Customer Reviews

Fly by Wire: The Geese, the Glide, the Miracle on the Hudson

5 star:		(24)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(4)

 

 

As a retired airline pilot who flew both Boeing and Airbus aircraft, I was "teased" into reading this book by the implication that somehow the automation of the A320 was a major factor in the successful ditching. I had heard the author on a NPR radio interview extolling the virtues of the Airbus fly by wire system (which the author uses interchangeably for aircraft automation}, and I was hardpressed to see how this affected the outcome. After finishing the book, nothing the author wrote convinced me that the ditching would have been any less successful had Captain Sullenberger been flying a Boeing under the identical conditions. While the book was a quick and enjoyable read that provided some interesting insights into the airline world these days, I really didn't learn anything new about the accident and there was a lot of "padding" in areas of little interest - i.e. migratory geese. Another complaint I had with the book was the author's advocacy of the Airbus design philsophy that basically takes as much control away from the pilot as the engineers can achieve. It seemed to me that he was using the Hudson ditching as a validation of the Airbus design philosophy, when in reality, it was the captain's skill that brought about the successful outcome. The author gives ample credit to the pilots, but he also credits the Airbus automation with "keeping the wings level," and "preventing a stall" just before touchdown, both conditions easily controllable by a capable pilot. Clearly, the extent to which aircraft should be automated is a hotly debated topic among pilots, engineers and air safety experts, with Boeing engineers leaving considerably more control in the hands of the pilots that does Airbus. A book written on this topic with the pros and cons of each design philosophy would be most interesting and informative for the flying public, but this book proves nothing except that experience and skill in the cockpit are still the most important factor in air safety.

William Langewiesche's analysis of all the factors which contributed to the "Miracle on the Hudson" is a story that matches the events themselves in terms of excitement. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, pilot of the Airbus A320 which hit a flock of geese, lost both engines, and landed in the Hudson River with no loss of life on January 15, 2009, has rightly been lauded for his performance and has become a popular hero. But he was not alone in the making of this miracle. The plane itself contributed mightily to the successful outcome and the saving of the lives of all one hundred fifty passengers and five crew. Designed to remain stable under the most extraordinary conditions, the European-made Airbus is controlled by computerized systems which can not be over-ridden by pilots as they make split second moves during emergencies. "This marriage between electrical control circuits and digital computer [has become known] as fly-by-wire."

Langewiesche, an award-winning journalist and pilot, is at home with his subject, and he has interviewed virtually everyone who could give input into this story, creating a vibrant, lively, and thoughtful analysis of all the individual elements--including luck--which contributed to this happy ending. At the same time, he also analyzes some of the elements which may have led to the accident, including the issue of bird strikes throughout aviation history and why they happen. In his attempt to give the complete picture, Langewiesche also considers the financial problems of the airlines, the power of the pilots' unions, the comfortable relationship between the NTSB and the airlines and unions, and the competition between Airbus and Boeing. He includes a number of case studies of major accidents, many of which will be familiar to readers, and one of which is the disappearance into the Atlantic of the Air France flight from Brazil to Paris in June, 2009.

As Langewiesche describes the flight from takeoff to landing in the Hudson a mere five minutes later, he really hits his stride, creating a fast-paced narrative full of tension and human drama. Co-pilot Jeffrey Skiles, air traffic controller Patrick Harten, and the flight attendants, are praised. Ultimately, Langewiesche grants enormous credit to Sullenberger for his decisions, including the decision to head for the Hudson when many thought he might have made it to an airport. "Sullenberger made the right decision. No matter what," Langewiesche says. Sullenberger also made a few original decisions based on his feel for the plane and his intense concentration during the emergency, despite the fact that these moves have never been included in any operations manual. One of these decisions helped prevent a more catastrophic loss. A serious study which nevertheless has moments of humor, Fly by Wire is a thoroughly absorbing account of a great moment in aviation history and the people and the plane which made this moment a "miracle." Mary Whipple

After reading "Fly By Wire" on a recent trip, I find it interesting to visit Amazon.com and see a recapitulation of the passionate debate that Langewiesche describes in his book. On the one hand, there are those who feel that "fly by wire" technology is overrated and perhaps even dangerous--these reviewers tend to give the book low marks and hard reviews, some of which strike me as a bit unfair. Other reviewers--admirers of Langewiesche's journalistic style or the cogent explanations that he offers--give him high grades. On balance, I enjoyed "Fly by Wire," but I can understand how it will hit some raw nerves.

For the record, Langewiesche has nothing but high praise for Captain Sullenberger and his crew. He agrees that they did a superb job under incredibly difficult conditions, and the fact that they did it in an Airbus A320 takes nothing away from their accomplishment. As near as I can tell, the crew of US Airways Flight 1549 are real heroes and deserve the praise they have received.

"Fly by wire" technology combines electrical control circuits and digital computers to replace traditional hydraulic and mechanical flight control systems. Langewiesche really "pokes the bear" and elicits a strong emotional response from many of his readers when he suggests that "fly by wire" was a major contributor to the Miracle on the Hudson. Readers who want their heroes to be like Beowulf, brave and omnisciently skilled, dislike the suggestion that Captain Sullenberger and his team may have been helped by the revolutionary design of the A320. Pilots who are concerned about losing control over their aircraft to computers are also bound to take issue with Langewiesche's core theme, which is that the revolution in "fly by wire" technology pioneered by Airbus has saved lives and will continue to save them. It's not unreasonable for people to argue with Langewiesche's thesis, but I'm glad that he and others are having this debate--I suspect that in the long run many air travellers will be safer for it.

