Customer Reviews

Five Days in London: May 1940

5 star:		(25)
4 star:		(24)
3 star:		(7)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(8)

 

 

This book is a thrill to read: the crucial five day period during which a very small group of determined people, led by one particularly - determined man, persuaded England and The West to hold the line against Hitler, and at least arguably saved The World...

The story is not new, but this presentation of it is. A generation -- or so, now -- raised on Wheeler - Bennett and AJP Taylor, and Nicolson and Namier and all the very many others, knows very well the story of Winston Churchill and his country's lonely stand against the Axis just following the Fall of France.

What never has been presented as dramatically as John Lukacs now presents it are the machinations, and the political follies and wisdom, and the ultimately very personal story of just how Churchill and a few others convinced the British at the time to do what they did: not in broad brushstrokes -- those are far easier to paint, as so many have on this topic -- but in the meticulous details which, alone, can show the individual frustrations, fears, jealousies, and uncertainties which characterize any truly historic human situation.

Detailed and meticulous as it is, however -- Lukacs is a well - respected historian -- the book is very short, and very dramatic, not at all pedantic or defensive as books about the period increasingly tend to be. His writing style flows smoothly. His aim, the author says in his Preface, is to explore an idea he has held for "forty, perhaps even fifty, years" that the five days specified in the title were critical not only because of the Fall of France but also because, "Churchill's situation within the War Cabinet was much more difficult than most people, including historians at that time, thought".

The result is a fascinating, day - by - day, account of how single - minded and occasionally - brilliant but nevertheless inexorably - human politicians maneuvered, and ultimately out - maneuvered, each other into positions -- positions which can be seen to be clear and on the side of the angels, or on the other, only in retrospect. At the time, all was very murky, as it perhaps is at any truly significant historical turning point, and Lukacs the careful historian practically forces us to appreciate this.

Defenders of Edward Wood, Lord Halifax will be upset by this book, and so perhaps will be the increasing numbers of armchair revisionists of the period now making historical hay from views ranging from "World War II need not have happened" to "World War II did not happen" to "World War II was not a war". There will be arguments -- there are any time someone saves The World, or is suggested to have done so. There also are heroes, occasionally, or at least heroic actions -- and there are traitors, and cowards and fools -- and always there is foolishness, and some bravery and many errors, committed as much by the heroes as by their counterparts.

But Lukacs is not chiefly concerned in his book with such after - the - fact debates -- although he does not avoid them, and although they may engulf him when his critics take on this book simply because he has chosen this particular highly - controversial period. He instead addresses most directly a more immediate and at once a more universal theme: how do people act, and react, under enormous pressure, particularly when the "correct" decisions to make are not popular or, worse, are not clear.

Churchill, and Halifax and the others, all were operating under such conditions during these five crucial days in May in 1940. It is instructive for any of us too accustomed to comfortable certainties in history to see just how uncertain all of this was at the time; chastening to be reminded just how imperfect human decision - making processes are; breathtaking to realize how rapidly situations and events unfold for political leaders who in fact often have all too little power really to influence results.

This book is a very good read, for anyone interested in its particular war, but also for anyone interested generally in politics, power, or personality.

"But in May 1940 Churchill was the one who did not loose it" This is the theme of a compact, extraordinary 5 days that decided the outcome of WWII. This is certainly not the only event that brought the allies victory, however Mr. Lukacs demonstrates that while England was never in a position to win the war alone, she was in a position to loose it, and Churchill was the individual who saw that it was not lost. I don't believe he overstates Churchill's role in the slightest. Had the War gone the other way Churchill certainly would have been given all the blame. Churchill was flawed, but during the decade of 1930, in what are often referred to as "His Wilderness Years" the same men who would later owe their existence and that of their Country's continuance to him rejected him out of hand. When he finally became Prime Minister it was when all the disasters had begun or had been completed. Churchill was given the mess that he inherited from Chamberlein and others; Alsace Lorraine gone, Austria gone, Czechoslovakia given away with Chamberlain's active participation punctuated by the "Peace In Our Time" debacle. Further, France was quickly falling apart, as were the Low Countries, Dunkirk loomed, and what is worse, Churchill had to cope with members of his own Cabinet that wanted to negotiate with Hitler as he was storming across Europe. Churchill managed to bring those in government and the public to his side, and the rest as they say is History. Mr. Lukacs provides great additional information, footnotes that are as informative as the body of the text, and an even handed description of those players involved including Churchill. Brilliantly written History, that is also readable, and demonstrates that what we may have thought of as an event that actually did take years to finish, may well have been decided in 5 days. Buy the book you will not be disappointed.

