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Fire In The East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age

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Paul Bracken the author and professor of management and political science at Yale University has written a quixotic book on Asia. He goes into the history, psyche and challenges of an Asia full of regional and world competition just starting to bud. It seems the author points out that Asian nations are no longer content in simply trading and developing markets. Apparently, they are following the folly of western nations by building up their military and nuclear power as if that will lead to unfeigned independence. This is happening exactly at the time when the world is growing ever more interdependent. Consequently, unless Asian powers change they are set on a course that can actually disrupt the glorious economic miracles they have been creating just as Europe did in 1914 and 1939 with two World Wars. It seems David Gruen, (better known as David Ben Gurion), Israel's first Prime Minster quote in 1965 has more significance today when he said, "Our Future Lies In Asia, Even If Our Way of Life Is Modeled On Europe...Israel Stands At The Gateway To Asia". What David Ben Gurion knew is what the world is finding out, Asia is coming onto the world scene and the world is going to change too! The author outlines these observation in his book with documentation from yesterday and today. I highly recommend this superb book by this distinguished visionary and author.

DON'T be misled by the title of the book. It is not 'merely' about how the spread of weapons of mass destruction into nearly a dozen Asian countries and the decline of the West and the United States are inexorably changing the strategic landscape of the vast landmass between Mediterranean on the west and the Pacific on the east. Paul Bracken, the author, has succeeded in analysing the fundamental changes in Asian military balance and their consequences in a broader historical context of half a millennium. For example, in discussing India's nuclear tests in May 1998, Bracken reminds his readers of what had happened that month five hundred years ago: Vasco da Gama reached India in May 1498. While da Gama's visit heralded India's subjugation by the European colonial powers, last year's nuclear tests proclaimed India's determination 'never' to lose its independence. But the same sentiment, legitimate though it is, is driving a dozen Asian countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) and ballistic missiles. With the ability of many countries to hit hitherto far away countries, the Asian geography has shrunk to such an extent where traditional grouping of countries into regions (South Asia, East Asia, etc) hardly makes sense. Thus, the 'death of distance' means that the traditional way of looking at peace and stability, too, is no longer valid. In order to be able to hit the continental US, the Soviet Union had to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba, which led to a crisis in 1962. What it failed to do in Cuba, the Soviet Union succeeded in doing through the development of long-range missiles. Overnight the two super powers became next door neighbours to each other. In 1998, by firing missiles across Japan, North Korea "turned the Japanese archipelago from a zone of sanctuary into a target zone..."

Moreover, "the ballistic missile has empowered pawns to check the dominant powers; countries that were once pawns now have the reach of knights and bishops". The new power and status of the Asian pawns are almost coinciding with the emergence of Asia-Pacific as the new power house of world economy. Hopefully, the present South East Asian financial crisis is just an aberration or an interlude. Bracken draws several pertinent analogies to explain how all the new developments in Asia fall into a historical pattern.

When Europe fought the Thirty Years War in the 17th century, rest of the world remained unaffected. But the Industrial Revolution made Europe rich, powerful militarily and to acquire colonies. Thus, its later wars became everybody's wars. His conclusion is that Asia, too, is "going through a comparable transformation". Throughout, the author proceeds with a bold assumption that the conditions that had led to Asia's decline and colonial subjugation have changed for the better.

There is something 'disruptive' about Asian resurgence. Bracken terms the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as disruptive technologies because "they nullify Western advantages in conventional weapons" in Asia. They are equilisers in that, military asymetry will not matter much: A country with crude disruptive technological capability can stand up to a leader in them. Moreover, a poor country can also acquire biological and chemical weapons, if not nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles to deliver them.

This development has introduced a fundamental change in the strategic environment of Asia. For a long time, the predominant military power in Asia has not been Asian. The US indeed is the big power in Asia even at the moment, but the disruptive technologies made its predominance irrelevant. And Washington can no longer 'manage' Asian affairs the way it likes.

Such a situation developed despite the US efforts to contain the spread ofthese technologies through the so-called non-proliferation strategy. Though it seemed to work for a while -- mostly in tarding the spread, not the spread 'per se' -- it ultimately failed. Bracken attributes this failure to the American attempt to "sustain permanently an asymetric advantage" favouring the US. The fundamental difference between the arms control efforts between the two super powers on the one hand and in Asia on the other, is that while in the former case maintaining stability was the focus, in the latter it was maintaining the status quo. It may be recalled that one of the early arms control efforts -- the Washington Naval Treaty -- was aimed at limiting the Japanese naval strength so that the US and Britain could maintain their lead. It ultimately failed then; a similar strategy will fail in future.

