Customer Reviews

The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (First World War (Oxford Hardcover))

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4 star:		(5)
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2 star:		(3)
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The first of three volumes by Hew Strachan of the University of Glasgow (and beginning in 2002 holder of the Chichele Chair of Modern History at Oxford University), this brilliant book, indicates that his trilogy, "The First World War," is going to be the definitive overall account of World War I for years to come. Recognizing a weakness in previous histories, Strachan has wisely chosen to emphasize comparative history, and he has drawn extensively on sources in German, French, and English to provide multiple perspectives on the war both at home and at the front. He also goes gives us full accounts not simply of the war in Europe but in Africa, the Pacific, and the Middle East, effectively including some topical chapters within an overall chronological framework. The thrust of "To Arms," the first volume, is a narrative of the origins and the early stages of the Great War. The book features superb descriptions of the diplomatic crises and intellectual justifications for war in 1914, an incisive analysis of Germany's global strategy, and vivid accounts of the early battles on land and sea. Additionally, Strachan provides topical chapters covering several years on the war in Africa and the Pacific, as well as thematic chapters on finance and industrial mobilization. With expert dexterity, Strachan maintains a balance between the large sweep of history and the views and actions of historical actors. The author never loses sight of what is important, and he uses dramatic vignettes and skillful analysis to highlight it. The book includes social and economic developments, but its emphasis is on political and military history, and that makes it rattling good reading. Despite the book's length (1,200 pages), Strachan's extensive research, up-to-date findings, incisive analysis, and lucid prose make reading it both edifying and enjoyable.

.... ... This book is a must for any serious student of 20th Century history.

Professor Strachan, who has headed the Glasgow University's Department of War Studies, has just been appointed to a prestigious chair at Oxford. Reading his latest book explains the appointment. It is a tour de force of information, and, of more importance to the student of this defining event for the 20th Century, an insightful and thorough analysis of the crucial events preceding and during the first year of the war. It is the first of three volumes and, although some sections deal with events after 1914, the first volume is focused on the causes and the beginnings of the conflict.

A word of caution for prospective purchasers of this book: This is not a book for the casual reader of history, especially military history. Professor Strachan assumes a relatively sophisticated reader. Furthermore, his depth of descriptive detail and analysis might be much more extensive than a casual student of history would appreciate. If the reader is not familiar with military terms such as "staff ride," perhaps another summary of World War I would be more appropriate. The work is actually a comprehensive reference book on the entire subject of World War I. The section on the entry of Turkey into the war, could be a book in itself.

Extensive treatment of the economic and social aspects of the war provides a broad backdrop for the military events. The military analysis is suburb and provocative. Just one of many examples: Strachan's explanation of the legendary "Schlieffen Plan" and the reality of its effect on the war put the simplistic common historical explanations into a more understandable perspective. A careful reader is given enough detailed information to be able to appreciate the realities of battlefield commanders and the enormous complexity of the interplay of thousands of events as they shape the ever-changing outcomes of a war with one front 400 miles long. As the British would say, Strachan "puts paid" to the simple explanation that the initial German offensive ended in the trench stalemate because Moltke weakened his right and failed to follow the Schlieffen Plan. Strachan carefully reviews all the facts and concludes that the salient event was the French victory on the Marne, which resulted from French willingness to maneuver.

American readers will eagerly await Strachan's view of the U.S. entry and participation in the War. We can hope that some of this will be in Volume II.

Hew Strachan was commissioned to write this book to replace C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's 1934 A History of the Great War and it has been anxiously anticipated by scholars. Most reviewers have called it definitive, but this is difficult to claim with still two volumes to follow. Given that this book took 15 years to complete, it is doubtful that Strachan himself will ever complete the work. Nevertheless, this is a monumental achievement but flawed.

To Arms is an enormous achievement in scholarship. Strachan has utilized all the most recent resources as well as the older material in several different languages. The synthesis of this overwhelming and diverse amount of information into a coherent, pleasurable, and largely unbiased prose is perhaps Strachan's greatest achievement. Strachan covers the year 1914 including the events preceding the war, Anglo-German antagonisms, war plans for all the belligerents, Socialist parties in each country, leaders, and economies. The roles of the leaders, the maneuvers of the armies and navies, and the tangling alliances all receive ample treatment. The virtually unprecedented depth of treatment of the African theater is worth the purchase alone. Both the Eastern and Western Front are covered in some depth as far as the armies and generals are concerned. Strachan has also impressively managed to paint the war as a truly global war, and not just a European war. Japan and her war aims are expertly explained. Strachan manages to cover political, economic, social, and military issues while revealing the lack of planning and preparation for war, especially the war aims of the different countries.