Lukacs sets the five days up for readers like a dramatic play...Churchill, Chamberlin, Halifax, etc are fascinating characters carrying the weight of the world as well as their own political baggage. The English people seemed surprisingly unmotivated to continue fighting after the grim results at Dunkirk. The decision made on those five fateful days changed the history of the world. I am an unlikely history fan, but this book was great!

The author's premise, correctly stated from the book, is that Hitler never came closer to winning his European war than at the end of May, 1940.

A newly installed Prime Minister, Churchill, was presented with: France on the verge of defeat, the BEF bottled up on the coast at Dunkirk, no allies on the horizon once France was gone, an aristocracy that had some members who admired and/or feared Hitler, and a Conservative majority in Parliament which at that point tolerated is presence rather than enthusiastically embracing him.

The War Cabinet, Churchill and four other senior members of the cabinet, had to decide whether or not to fight it out no matter what, or inquire of Hitler upon what terms he would allow England to survive. That is at least how Lord Halifax saw the options. Churchill was resolute from the beginning -- any hint try at accommodation would lead to the eventual destruction of Britain and cement the Nazi map of Europe in place.

The five days in question follow a long debate among the cabinet, or chiefly among Churchill and Halifax, regarding the issue of whether or not to advance an overture to Hitler. Chamberlain played some role, usually siding with Churchill as the discussions progresssed, but holding the balance of power none the less.

Why is this debate important? Well, with the clarity offered by hindsight, it is now easy to appreciate that any attempt at purchasing peace from Hitler would have only meant a thus weakened Britain would have been added to the Third Reich later. In the spring of 1940, serious people seriously discussed this acquiescence strategy in London. If that strategy had been followed, it is possible that the English government of the time could have lost the war for civilization. Thus, the author's important point is correct. During this period -- this hinge of history -- Churchill did not lose the war -- and thus deserves history's gratitude.

Why did Churchill simply not force the issue? For several reasons. He was in the PM's chair only a fortnight -- the second choice of the King and the Conservative Party (Halifax, the first choice, had turned it down requiring one to appreciate either his selfless patriotism, divine intervention, or some combination of both). It was probable that a major disagreement within the War Cabinet would have brought him down and proved disasterous for public morale. In addition, any public hint that the War Cabinet was even thinking about an accommodation of Hitler would have quite likely retarded the English people's will to resist. (I can state from personal experience in assuming a political leadership role at the head of a divided caucus that in the beginning one must build political capital until a point is reached where decisive action can be taken by the leader because it will be supported, even it the decision proves costly or presents great difficulty.)

Churchill had the wisdom to know that his only choice in making the right choice (ie, rejecting accommodation and fighting to the end), required his moving the War Cabinet decisively behind his position through personal diplomacy and moral suasion. Churchill proved to be a master of this technique (interesting to view because he is remembered publicly for his defiant and blustery leadership, but he was quite the canny politico, too).

This book tells the tale in an interesting way. Each day is a chapter. The War Cabinet meeting summaries are nicely interspersed with background discussions of the participants, an overview of the political and military situations and a daily reading of public opinion (as gleaned from an early survey technique employed by the government and some newspaper and diary accounts). I would have preferred more discussion of the cabinet sessions and thought the daily public opinion discussion could have been discarded. However, this is a neat little book that should be of interest to any WWII devotee or political science student. The author does a good job and makes his case well regarding the decisiveness of this time period for human history.