'Nationalism' makes the second nuclear age distinct from the first one. It provides the impetus in countries from Israel to North Korea -- the area what the author somewhat crudely calls 'the arc of terror'. The crux is this: Several countries possessing disruptive technologies and driven by 'nationalism' as well as 'national security' considerations will undoubtedly make Asia a more unstable world. Moreover, for the West which long ago enjoyed and suffered 'nationalism', the Asian penchant for a dead and gone sentiment looks incomprehensible. Therefore, for Asia and the West, the emerging order presents many challenges and the failure to effectively meet them will be catastrophic. The author lists out the merits of several strategies for the West including the 'World Government'. Mostly, he himself is not convinced of their efficacy. His conclusion? "An age of Western control is ending, and the challenge is not how to shape what is happening but how to adapt to it". Bracken has written a fascinating book. In just about 180 pages, he manages admirably an illuminating analysis of too complex a subject. A less competent author would have needed double the space, with lengthy citations and distracting footnotes to substantiate his assumptions. The two-page bibliography will disappoint those keen on carrying out further research--a trivial shortcoming compared to the merits of the book.

D. Shyam Babu, Assistan Editor, The Observer of Busness & Politics newspaper, New Delhi, India

"Fire in the East" is a clear, readable essay on the increasingly complex and volitile Asian military threat. This book should be required reading for those policy makers in Washington who seem to view the security of U.S. interests abroad, and our previously untouchable position at home, as a God-given, undeniable right. The reality, as Mr. Bracken has shown, is that our nation is moving forward into an increasingly uncertain and potentially dangerous world where NOTHING is guaranteed. Failure to adapt to this new environment will lead to an undesirable outcome in future Asian politics. Well done.

This book is a fast and provocative read for any person interested in the future of international relations and national security - especially for Americans, but for anyone, anywhere in the world. It makes a compelling argument that Americans must wake up to the fact that the different ways of thinking of the civilizations found in Asia will significantly and dramatically impact us in ways we will not anticipate unless we educate ourselves about the nation-states of Asia, their technological knowledge level, their values and their thought processes. Americans, and Europeans, for that matter, need to become aware that other ways of thinking than those to which we are most accustomed will have a greater impact on our security and our own civilization in the next centurey. I am living in Asia at the moment, and the analysis rings very true. Anyone concerned about international relations or national security, or about the future of American civilization, should read this book.

Bracken challenges all of the conventional assumptions surrounding US security policy in East Asia, and backs it up with brilliant insights. Always creative and thought-provoking, he leads you through a critical analyis of the era after the end of the cold war, in the region where we have fought three wars this century.

This book by Paul Bracken is a timely piece of scholarship that points to the changing face of international politics. The emergence of the "second nuclear age" points to the end of Western dominance in East Asia. The power configuration in international politics will require a greater understanding of the cultural differences and values of the Eastern nations if the world is to have a chance of escaping some future nuclear war. Paul Bracken does a fine job helping the reader to understand the fundamental differences in the experience of the West and the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and the problems face by the emerging nuclear powers. This is a must read.

If Bill Gates ever decides to influence foreign policy, inundating Washington politicians and advisors with this book would be a smart way to accomplish the goal. Dr. Bracken looks at the 21st century with a global perspective. He points out cumulative changes which have unbalanced the power structures between the developed, western world and the "East", which includes the Middle East, Central Asia, China and South Asia. In particular, Dr. Bracken emphasizes how economic improvements in these countries will definitely not bias opinion towards western ideas. In fact, he makes a frighteningly convincing case against US ability to influence or control much of what will happen throughout these regions. Dr. Bracken shows just how limited the mighty US military machine will be when faced with geographic difficulties, or the volatility of emerging nation states, some of whom now include nuclear and biochemical arsenals.

"Fire in the East" provides an clear summary of the subtle diplomacy which will be required. Fascinating read.

This book made me think about how, though the cold war is over, the United States has to be aware of what is happening across the Pacific. The recent Chinese spy incident makes sense to me now.

Mr. Bracken makes loosely-worded assertions (too many to mention here) and does not back them up with facts. I was disappointed by a lack of a scholarly, studied approach. He is quite judgmental and sometimes outright wrong. He has a shallow understanding of the countries that he mentions in his book. The book is repetitious and belabors certain points over and over again.

To be fair to Mr. Bracken, he does make some good points. However, what the book lacks is a substantiation based on facts. Most of the substantiation is on basis of judgments (which is a weakness of the book).