There are weaknesses. The typographical errors are numerous enough to become irritating. Expect major revisions on the reissue. The maps that accompany the book have already been a chief criticism of most reviewers but I must state that they are simply useless. The importance of operations and command strategy are the chief focus while the individual trials of combat for the soldiers are absent, but these may be covered in the later volumes. Strachan also tends to skim over extremely important areas, giving passing treatment to the crucial battle of the Marne and its intricacies. Strachan prefers to explain it from the generals' points of view, and focuses on the cooperation problems with Sir John French and the BEF with Foch, Joffre, Lanrezac and other French generals. Factual errors are few. The only one I can remember is Hitler celebrating the coming war in Vienna when it was actually Munich

Despite these problems this book is deserving of the high praise it has received and a worthy read for any First World War scholar. Casual readers and those with only a marginal understanding of the First World War would do well to avoid this book. Strachan assumes a competent level of knowledge of the War from his readers and tends to skim things of standard knowledge
.

Hew Strachan was commissioned to write this book to replace C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's 1934 A History of the Great War and it has been anxiously anticipated by scholars. Most reviewers have called it definitive, but this is difficult to claim with still two volumes to follow. Given that this book took 15 years to complete, it is doubtful that Strachan himself will ever complete the work. Nevertheless, this is a monumental achievement but flawed.

To Arms is an enormous achievement in scholarship. Strachan has utilized all the most recent resources as well as the older material in several different languages. The synthesis of this overwhelming and diverse amount of information into a coherent, pleasurable, and largely unbiased prose is perhaps Strachan's greatest achievement. Strachan covers the year 1914 including the events preceding the war, Anglo-German antagonisms, war plans for all the belligerents, Socialist parties in each country, leaders, and economies. The roles of the leaders, the maneuvers of the armies and navies, and the tangling alliances all receive ample treatment. The virtually unprecedented depth of treatment of the African theater is worth the purchase alone. Both the Eastern and Western Front are covered in some depth as far as the armies and generals are concerned. Strachan has also impressively managed to paint the war as a truly global war, and not just a European war. Japan and her war aims are expertly explained. Strachan manages to cover political, economic, social, and military issues while revealing the lack of planning and preparation for war, especially the war aims of the different countries.

There are weaknesses. The typographical errors are numerous enough to become irritating. Expect major revisions on the reissue. The maps that accompany the book have already been a chief criticism of most reviewers but I must state that they are simply useless. The importance of operations and command strategy are the chief focus while the individual trials of combat for the soldiers are absent, but these may be covered in the later volumes. Strachan also tends to skim over extremely important areas, giving passing treatment to the crucial battle of the Marne and its intricacies. Strachan prefers to explain it from the generals' points of view, and focuses on the cooperation problems with Sir John French and the BEF with Foch, Joffre, Lanrezac and other French generals. Factual errors are few. The only one I can remember is Hitler celebrating the coming war in Vienna when it was actually Munich

Despite these problems this book is deserving of the high praise it has received and a worthy read for any First World War scholar. Casual readers and those with only a marginal understanding of the First World War would do well to avoid this book. Strachan assumes a competent level of knowledge of the War from his readers and tends to skim things of standard knowledge

This is a book that was commissioned some time ago by Oxford Press to be a replacement for a book written in 1934 called a history of the Great War by Crutwell. It is the first of three volumes and it covers the lead up to the war and the first two years.

The book is quite long over 1,000 pages but it is a thorough treatment of the subject. Not only does it cover the diplomatic lead up to the war and the initial campaigns, but it also covers the naval war, financing the war and the problems faced by both sides in producing weapons and munitions.

The book is without doubt the best volume so far written on what is now a rather remote conflict. The reason for this is the partisan nature of previous histories. The First World War saw a number of technical developments including the invention of barbed wire, smokeless powder, the magazine rifle, the machine gun and recoil mechanisms for artillery which enabled battlefields to be engulfed in rapid accurate high explosive and shrapnel fire. These developments favoured the defence. In the confined area of the Western Front battles turned into a form of siege warfare that led to immense numbers of casualties for attacking forces. (The Eastern Front because of the much greater distances operated differently)

Following the war many British Writers such as Hart and Fuller wrote a number of books which shaped our understanding of the war. These histories were in general terms rather simplified schematic and sought to portray the military leaders of mainly the allied powers as dull blockheads who butchered thousands of men with little regard for the cost. It picked out a small number of leaders such as Monash as examples of the doctrines which these authors thought the key to future warfare. This view of things is the basis on which military history of the conflict has relied until recently.

Strachan has only written about a small amount of the actual conflict, but what he has said so far paints a different picture from the normal orthodoxy. To illustrate:

In deciding to go to war Germany faced considerable problems. Although the German High Command believed that their troops were of higher quality than those of the allied powers, it was clear that they were outnumbered because of the potential number of troops that could be mobilised by Russian. The Germans were also aware of the potentiality of new weapons and the changes which favoured the defence. Their planning for war depended on invading Belgium thus avoiding a frontal contact with the French and using the room gained by invading a neutral country to surround and role back the French Army. The initial proposal of this strategy was made in 1906 by Alfred von Schlieffen a member of the German general staff. Histories of the conflict have tended to focus on the Schlieffen plan? as if it was a set in concrete operational plan which was set in concrete. Historians have tended to focus on the German operations in 1914 and suggested the reasons for defeat were because of minor alterations to this ?plan?.