Many historical works seek to present the sweep and pagentry of history. This one does something different. John Lukacs focuses on five critical days in May, 1940 and on one key question on which the fate of the modern world depended; would England fight or give? The book returns us to a time when Nazi Germany was sweeping across Europe, France was beaten and England was vulnerable and alone. It was a time when some in England could argued that negotiating with Hitler was a possibly tenable option and maybe the most prudent course.

What Lukacs seeks to do is to trace the course by which, over a critical 5-day period, Churchill brought the War Cabinet to an irrovocable "no negotiation" stance. It is an almost hour by hour chronicle of who did and said what and how Churchill and Lord Halifax dueled.

The book has some weaknesses. It includes extensive focus on the general mood of the country during this five-day period. It's fascinating information but it isn't so clear that this mood was central to the Cabinet's eventual decision to fight. Also, did the author really make the case that those at least toying with the idea of negotiation were doing more than trying to keep options open? Lord Halifax comes across as very tentative in his position and surprisingly unwilling to confront Churchill at a time when the latte was at his weakest. It was never clearly shown (in this book) that those favorable to the negotiation position were doing more than hunting amid back channels for some slim hope of peace.

Yet, even so, the argument goes that any move towards negotiation would have sucked England down a road where the will to fight would have been lost and eventually terms--whatever Hitler would eventually have offered--would have had to be accepted. Thus, even the tentative moves towards negotiation had to be stopped and the process of how this was accomplished--how a "no negotiation" postion was forged--is very interesting.

Not everyone will enjoy this book. The very narrow focus and the documenting of each meeting and cable may not excite all readers. For me, however, it was exactly that kind of "behind-the-scenes" detail that made the book so interesting.

Recommended for those who already know something about the period, who love history and who find the political nuances as exciting as a heroic battle.

Lukacs' book is an excellent analysis, well worth reading. My only complaints are with his writing style. At times he rambles as though he were giving a history lecture off the top of his head; it charmed me at first, exasperated me after a while, but I was resigned to it by the end. Far more irritating is his habit of liberally sprinkling lengthy footnotes on just about every other page. It's not that the footnotes are boring; it's that they continually interrupt the flow of his narrative. Better, I think, to have either worked the information into the narrative or to have had an appendix at the end. Small quibbles with an otherwise excellent book.

In the entire history of the twentieth century world there are really two years that mark points of inflection; 1914 and 1989. John Lukacs in this short book looks at a key moment towards the middle of this seventy-five years, that being the darkest days of Britain's struggle during the Second World War. Avoiding the historian mind game of "what if", Lukacs looks in detail at a few key days just before the "miracle of Dunkirk", when it seemed all but certain that most of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) would be killed or captured in the channel ports of northern France. This would leave 300,000 British men as German prisoners, and deprive Britain of its only available and trained army elements, while at the same time it faced the near prospect of a German assault by airborne or sea borne troops.

This terrible deluge of military disasters began on the very same day (May 10) as did a new British government of national unity, headed by the largely untrusted Winston Churchill. With limited support in his own party, Churchill had to persuade the War Cabinet, the Cabinet at large, and the Commons to hold out against the Nazis and not to respond to peace initiatives that were then being proffered in secret by a still neutral (technically, at least) Italy.

Lukacs makes the valid point that these events and issues are glossed in Churchill's history of the war, perhaps out of magnanimity to Lord Halifax, who was testing the prospect of negotiations in the War Cabinet. Halifax's view must have seemed most sensible at that hour. Belgium had surrendered. France was being routed. The US could offer no quick (or even certain) military aid to the Allies, and the Churchill/FDR relationship had not yet blossomed. What did Churchill's point of view have going for it? Three points only: 1) Britain was not yet defeated. 2) Hitler's terms were not likely to be worse should Britain subsequently be defeated 3) a view of the war as not merely another European war, but as a struggle for the very future of Western Civilization. This view was Churchill's, and not widely shared at the time. From the perspective of the Millennium, we take for granted that the third point has validity, but in May 1940 only an out-of-date Victorian fool like Churchill could think of the war primarily in these terms. Few as such fools were, within a few months Churchill would find in FDR a fellow Victorian fool who shared his dread of Nazism, and was willing to press his own considerable powers to the limit in order to assist Britain in its elimination. Churchill told the House in May to "prepare for heavy news". The salvation of the BEF at Dunkirk postponed that necessity. Instead, Churchill reported the miracle of Dunkirk to the House in early June. The heavy news would come later that month, when France also surrendered, leaving Britain entirely alone. Yet even then, the key points in favor of Britain continuing the war remained valid.

