Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Maritime Studies) [Hardcover]

Nicholas Lambert (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Review

. . . this is quite a splendid book and one that it is hard to recommend too highly. -- Journal of Military History 1/2000

...an intensive investigation of archival sources that surpasses all previous work on the Royal Navy in the steam era. -- Proceedings 10/99 --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

About the Author

NICHOLAS LAMBERT received his doctorate from Oxford University in 1992. He has held fellowships at Yale University, Wolfson College, Oxford, and Southampton University. He lives in London and Pasadena, California. --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 364 pages
• Publisher: University of South Carolina Press; First Edition edition (June 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1570032777
• ISBN-13: 978-1570032776
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.3 x 1.5 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.8 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #4,162,860 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

28 of 28 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Radically Revisionistic History, March 28, 2000

By 

Steven Zoraster (Austin, Texas USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Maritime Studies) (Hardcover)

This is a major revisionist interpretation of British naval policy as conceived and carried out by Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord between late 1904 and early 1910. In fact, there appears to be hardly a single conventional assumption about Fisher's policies, and the policies and technical flexibility of the Admiralty during this period that is not subject to reconsideration in the book.

What I found most interesting was the startling - to me - degree to which senior British naval officers readily accepted the potential for torpedo-armed submarine and destroyer flotillas to change naval warfare, and the amount of effort they were willing to put into devising ways to use this revolutionary potential to reinforce British naval supremacy. The book is filled with descriptions of British investment in submarine technology and the ongoing discussions between naval officers of ways to adapt that technology to British needs.

According to the book, Fisher's planned great revolution in naval warfare was not intended to be the Dreadnought battleship that his name is still commonly associated with. Instead it was to be a British fleet made up of a combination of battlecruisers with Dreadnought-scale heavy armament, great speed, and excellent gun laying based on analogue computers, designed for overseas force projection; and a submarines and destroyer flotillas designed and deployed for protection of Great Britain and such other narrow seas where they could be used to bottle up potential enemy forces. This assertion is thoroughly backed up with detailed quotes from personal letters and Admiralty memos and position papers, plus the evidence of how Fisher spent funds available to him.

The plans of Admiral Fisher and others in the British Admiralty were developed in largely hostile political environment. The British government during this period, and the opposition political parties, were intent on reducing British naval expenditures, and not at all interested in developing the ability to expand British ability to project naval force overseas. Therefore, Fisher and his allies had to act largely in secret, while disguising their true goals from most of their political masters.

This book has a lot of trees in its forest. I did not find it easy reading, and I would not recommend it to someone with only casual interest in British naval history or the history of naval technology. To fully understand appreciate the book's thesis and scope, the reader must be willing to delve along with the book's author into British domestic politics, British foreign policy, and a host of technical issues beyond those mentioned above. I personally found it difficult at first to fully understand why, given that Fisher had much of the Admiralty behind him, and that Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty from 1910 up to 1915, also had great faith in submarine and destroyer flotillas to control narrow seas, the Royal Navy didn't manage to make the changeover desired by Admiral Fisher. The way I finally understood it, it comes down to one basic fact, Fisher, Churchill and their allies in the Admiralty simply did not have enough time. Not enough time to educate and prepare the politicians and the British public, not enough time to nurture the necessary submarine building industry in Britain or in one of the Dominions, and not enough time to guarantee a completely united front in the Admiralty needed to quickly push through such radical change in naval policy. Given that it was less than a decade between Fisher's appointment as First Sea Lord and the outbreak of WWI, that is probably reason enough.

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Lambert sets a new standard, January 19, 2007

By 

Soren Swigart (Edmond, Oklahoma, USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Studies in Maritime History) (Paperback)

In Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Nicholas Lambert has provided a comprehensive analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the ten years before the outbreak of World War One. Displaying a remarkable command of the source documents Lambert examines grand strategy, tactical concepts, national financial policy and politics with great skill and fluidly moves between these seemingly disparate subjects with ease. It becomes apparent as Lambert dissects events that much of the research that has went on before on this subject and which forms the basis for many people's ideas about era is superficial and incomplete.

This is a complicated subject but Lambert's grasp of narrative and clean clear prose makes it easy for the interested reader to follow the string through the maze that was British naval policy in the Fisher era. Lambert makes it clear that Fisher was not appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 to introduce the dreadnought battleship/battlecruiser but to cut naval spending. This fact spurred Fisher to introduce new technologies to maintain Britain's naval supremacy when that supremacy was increasingly under threat from a number of quarters. Lambert puts emphasis on Fisher's ideas about the use of flotilla craft. These were small submersible boats and surface craft armed with torpedoes that could close the narrow seas around the British Isles to enemy battle fleets thus freeing the British fleet to roam the high seas, bringing battle to the enemy and protecting her own huge ocean trade. Lambert shows how on the eve of the war, the Royal Navy was on the verge of stopping battleship construction altogether on favor of flotilla craft. This is new ground.

Fisher was faced with four other areas of crisis which this book delves into: financial constraints, manpower limitations, ship deployment policies and forging new tactics that would take advantage of the developing technology that was changing the face of naval warfare. Lambert also makes clear that the senior officers of the Royal Navy in the decade before the war were not operating in an intellectual vacuum, countering the unfortunate impression that many historians have fostered that the navy was resistant to new technology, unable to think critically, and too lazy for deep analysis and staff work. While a number of hidebound ignoramuses had managed to reach high command, most senior officers were energetically working to exploit the emergent technologies to the full extent.

Lambert's story of the Royal Navy before 1914 presents a picture completely different from the accepted one. It is one that is wholly convincing and presents a more satisfying explanation of what happened, and why, than we have had before. I recommend this book to those who are familiar with the subject and have a desire to go deeper into it. You won't be sorry.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Totally Unexpected, December 11, 2010

By 

Weesel "TJ" (Balmer, MD) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Studies in Maritime History) (Paperback)

Admiral Fisher is one of the most interesting historic characters I've run across. However, the man associated with big-gun battleships had many, craft, prescient sides to him that I'd never suspected. The purported revolution of the title was most unexpected and the tactics involved were downright sneaky to the point of brilliance. I salute you, Sir John!