The reality is that in reality there was no such ?plan?. Rather the invasion of Belgium was seen by successive General Staffs as a rational solution of how to overcome the problem of numerical inferiority. Various plans would be brought out depending on the strategic situation as it evolved from 1906 to 1914.

Strachan also attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of Joffre, the French Supreme Commander. Hart and Fuller portrayed him as a fool who rather than examining the reality of war, was obsessed with the notion of the offensive and the importance of the bayonet charge. The French Plan for an offensive into Alscace and Lorraine was portrayed as suicidal nonsense which could only lead to immense casualties because of the invention of the machine gun and magazine rifle. Strachan shows that Joffre?s offensive plans were in fact flexible and rational. In addition it was Joffre who responded to the German attack through Belgium by the manoeuvres which were to become the battle of the Marne and ended in German defeat and the relieving of the German commander Moltke.

This is indeed a fine book. One criticism of it is the maps. The author instead of providing maps with military units displayed with arrows to show their movement, simply has terrain maps and one has to concentrate on the text to work out what has happened. This is slightly annoying but a minor irritation in what is otherwise a fine book.

The discussions also about Naval Strategy, the Shell ?crisis?, the entry of Turkey into the war and the African campaigns are all first class. This is the best book written to date on the war.

This book justifies its imposing length both substantively and with great style. The author covers all aspects of this great and puzzling war -- military, political, and economic -- in a comprehensive and readable way. Avoiding an Anglocentric or even Eurocentric point of view, Mr. Strachan well supports his thesis that this war was a global war with global implications. Mr. Strachan demands attention from the reader, but well rewards that attention with a clear exposition that leaves one in awe not only of his scholarship, but his ability to synthesize so many sources. It is clearly worth the investment not only to purchase, but to read closely and enjoy greatly.

Yes, this is THE history of WW1. I have no complaints about the text.

However, it is seriously flawed because of its third-rate maps. There ARE maps, but they only show cities, towns, borders, railroads, and rivers. There are no symbols for armies, no arrows showing movements, not even little crossed-sword symbols to show battle sites. And some of the locations mentioned in the text are not shown on the maps, so at times you are really left clueless.

And, no photos. 1200 pages of text and no pictures!!!!

There are solutions. For maps, Arthur Banks' Military Atlas of the First World War is an essential companion to this book. For photos, there are several illustrated histories of WW1 (including one by Strachan)....

Nothing written on WWI compares to this volume. Before picking up this rather hefty tome, I thought I had a pretty good handle and most of what did and did not happen in the first stages of The Great War and the various theories to explain these events. Strachan, admittedly, presumes such knowledge but then builds on it and expands on it to a degree I have yet to see in the historiography of the period. 1100 pages don't often fly by -- these did -- with only a minimum of skimming.

Strachen does a magnificent job of analsyzing the events before and leading to the first world war and the events of the first year of the war. he addresses commonly held misconceptions attributable to multiple authories on WW1 including Tuchman, MacDonald and Churchill. he uses many sources, all referenced, from the commanders orders, the political leaders speeches and orders, as well as diaries of the generals and foot soldiers! i dont know where Strachen found the time to write and research such an outstanding accomplishment and there are 2 more to come! the maps could have been better illustrated by showing the movemnts of the armies and corps in their main battles. these 3 books may well wind up being used mainly as a reference unless you love the first war world time period and have the perserverance to read it! i did and i am eagerly awaiting the 2nd and 3rd volumes! kirk vestal md

This is the first volume of what will be the standard history of WWI. The depth and breadth of scholarship is tremendous. Strachan has mastered the extensive literature in English, German, and French supplemented by appropriate reading of work in other languages. Strachan's essential point is to demonstrate that WWI was indeed a world war involving virtually the whole globe. His perspective is the result of a determined effort to avoid the excessive concentration on the Western Front found in most of the English language and French literature. In this volume, for example, Strachan devotes considerable effort to describing and analyzing the war in sub-saharan Africa. The topic is treated usually as a minor sideshow. Strachan makes the essential point that the labor demands of these campaigns were enormous and affected a large percentage of the population of Africa, justifying easily his extensive treatment of this topic. The book is organized into a hybrid chronological/thematic scheme. Chronological presentation of the prologue to the war and the events of 1914 in Western and Eastern Europe is alternated with thematic presentation of topics like the war in the North Sea, financing of the war, and industrial mobilization for war. The method of organization works well. Strachan is a good writer and this thick book proceeds smoothly. I agree with other reviewers that the maps are inadequate. I wish also that the bibliography was annotated. Regardless, this book is and its successors will be remarkable works of scholarship.