Churchill, while correct in his convictions, was also lucky in his enemy. Certainly allowing 350,000 men to escape across the Channel from France was both a huge and unnecessary blunder, the first of many such that Corporal Hitler would personally make as a commander in Chief. In the case of Dunkirk, the Fuhrer was concerned about overextending his armor, and overconfident in the ability of Goering's Luftwaffe to control the skies and damage British forces from the air. A second and even more strategic blunder followed soon after. This was to transfer the focus of the Luftwaffe's air attacks to London instead of the British aircraft industries. This decision was firmly set in response to the bombing raid on Berlin by the RAF during early September, which had little effect outside of propaganda (and thus illustrates the immense potential value of such propaganda driven military actions). While London burned and bled, Britain was resupplied and rearmed.

Had the Third Reich captured the BEF at Dunkirk, and/or established air superiority over Britain, the war could well have been lost militarily and ended shortly. Hitler might have pursued his Soviet campaign with a defeated, vassalized Europe at his rear, and not in the context of any "World War". Instead the Nazis struggled simultaneously in Africa, Italy, and finally in France when the ever-present threat of a second front finally came to fruition in 1944.

-Harry Forbes

Professor Lukacs has written another great book.(Hitler of History is essential reading too)His argumentation and particularly his footnotes are a pleasure to read.I read it uninterupted during a flight. He has concinced me that Churchill has saved the world from the Third Reich because he early on recognized that the true danger was Hitler and not communism. He is very good at using counterfactuals (what if )too. Lukacs is one of my favorate historians because he tells us why things happened . I am trying to read all his work.

This is a political history of a pivotal one-week period on the uphill side of World War II. Filled with much detail drawn from contemporary accounts, it represents a huge amount of research. It brims with interesting tidbits; You get a real sense of what went on at the highest level of British government in those dark, foreboding days when France was collapsing before the Nazi juggernaut and the BEF was falling back towards the Channel with nary a counter-punch. If there is a weakness in this book, though, it is the implied presumption that the reader is already familiar with the key players. >In the end, this is not a book just about Churchill (whom Lukacs clearly admires and, rightly so, finds truly heroic) or his stiffening of the British spirit. It is also a book supporting a central theme in the worldview Lukacs developed over his career. Lukacs holds that "Churchill understood something that not many people understand even now. The greatest threat to Western civilization was not Communism. It was National Socialism. The greatest and most dynamic power in the world was not Soviet Russia. It was the Third Reich of Germany. The greatest revolutionary of the twentieth century was not Lenin or Stalin. It was Hitler. BR>This book is more than its title suggests. More than just fine history, it is history with a message. The last three pages in particular are worth the time it takes read the whole book. I wonder if we in the West are not at such a juncture today. Five stars for this one, Mr. Lukacs.

After trudging through Martin Gilbert's Churchill, which is a lackluster cut and paste job of his multi-volume bio series, I learned more about Churchill, parliament, and England during the most important period in its history thanks to this little book. While Gilbert always keeps the "camera" close to Churchill, we never learn what others thought of the great leader. Now, in Lukacs's fine book, not only do we learn about Joe Kennedy's poor opinion of Churchill, we also learn that Elinor Roosevelt had a less than stellar opinion of Winston. The book not only captures the urgency of these important days, we also learn that opinion polls have roots going back to the 40s. Read this slim -- 220 page -- book and learn more about the early days of the war than a lumbering, 800 page bio of the man who convinced England that Hitler was a threat, Stalin was an evil ally, and England would prevail.

Time magazine was wrong -- Winston Churchill was the Person of the Century, not Albert Einstein.