Customer Reviews

The Final Invasion: Plattsburgh, the War of 1812's Most Decisive Battle

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

While the author's thesis may be arguable, the evidence he presents is not. At this point in the War of 1812, nearly every action fought was decisive to the American cause. The War of 1812 undoubtedly the war in which the US was most unprepared to enter and fight. The military incompetence of both the Jefferson and Madison administrations, coupled with a foreign policy that was none too bright, nearly doomed the infant United States. The virulent hostility displayed towards a standing army and navy by both administrations, and the inability to prepare for a major war, condemned the United States to early defeat. Luckily for the US, competent commanders emerged from the crucible of combat to fight a well-earned draw with the British. This book is the story of such commanders and a decisive victory won against long odds by American land and naval forces in 1814 along the Canadian frontier.

The author presents the situation in a simple, straight forward manner, having done excellent research on the subject, to the extent of uncovering new material in a forgotten collection which clearly demonstrates both the long odds faced by the Americans and how much importance the British placed on this invasion of the United States from Canada. This alone makes this book valuable to all students of the period. This may not be the best book available on the one of the War of 1812's battles, but it is undoubtedly one which adds decisively to our collective knowledge of this particular campaign and what was at stake for the United States in the summer and fall of 1814.

There are some minor errors in the illustrations which are moderately distracting. There is one picture of US Marines of the War of 1812 identified as US Army, and a picture of the USS Constitution vs HMS Guerriere mislabeled as part of the naval battle on Lake Champlain. While this is a little disturbing, it does not distract from the text or lessen the value of the book in general.

This book is recommended, as it can take its place among other recent valuable books on the subject.

The author clearly did his homework before writing this account
of the 1814 British/Canadian attack on Plattsburgh, NY. Had it
succeeded, things might look differently today in terms of U.S. territory and we would have another humiliating defeat to look back on.
The events leading up to the combined land/sea battle are well laid out and the battle itself is described in rousing detail, particularly the bloody Naval conflict on Lake Champlain. All the events in the book are also put into perspective with the invasion of Washington DC and Baltimore which was part of a recently discovered British grand strategy.
A few minor omissions and errors keep the book from being great history but don't hurt the overall narrative too badly. The newly discovered Prevost papers ( he was C.O. of the invasion and Governor of Canada ) lend new light on the subject but seem to have biased the author toward Prevost. Prevost was overly cautious in his approach and abandoned a partly successful attack with a huge numerical superiority at Plattsbugh. Worse still, he abandoned supplies and equipment in a hasty withdrawal which was not pursued. The author goes to some length to justify this even the Prevost was court martialed for it.
The Niagra Campaign on the other side of N.Y. state is not mentioned at all despite the mistaken withdrawal from Plattsburgh of most of the U.S. regulars to fight in it. The author also errs in reffering to the Royal Americans as the 62nd foot- they were known as the 60th for most of their career and also gives the imppresion that the Washington DC invasion force suffered much fewer battle casualties than in an accidental explosion. This is untrue, read "by Dawn's Early Light" by Lord to get a good picture of this battle.
Overall, other than omitting the Niagra campaign, these are minor quibbles that don't lessen the fact that this is a well written history of a neglected chapter in American History and a great victory by American arms during a dark hour.

This book is a companion to a documentary produced for PBS. Unlike television, books demand solid research, detail and well structure arguments. Like so many television companion books, this is popular history that suffers from incomplete research.

While a wide range of sources may have been consulted, the lack of a bibliography leaves the reader to consider the few titles and documents listed in the endnotes. For example, there is considerable discussion of the British Army, without any reference to any of the key secondary sources dealing with the period, let alone documents. One would have preferred more discussion on the quality of the officers corps, the fighting units and structural problems rather than the facing colours, rows of buttons and descriptions of Polish cuffs. Much would have been revealed had CO 42, the Secretary of State Correspondence for Canada been consulted. At times I was uncertain if the author was elaborating on his research to support the thesis or simply list the other authors he has dined or had drinks with.

As noted elsewhere, there are a host of errors. As with all popular histories, if you read this book, do so with care.

Great research in a military intelligence gathering style. Good military analysis of the event. Book length, but a short story due to large font. I am suspect to some details, such as the use of "Britsh 62nd Regt of Foot or Royal Americans" when he may mean the 60th Regt. A major error I think.

This book is a companion to a documentary produced for PBS. Unlike television, books demand solid research, detail and well structure arguments. Like so many television companion books, this is popular history that suffers from incomplete research.

While a wide range of sources may have been consulted, the lack of a bibliography leaves the reader to consider the few titles and documents listed in the endnotes. For example, there is considerable discussion of the British Army, without any reference to any of the key secondary sources dealing with the period, let alone documents. One would have preferred more discussion on the quality of the officers corps, the fighting units and structural problems rather than the facing colours, rows of buttons and descriptions of Polish cuffs. Much would have been revealed had CO 42, the Secretary of State Correspondence for Canada been consulted. At times I was uncertain if the author was elaborating on his research to support the thesis or simply list the other authors he has dined or had drinks with.

As noted elsewhere, there are a host of errors. As with all popular histories, if you read this book, do so with care.

Fitz-enz shows his vast knowledge of military history and of this little known battle at Plattsburgh in 1814 in this book and in his video of the same name. Filled with detail but written with a simple direct prose style it is a compelling account. I felt drawn to the times and the people. The description of the naval engagement is extremely visual. You can almost smell the cannon balls flying back and forth.

