Customer Reviews

Fighting In Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage

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1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book covers the German army from D-day to D+7. Each day begins with an overview by the editor, David C. Isby. The OKW war diary comments on the conflict follow. These summaries are helpful, but the real meat on the coconut are the specific descriptions of the actual German units doing the fighting and the problems they faced as well as successes and failures experienced for each day. Most the the narratives are based on recollections of the officer participants whose rank varied. They are dominated by the general officers, naturally. The volume closes with some overview comments by some of the senior German officers involved in the fighting.
This book is a useful addition to any library concerning the Normandy campaign. Despite the many German units involved, the organization of the material is easy to follow. There are interesting tidbits spread through it as well as some opinions about the quality of the allied forces. No surprise, they didn't think much of the competence of the British leadership although the courage of the British soldiers was admired.
Pride in the German army is evident, and its ability to respond to the invasion described through these dispassionate commentaries is impressive. Example: despite taking the brunt of the attack at Omaha Beach, the 352nd infantry division was still a cohesive entity at the end of the eight days. Even though its losses were terrible, it remained in the line fighting the invaders.

This volume in the "World War II German Debriefs" series covers the week of 7-13 June 1944, when the German forces in Normandy were contemplating how to throw the Allied invasion forces back into the sea. It contains succinct transcribed reports by German staff officers submitted to the U.S. Army Intelligence staff after the war. The first seven "Parts," coincide with the dates 7-13 June inclusively. "Part Eight" is a Summery of "Panzers in Normandy," while "Part Nine" covers "The Reasons for the Defeat." There are roughly ten reports per Part, covering all aspects of the invasion front, command decisions, deployment of units, strategy and tactics. Each Part begins with a brief historical synopsis by David C. Isby, the book's editor. Since the end of World War II, historians have criticized the reports stemming from the other side of the hill. Too much repetitiveness of German officers blaming Adolf Hitler, they claim, for his paranoid micro-managing of paper armies, which, in the case of the D-Day invasion, was his decision to hold back Panzer reserves too far from the beaches for a swift counterattack. The German emphasis on Allied material advantages, particularly air superiority, is another of the chief criticisms of the historians. There are some of those conclusions here as well, but there are many insightful and interesting morsels contained within these pages. For example, the first German reinforcements to enter the fray were Anti-Aircraft units that were deployed strategically along vital German supply routes. Although this decision did not alleviate the Allied control of the air, it made them pay a heavier toll for strafing German columns. Secondly, a mysterious "lost order" incident occurred when an order deriving from the U.S. V Corps, detailing the entire American plans for the invasion of Normandy, washed ashore and into German hands. Probably not since General Robert E. Lee's famous lost order at the Battle of Antietam, has such a twist of fate occurred. Fritz Ziegelmann, a staff officer with 352. Infanterie-division, could not believe what he held in his hand on June 7. On the journey up the chain of command, its importance diminished, however. After languishing at Seventh Army (7. Armee) Headquarters for several days, it finally reached Rommel's Army Group B. There, according to Ziegelmann, the American order was not taken seriously; what else would explain the piece-meal arrival of German reinforcements? Though informative, these reports are sometimes dry, and otherwise dull. Their principle significance is that of a primary resource for researchers. Absent is any semblance of an Introduction explaining how, why, where, and by whom, these German Debriefs were conducted. This is inexcusable! A one-page Introduction would suffice, and add vital information to the collection. In addition, a brief biological blurb of each author of the reports would have been a major asset. Transcribing reports is easy, researching their origin and authors takes time, effort, and money, something the publisher was not willing to invest. Finally, there are no explanatory notes about the content of these reports what-so-ever. Thus, the diligent researcher has no choice but to rely on the integrity of the copying and editing (or lack there-off) process for authenticity. But, for those who cannot journey to the respective archival repositories, this collection offers a substantial window of the defenders of Normandy.

This book is fair, so far as it goes. The translating, on the whole, is excellent -- very little hard-to-understand language. The photographs are so-so, but contribute very little. As I read the book, I found two things irritating: First, there is a frequent use of German Army abbreviations, but there is no glossary or other translation (simple paretheticals would have sufficed). Second, there are only a few maps and they are either so pale, so small, or so cluttered as to be virtually useless.

The information given is interesting and well put, allowing for a certain formality of style. The reader certainly leaves the book with an understanding of the problems facing the German commanders.

All in all, it's a shame. The idea is splendid, but the execution is disappointing. It falls down on the side of clarity, and that could have been avoided.

The book is mainly composed of memoirs. Each chapter of the book covers a single day after the invasion: chapter one covers D-Day +1, chapter 2 D-Day+2, etc...as seen from the german perpective. I really loved the format: most memoirs are around 2 pages long, by unit/officer per day. It makes for short chapters and quick description of events; thus, it conveys the urgency and initial shock of the landing for the german army. I would have given it 5 stars, but good maps are missing - in fact, the few small maps provided in the book are of no help,so it is easy to become lost as soon as smaller or not-so-famous cities and villages are mentionned as objectives. Beside that small flaw, it is an excellent read. WARNING: don't buy it to read from Guderian - his "chapter" is really short, just like the other chapters. It's really just a sales-pitch.

I share the criticism of the earlier reviewers, but not the praise. This book consists of statements provided by various German commanders to American military intelligence after the war. The majority of the selected statements were by commanders that took part in the combat in Normandy during the period. Heinz Guderian also is represented by two interviews which I found interesting, but there are much better sources if you would like his insights (Panzer Leader for example). The book roughly follows chronological order from D-Day+1 (June 7th, 1944) to D-Day+7 (June 13th) with each day being accorded a chapter. I say roughly because many of the statements cover several days or repeat events from the previous days. Everything is disjointed. This is followed by two summary sections about Panzer Tactics in Normandy and Reasons for the Defeat. These two sections are probably the most interesting of the book.

I feel Isby's book is a failed opportunity to show the German perspective. I expect more from an author than just organizing a group of interview statements and sticking it in a book. Isby does include a summary section for the day at the beginning of each chapter, but many of these are less than a page and provide little value. I expect the author to fill in the gaps between the statements to provide a full picture of what is going on. There is no transition except for Isby's half page daily summary. I feel like the German command trying to weed through the muck. There is also an extreme limit on maps showing what was happening. The statements are filled with various defense lines and place names that are not shown on any map. There are a couple of maps that show enough detail, but they are far too few. I held back from giving the book one star because of the primary sources that are presented. If only they had been presented in a more professional way. I would recommend reading Cross-channel attack (United States Army in World War II. The European theater of operations). It only follows the Allied and the German activities in the American sectors, but the author had access to the documents in this book and it makes more sense. Don't get the Barnes & Noble version because it is missing vital maps.

My copy also had double printed text on some of the pages which made reading the book a bit annoying, fortunately the majority of the text did not have this flaw. Add poor publishing to poor editing.