Customer Reviews

Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice

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Captain Hughes is the first person to formulate a method of tactical thought geared for naval officers (vice policy-wonks in the world's defense establishments). While on initial perusal, the book appears to be a historical survey, Hughes actual aim is to inspire naval officers to develop a methodology for tactical analysis which can be applied to real-world tactical problems. He provides simple examples of operations research models of naval combat. These models do not provide the "answer" to tactical problems but rather provide the means to formulate tactical principles in a systematic fashion. One doesn't have to be a mathematician to understand this book, just someone open to new ways of looking at an old problem.

Although written as a text book. A person can read this book and get an appreciation of the problems of naval warfare particularly involving fleet. Many historical problems that I have heard. Such as why the German's in WW1 did not use their fleet much more and why the Japanese kept splitting their fleet in WW2 are explained here very well.

I have learnt a lot from this book.

The book is a very good summary about five principles of naval tactics (Scouting, Command, Doctrine, Information, Training ) that could apply almost wherever there are forces in conflict or complex actions integrated by several people. These principles are clarified with historical battles and their results. It also include the evolution of naval tactis with techology.

CAPT Hughes work was a seminal realization for the waning Cold War Navy. The application of small, fast, networked craft in a mass assault against surface fleet elements was riveting and a telling indicator of our present (2007) military situation. What CAPT Hughes failed to adequately factor into his work was the impact of economics, improved missile capability and survivability.

Hughes makes the error of fighting the last war (in his mind WWII) in the present day. The USA has abandoned ships of the line (CGs and the like) in favor of ESG (expeditionary strike groups). He works valiantly to update this in his 1999 version with an added section on Coastal Combat. However, aside from its historical perspective, this work fails to instruct or enlighten.

I read this work will reading Mahan (whom Huges is very critical of) and found them to both contain the part the other lacks. Mahan, focusing on national policy, neglects the importance of tactics and their evolution. Hughes, however, states that tactics have universal pillers that remain despite the evloution in technology.

Hughes shows that the most curcial part of tactics is the situtation; his analsis that Nelson's strength was knowning his foe and his own abilities led to victory more than mere luck smacks of Sun Tzu's know thy enemy. He shows that what worked in one place does not always work everywhere.

Also, he shows how tactics changed with tech (from the sailing age to mondern times) and still kept their truths. his five pillers of sea power are just as vital today as they were for Cromwell.

As an aspiring Naval officer, I found his work both intellectally intreasting and at the same time well writen with theroy backed by pratice; Hughes shows how these princples played out on the battlefield.

i read this one from cover-to-cover in a short time. i felt i definitely got my money's worth.