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Final Secret of Pearl Harbor

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Many of the arguments Admiral Robert A. Theobald makes in this book have been fleshed out further by the research of later writers. In particular, readers familiar with Stinnett's Day Of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (2000) and Gannon's Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation Under Attack (2001) will find many of the same arguments, though in a more condensed fashion, here.

The difference, of course, is that Theobald was writing in 1954. And he brings to the table not only the viewpoint of a professional naval officer, but also one who was in fact present in a relatively senior position (Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force) at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. His argument is that Roosevelt deliberately backed the Japanese into a position where they had no choice but to launch an attack on the Pacific Fleet -- a fleet that was deliberately weakened, and denied critical information, by orders of the President.

Theobald does a fine job presenting his evidence and drawing (in my opinion) solid conclusions. His problem, unfortunately, is the same as Stinnett's: he lacks the smoking gun that places blame solidly in FDR's lap. The author can draw an evidentiary noose around the President, but can't quite close in the rest of the way. The nearest he can come is a 1945 comment by Admiral Stark that everything he did in the days prior to the attack, including refusing to forward key information intercepted from coded Japanese messages to the commanders in Hawaii, he did on higher orders. Of course, as Theobald points out, Stark was the senior admiral in the Navy. The only "higher" place orders could come from was Roosevelt himself.

If Theobald's analysis has weaknesses (apart from the evidentiary ones), they are (1) his willingness to trust the motives of senior military and naval commanders implicitly, and (2) his apparent agreement with the idea that it was "psychologically essential to the successful prosecution of the war" that the "prestige" of Roosevelt and his Administration not be undermined during the war by suggestions they deliberately precipitated the attack (p. 157). I can't accept this second, but it's his opinion and he's entitled to it. The first weakness is the more serious: Theobald believes senior military commanders of high personal and professional reputation would never willingly do anything to put their ships and sailors at risk. Therefore, he argues, the fact that they did exactly that proves they must have been ordered to do so by FDR himself. This "evidence" seems to assume as much as it "proves."

On the whole, however, this book is an important part of the so-called "revisionist" school of Pearl Harbor scholarship. Later research, including many facts not available to Theobald in the 1950s, substantiates many of his arguments. And if it's still not possible to prove conclusively every part of the statement, "Roosevelt knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941," Theobald's *J'accuse* makes it clear that FDR's hands are, at any rate, far from clean. The "final secret" of Pearl Harbor may always remain exactly that.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald makes the case (and a very good one) that Franklin Delano Roosevelt deliberately left Pearl Harbor commanders in the dark with regard to the threat of a Japanese attack in order to rally the American people into entering World War II.

I believe this book makes it abundantly clear that something was amiss in the way the Roosevelt administration handled the intelligence data that indicated Japan was preparing to attack the United States.

While other localities of military interest were fully cognizant of the ongoing evidence, the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii was kept out of the loop. Additionally, Pearl Harbor itself was given orders that were inconsistent with military intelligence and in fact suggest that Pearl Harbor was purposely weakened in order to make it more vulnerable (and hence attractive) to a Japanese attack.

The military officials who were responsible for informing Pearl Harbor of the unfolding events either were collectively incompetent or were given strict orders not to propagate pertinent information to Hawaii. And since many of these commanders reported directly to Commander-in-Chief FDR, Theobald believes (and I concur) that it was FDR's intention to ensure a Pearl Harbor slaughter of sufficient magnitude to change public opinion towards favoring entry into World War II.

On the evidence alone, I believe Rear Admiral Theobald makes a case sufficient to render a guilty verdict on FDR. But it is even more compelling given the documented corruption of FDR throughout his years in office. Of course, his most damnable action was the Yalta Betrayal where he agreed to enslave Eastern Europe to appease Uncle Joe Stalin.

. The sacrificing of American military men and women in order to effect public opinion is unforgivable.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald makes the case (and a very good one) that Franklin Delano Roosevelt deliberately left Pearl Harbor commanders in the dark with regard to the threat of a Japanese attack in order to rally the American people into entering World War II.

I believe this book makes it abundantly clear that something was amiss in the way the Roosevelt administration handled the intelligence data that indicated Japan was preparing to attack the United States.

While other localities of military interest were fully cognizant of the ongoing evidence, the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii was kept out of the loop. Additionally, Pearl Harbor itself was given orders that were inconsistent with military intelligence and in fact suggest that Pearl Harbor was purposely weakened in order to make it more vulnerable (and hence attractive) to a Japanese attack.

The military officials who were responsible for informing Pearl Harbor of the unfolding events either were collectively incompetent or were given strict orders not to propagate pertinent information to Hawaii. And since many of these commanders reported directly to Commander-in-Chief FDR, Theobald believes (and I concur) that it was FDR's intention to ensure a Pearl Harbor slaughter of sufficient magnitude to change public opinion towards favoring entry into World War II.

On the evidence alone, I believe Rear Admiral Theobald makes a case sufficient to render a guilty verdict on FDR. But it is even more compelling given the documented corruption of FDR throughout his years in office.

It is sad that America has erected a memorial to FDR in Washington, D.C. The sacrificing of American military men and women in order to effect public opinion is unforgivable. FDR's mythic legacy should be tossed onto the ash heap of history where every other evil and false ideology is placed.

Adm. Theobald wrote a terse yet accurate account of the lying and treason that led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This book is a good account of the events that occured before and during Pearl Harbor whereby FDR and his supporters knew of the exact time and date of the attack but refused to inform Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short of the impending attack which cost the lives of unaware of sailors and soldiers.

Some of the anecdotes in this book include the diplomatic dispatches sent and received by Japanese officials that were well known as early as late October and through November of 1941 which clearly indicated that Japanese were to attack on December 7, 1941. For example, Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel were never informed of the deteriorating diplomatic relations between the Japanese and American government officials which originated in the summer of 1941. Both commanders were given orders and information that led them to believe that any hostile action might involved sabotage. Neither commander knew of impending war between the Japanese and the Americans, and the officials in Washinton, D.C. made sure that these commanders were not so informed.

Further note should be made of the East Winds Rain Message which was a 14 section message that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor was never sent to Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short. In fact, the Japanese diplomatic officials destroyed records and deciphering machines just a couple days before the Pearl Harbor attack. Such destruction is considered a clear indication of war, and neither Adm. Kimmel nor Gen. Short.

While such information has been kept secret in the U.S., such information was well known elsewhere. The Soviets acknowledge that Dr. Sorge, a Soviet spy, informed the Soviets of the Japanesse attack on Pearl Harbor and that the Japanese were abandoning any plans to invade Siberia to get natural resources. The was a break to the Soviets who could transport their Siberian troops to European Russia to face a massive German invasion. While U.S. officials concealed this information, the Japanese authorities gave complete account after World War II was over.

Another point that Adm. Theobald makes is that many subsequent investigations about the Pearl Harbor attack were a facce. When Adm. Kimmel read the transcripts of his testimony, he found it so badly transcribed and mis-quoted that he had difficuly restoring it to some semblence of readibility. During one investigation, government "experts" were so incompetent, but the Republicans refused to attack their credibility. One should note that Harry Stimson, Sec. of War for FDR, was a Republican.

While this book was originallhy published in 1954 and was pessimistic, readers should note that Adm. Kimmel was exonerated by members of the U.S. Congress a few years ago. One should ask why no one raised questions as to was actually responsibile.

Adm. Theobald's book is important and is relevant. Recent disasters incubating in Western Asia (Afghanistan and Iraq) are the result of government lying and attempts at intimidation. Adm. Theobald's book is a good guide for understanding these events.