I liked this book for the information presented, but the writing had me skipping though the book at times.

This could have been an excellent work, but with so many errors, I was forced to downgrade it (reluctantly) to 3.5 stars. For example, the standard American longarm was the (Springfield, Harpers Ferry & contract) 1795 Musket, (with its variations, most notably the 1808), not the 1775 musket which never exitsted. Patterned on the French Charleville, the author contends it was superior to the British Brown Bess (the 3rd model was used in the Napoleonic Wars), a claim that is certainly open to question. Other reviewers have pointed out many other errors, so I need not go further on this point. Suffice it to say, that what is seen on TV is usually grossly "dumbed down" and inaccurate for popular consumption, and companion works rarely are written with the attention to detail and scholarship that is necessary for a good historical treatise. In addition, the author repeats several of his comments sufficiently often to cause me to line out a number of paragraphs as redundant.

That being said, there is much good here. The author's treatment of the actual battle between MacDonough and Downie was excellent and incisive. His explanation as to why the British guns shot over the American line after the first broadsides, (with credit given to gun expert Adrian Caruana who explained that the quoin moved out slightly on the 24-pounders with each firing so the guns increased their elevation with each broadside), was worth the price of the book by itself. This factor, along with the lack of wind that foiled the British attempts to maneuver and that the men manning the British boats were soldiers rather than sailors is what determined the outcome (all other things being equal.)

Another excellent feature of this work is that it explains the British strategy in 1814 as England turned its attention to eliminating the second troublesome republic (after France) that threatened the natural European order of authoritarian monarchies.
There were two diversions to draw American attention from the main thrusts: a small one to draw off Izard's army to Niagara (successful), and a large one to threaten Washington and Baltimore (successful beyond their fondest dreams). The main thrusts were down Lake Champlain to separate New England from the rest of the US and hopefully be able to lay claim to New England, New York, and Michigan through their victory following Burgoyne's strategy in 1777, and Pakenham's seizure of New Orleans that would allow Great Britain to claim all land west of the Mississippi. If this sounds like a pipe dream, it must be remembered that the American Navy had been swept from the high seas by this time, and negotiations were already underway on a peace treaty. All that Great Britain needed were the victories as planned (supposedly, from the British side.) Of course, even had those victories taken place, the treaty provisions remain speculative, but after the destruction of Washing, the US Federal Government was barely functioning.

It may be difficult in 2009 to understand the extent of British arrogance in 1814 as the world's greatest superpower. Even after the Plattsburg defeat and Prevost's retreat back to Canada, many British were in favor of sending Wellington (who volunteered to go) to America with an army of 50,000 Napoleonic War veterans. Given that the US was still depending on militia and its navy was bottled up in port, it is most likely that another long war would have ensued. As William Corbett said, "We must completely subjugate the Americans... A great kingdom, the mistress of the sea, and Dictatress of Europe, on the one side; and the last of the republics on the other. The world is now going to see whether a republic, without a standing army, [will] be able to contend single-handed against a kingdom with a thousand ships of war, and army of two hundred thousand men. May the end be favorable to this country (England) and mankind in general." Gee, no wonder the British treated Americans as cannon fodder in World War I and as naive, junior partners of no military competence in World War II. Unfortunately, this "British Empire Syndrome" is not only alive and well in 2009, but has been transferred to the EU as supposedly the greatest economic power and dominating political force today.

Jefferson had put his faith in militia and small, coastal gunboats -- both were disasters. Madison was basically a pacifist forced into the war as the British forcible empressment of US sailors for their warships topped 6,000 men, and his administration was hopelessly incompetent. The treaty of 1783 had only stopped the fighting temporarily, and the continued existence of the US was problematic. The 2nd Revolutionary War (of 1812) barely managed to maintain the status quo, and then primarily because of MacDonough's victory. Remember, Jackson's victory at New Orleans came after the peace treaty had been signed. The author is correct that had Downie and Prevost prevailed at Plattsburg and driven down to New York that Michigan and at least some of New England (Maine as a minimum) would have been handed back to England in the treaty. Think about it, the North would have been much smaller and could quite likely have lost the Civil War, etc., etc.

All in all, I recommend this work as a counterpoint to current American arrogance and belief in the inexorable march of the American republic. There is nothing inexorable about it. Frankly, we were lucky at Plattsburg.

For another take on this battle, I recommend "The Proudest Day" by Charles G Muller. New York: Curtis Books, 1960.

The story of Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost's 1814 Lake Champlain offensive, and how it was thwarted by Commodore Thomas Macdonough's squadron in an improbable naval battle fought within the confines of Plattsburgh Bay, is certainly worth telling. Unfortunately, Col. Fitz-Enz tells it rather poorly here. He has presented some interesting, new information which he obtained from Sir George's descendants - including the so-called "secret orders" for the campaign - but his book is neither particularly well organized nor particularly well written. It contains many factual and technical errors, as well as not a few gramatical and even spelling errors that should have been caught by even a cursory job of editing.
The principal value of the book is to rescue an important chapter of American history from ill-deserved obscurity for readers who otherwise might never have heard of it. Perhaps it will inspire more careful historians and more capable writers to more competently address the same topic.

I bought the book because it won the Distinguished Writing Award. Different from any other history book I have read because it is written from the British prospective more than the victors. Easy to get through,it tells a story that I have never heard before. How did I miss this important event in our country's history? To think that we were attacked on September the 11th once before. If we had lost this one, we could have lost it all.
It is a must read for every American.