Yale Political Scientist Paul Bracken proclaims that "a world of new military powers is appearing right before our eyes." Bracken proceeds to explain: "Asia's new military might was already a major factor in international politics." According to Bracken, "Atomic bombs get the West's attention," and he adds: "Whether Asia, and the world, can contain the international dynamics unleashed by weapons of mass destruction will be the other great challenge of the twenty-first century." I thought that this book had great promise, but it was very disappointing. Much of what Bracken writes is correct but obvious, and some of what he has to say is incorrect, if not utter nonsense. For instance, Bracken asserts: "The problem is that the United States isn't thinking about what it will be like to live in a world where five to ten Asian countries are nuclear powers, with missiles that can hit distant targets." According to Bracken: "In 1995, China had about fifty missiles aimed at Taiwan. Now, 200 missiles are there. In a few years, a thousand missiles are likely to be pointed at [Taiwan]." Bracken is far from unique in recognizing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be one of the most important international-security issues of the 21st century.

According to Bracken: "An unbroken belt of countries from Israel to North Korea (including Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, and China) has assembled either nuclear or chemical arsenals and is developing ballistic missiles." He then asserts: "The ballistic missiles and atomic, chemical, and biological weapons coming to Asia are all disruptive technologies. They nullify Western advantages in conventional weapons." According to Bracken: "Ballistic missiles break down the entire strategy of forward engagement from fixed bases;" and "Without bases, there can be no concentration of military power. Weapons cannot be stored, let alone massed for use. No bases, no weapons. It is America's singular military weakness in Asia." All of this assumes that, at some point in the relatively near future, the United States will need to fight a land war in Asia or the west Pacific. I believe that is exceptionally unlikely. On the next point, I believe that Bracken is absolutely wrong on cause and effect. He writes: "Industrialization and globalization increase military potential. That is the record of the 1990s." That is a specious reading of receny history. A number of countries, in Asia and elsewhere, have industrialized without militarizing. Bracken is correct, however, that the international arms bazaar is one of the most serious problems in the world: "Now countries can buy almost whatever they want from others, using international markets greatly abetted from the forces of globalization." According to Bracken: "Atomic bombs, because they offset the vast superiority of U.S. conventional forces, are the premier disruptive technology at work in the world today." If that is correct, it is a curious reversal of the early Cold War pattern, when the United States's atomic weapons countered the Soviet Union's vast superiority in conventional forces. Bracken speculates that "arms races in Asia might take a form very different from those of the cold war. China, for example, has no need to take on the United States in strategic nuclear forces. It only has to be strong enough to threaten vulnerable U.S. bases in Asia." In my opinion, that is a fundamental misreading of the strategic realities. U.S. bases may be vulnerable, but they are ultimately protected by the deterrent strength of the United States' massive nuclear superiority. For example, if North Korea were to attack an American base in Asia, or an American ally such as South Korea or Japan, with an atomic, chemical or biological weapon, the U.S. could, and almost certainly would, retaliate with nuclear weapons, and every military installation, economic asset, and population center in North Korea could be reduced to a smoking, radiating ruin within minutes. The dilemma lies in what the United States would do if North Korea launched a serious conventional attack against an American ally. That would recreate the problem the United States faced in the 1950s in Europe: what provocation is a sufficiently serious threat to American interests to justify employing nuclear weapons? According to Bracken: "The shaky control of Asian nuclear forces increases the danger of accidental or unintended war." That is one of Bracken's most significant observations. "Transitions of power could be especially dangerous...An upheaval in the government could open the way to military adventures with catastrophic consequence." Bracken states the obvious: "Asia is rife with sectarian disputes, which are likely to take on a more ominous character in an environment of weapons of mass destruction." Israel's long standoff with its Muslim neighbors and the India-Pakistan rivalry are the most obvious examples of this point. Bracken probably also is correct when he writes: "The rise of Asian military power makes for a new relationship between the west and Asia." Nevertheless, according to Bracken: "The rise of Asian military power does not argue for a U.S. pullback from the world military. It argues instead for a restructured U.S. military, one that can operate at greater distances from home and is less reliant on vulnerable forward bases;" and "[T]he United States cannot continue to base its fighting power in these installations because they are becoming too vulnerable to attack." As I asserted above, this is the real dilemma: When is an attack on American interests sufficiently serious threat to justify using nuclear weapons?

This book contains no foot- or endnotes and only a short bibliography, so it clearly was written for a general audience. Nevertheless, practically none of Bracken's observations are profound, and some of his conclusions result from superficial, if not wrongheaded, analysis. However, this book cannot be completely dismissed. My criticisms notwithstanding, the issues Bracken raises are of vital importance. The world, may in fact, be on the verge of another cold war, one which could be every bit as unstable as its earliest manifestation during its most virulent period, between the late 1940s and the middle 1960s.