soviet-American balance.

I'd heard about this book from colleagues, but as soon as I finally cracked it open, I was glued from beginning to end. If you already know a lot about the Cold War era, perhaps this text isn't for you, but if you grew up during part of that period, you may have taken your knowledge base about the cold war for granted. This book will most definitely open your eyes to some of the goings on between 1945 and 1989. I cannot vouch for the absolute accuracy of his facts - and there are many of them - but I appreciated his level of depth. There is another review of this book which indicates that the level of detail was overwhelming at times; that may be the case, but those are the books I seek out. I look for texts that are serious treatises on their subject and this one accomplishes it while staying on target for its readability. When my memory of the book will have faded somewhat through time, I will remember most vividly the overall take away about the quality of the U.S. presidents. You will be sure to come away with a vastly different opinion of Eisenhower (the best of the bunch; he knew when the Russians were bluffing and he knew that his generals were blowing hot air) and Kennedy (weak and indecisive)for example, than other history books might suggest. I heartily recommend this as a first foray into this fascinating and complex period of history.

Saw the author's appearance on television (Book TV) - his viewpoint about the US decision to leave their bases in the Philippines was careless commentary and one sided research at best.Paraphrasing- "Who cares since that country's strategic importance is no longer needed".It turned me off to reading his book.