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First and the Last, The

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This book is the benchmark of World War II Luftwaffe studies, written by the man who commanded the Fighter Force from Dec. 1941-Jan.1945. Galland was not just a warrior and ace, but an innovator who constantly battled with Goering and Hitler over the fate of their nation. As a specialist in the field, and someone who knew Galland personally, it is an honest representation of the facts. Highly recommended as a text.

Galland recounts the evolution of the fighter arm and its employment in the face of supporting a land campaign of overwhelming dimensions in the east (which was given priority for everthing) and simultaneously trying to defend the Reich itself from the relentless bombardment by the Anlgo-American air forces from the west. Included are the silly solutions proposed by Goering (who confessed in the late '30's that he, "just didn't know much about modern aircraft") and the constant belittling complaints from Hitler that the Luftwaffe "had let him down", but who refused to listen to any realistic assessment of the need for a massively enlarged fighter force and continued to see the bomber as weapon which would overcome all. Interesting to speculate what the Wermacht might have accomplished, a propos the Soviet Union, if Hitler hadn't made the fatally stupid mistake (among several others) of declaring war on the United States in order to honor the Tripartite Agreement with Japan.

This text accuratly depicts the inner managerial tectonics of the Luftwaffe during WWII. Galland reveals a unique perspective of the German air war and the rather pervasive incompetence of the German leadership to use the fighter wings effectively. It also takes an honest look at the Allied air war and draws some rather unique conclusions concerning the popular opinion of the effectiveness of the bomber campaign in Europe which general reader might find interesting. This book will be of more interest to those drawn to logistics and strategy rather than action-packed air combat scenes, about which the ever-modest Galland spends little time bemusing.

As General of German Fighter Forces during the latter half of the war, and a squadron commander during the battle of Briton, Galland is in a unique position to give a very authoritative first-hand account of just what went on at Luftwaffe High Command during the war. Also of note is Galland's involvement in high-tech weapons of the time, including forming the first combat jet squadrons. This is a fascinating and engaging read for any history buff, and a unique perspective for anyone who wants to know why Germany lost the war.

Instead of repeating other reviewers, I mostly focus on undeveloped content. (Review is based on the 1954 edition). Adolf Galland's actions in the 1939 German/Soviet--Polish war are mentioned in the Publisher's Note. (p. ix). Oddly enough, Galland does not discuss it. Why? Also, both the Publisher (p. ix) and Galland (p. 17) repeat the myth of the Polish Air Force destroyed largely on the ground, a canard refuted not only by Allied but also by German sources. Click on The Luftwaffe War Diaries: The German Air Force in World War II (Reprint), and read the Peczkis review. Galland does mention the Poles' 1944 Warsaw Uprising, and how the Soviets had betrayed it. (p. 301).

The author provides much detail on the Battle of Britain. He speculates on the outcome of the Battle had it begun in the spring of 1940 instead of the summer, giving the Luftwaffe more time to destroy the R.A.F. before winter set in. He also asserts that Germany could have produced many more planes, up to that time, than she actually did according to wrong German priorities. Finally, he complains of the mistakenly-made short range of the German planes, which meant, according to him, that only 1/10th of England was subject to Luftwaffe combat, while 9/10ths of England had the luxury of unmolested aircraft manufacture, training of pilots, etc. [Is Galland exaggerating? I have seen maps that show roughly the eastern half of England within range of German planes. Furthermore, most British industry was located in the eastern and southern part of the British Isles.].

Should fighter aircraft be allowed to shoot those who bale out of stricken planes? This question was discussed by Galland and Goering, with an ambiguous answer that balanced old-fashioned WWI air-war chivalry against the greater value of pilots over aircraft. (pp. 86-87). [In another context, Galland accused Polish pilots of shooting at German parachutists during the Battle of Britain, conveniently disregarding the fact that the Luftwaffe shot at Polish parachutists (not to mention columns of unarmed civilians) during the 1939 war.]

Luftwaffe ace Werner Moelders is described as one who had strong religious convictions, and one who opposed the anti-Catholic polemics of the Nazi Party. However, Galland rejects the claim that this caused problems for Moelders or led to his violent death. (pp. 96-97).

The British de Havilland Mosquito is described as an amazing plane that flew so high and was so fast that the German aircraft could not pursue it (except by diving) until they developed the ME-262 jet fighter plane. (p. 195-196). Also, its wooden construction gave it a faint signal on radar, making it an early form of stealth technology [using modern parlance, not Galland's].

As for the ME-262 jet fighter, Galland contends that the Germans were 18 months ahead of the Allies in jet fighter technology. However, he realizes the fact that this technology was one that matured independently in different nations, not one nation alone. (p. 324).

Throughout this work, Galland points to isolated successes of Allied precision bombing (e. g., the dam-busting raid), and uses these to argue for the "uselessness" of Allied carpet bombing. However, he refutes his own arguments when he elaborates on how easy it was for the Germans to protect their vital industry from precision Allied bombing: "So far it [German war production] had been concentrated in 27 larger works arranged on production, technical and economic lines. Now it was spread over 729 medium and very small plants. Some were situated in tunnels, caves, or disused mines, some were hidden in forests, ravines, and villages. They were admirably camouflaged and not only made air observation difficult for the Allies but also their spying and sabotage." (p. 305).

The only one who could tell the story of Germany's Air Force in WW2 in such detail is someone who had fought alongside them, and that happens to be General Adolf Galland, who was there since the beginning and becoming an ace of over 70 air-to-air kills, and one of the few who managed to see the air force crash and burn in the last months of 1945. Without fuel or enough pilots, it mattered little that Germany's production of aircraft was far superior than the Allies with their first fighter jets, as it was done too little too late. Galland is a great author, as well as a splendid fighter, who managed to survive up to the end, unlike many of his comrades.

The arrival of this book was met with great anticipation. The book is an original copy printed almost 50 years ago and the pages have colored with age, but I am impressed at the shape of the book, which is still in excellent condition after all these decades, and I'm glad that a book of this kind has been given a proper home and is read with great anticipation and also respect for it's delicate age. Handle with care, indeed! This book will easily dazzle me for another 50 years to come, even long after the surviving veterans of this war become a faint memory.

Order this book! The money I spent on it was not in vain and I am very pleased with it's condition and the story that is on it's yellowed pages.

Galland did his best to take any possible blame for the defeat oF Germany out of his shoulders. That's why he wrote this book. He blames averyone and everything for the fall of ther Luftwaffe Fighter Arm, except himself, the leader of the aforementioned force. Very clever.