Regardless of your views on this hot topic, the book is worth a read. The author is an experienced pilot, so he is able to offer more insights than most journalists who covered this story. He does a good job of discussing bird strikes (especially the somewhat unusual one that crippled Flight 1549), the development of the A320, several crashes where "fly by wire" technology might have saved hundreds of people, and other examples where highly skilled pilots "pushing the envelope" in passenger aircraft have confidently done things that are amazingly dangerous, with disastrous results.

At the end of the day, I'm sympathetic to Langewiesche's argument that even great pilots can make mistakes, and that computers can help them accomplish things at the edge of their skills and experience that they would have a hard time doing on their own. Whether the computer or the crew was the decisive factor in The Miracle on the Hudson is at some level beside the point--not every pilot will be as skilled or capable of concentration as Captain Sullenberger, and computers can help prevent mistakes by crew who are pushing the outer edge of their experience and abilities.

For those who are convinced that "fly by wire" can never outperform a great pilot, consider two things. First, the question is not really whether fly by wire can outperform Captain Sullenberger, but whether it can outperform the average pilot with the average level of experience and savoire faire. Put another way, the next time you board an airplane, ask yourself whether the pilot flying your aircraft is one of the greats who will act like Captain Sullenberger, or one who has less skill or experience (the law of probability suggests that on any given flight, you are more likely to have the latter at the controls). Second, if you believe that "great" pilots are superhumans who never make mistakes, read Sway: The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior, which describes how KLM's famous and accomplished chief pilot made a series of errors that resulted in the worst air disaster in aviation history. Everyone, no matter how skilled, makes mistakes--"Fly By Wire" helps us to understand how we can harness our technology to avoid errors at the edge of the envelope where the skills or experience of most people gets spottier.

Just finished reading this book. It really is not that good. A lot of the book is devoted to the 'fly-by-wire' philosophy of Airbus, in fact, the author strongly advocates that philosophy.

But there is not much research in this book. He did seem to talk to the pilot and first officer, and did attend the NTSB hearing, but beyond that, it seems he did little work. He does point out that there was nothing miraculous about the water landing, it was a combination of good design and great piloting. He does bring up the fact that 99% of the time, airline pilots job is very routine, and in fact, fighting apathy and boredom is one of a pilot's main job. But surely there are better book on this subject.

In addition, the books just seems to stop. It stops, but does not end, and does nothing to tie up the information in the book. I'm going to donate my copy to the library.

If flight disasters in general are what you are after, a MUCH better book is 'The Mystery of Flight 427', by Bill Adair. In this book, the author makes you feel like one of the NTSB accident investigators, as they try to find out why some planes, near landing, suddenly tumbled out of the sky.

I just finished reading Fly By Wire and I feel it necessary to chime in, because I feel that some of the assertions in this thread are, unfortunately, off the mark. One person alleges: "It is widely accepted that the crew of 1549 are heroes. This author attempts to diminish their efforts." On the contrary, it's very clear that Langewiesche takes every possible opportunity to praise not only Sullenberger--whose decision-making and piloting he described as "masterful"--but the crew as well. A well-deserved number of positive adjectives are situated next to Sullenberger's name throughout the book. Just because Langewiesche goes a step further to praise the revolutionary aircraft, too--and its forward-looking engineers led by Bernard Ziegler--doesn't take anything away from what Sullenberger accomplished that day. He is merely telling the whole story.

And this: "This author disregards the numerous worldwide crashes of airbus aircraft due to its "fly-by-wire" automation. One of the best examples of this is the crash of an A320 which was doing an airshow fly by with one of Airbuses test pilots flying the aircraft. [...]. This airbus was flown below 50 feet over the runway for the fly by..." Langewiesche not only reconstructs this accident in exhaustive detail in the book, but he devotes AN ENTIRE CHAPTER to it. "Disregards?" Horribly irresponsible, to say such a thing. Please. Please. Read. The. Book.

I have followed Langewiesche's writing for years (his recent work at Vanity Fair and his encyclopedic catalog from The Atlantic in the 90s, and early aughts). He has never struck me, in any way, as a sensationalistic writer. He's not one to take on tabloid subjects. And this book IS NOT about debunking the hero myth of Sullenberger (he simply doesn't do it. See for yourself.). There are clearly bigger and more important issues at hand, and Langewiesche is operating at a much higher level (or, to keep with the theme at hand... A much higher "altitude"). It's the whole story of not only what happened the day, but a history of modern aviation.

(Also, in recent news: Langewiesche's extensive aviation writing--he's a professional pilot, after all--is being published in a forthcoming volume by Penguin Classics. The last I checked, they don't exactly do that for amateurs...)

My favorite part of Fly by Wire can be found in a gripping section where he pieces together the entire flight from inside the cabin--take-off to the Hudson. At one point he describes how one passenger, a man, takes a woman's child and protects it against the imminent crash, at a risk to himself. "What more can be said of anyone?" Langewiesche asks.

It's an amazing, thoughtful book that blazes by! Please. Read it!

Fly By Wire is a rare example of an aviation publication that is both well written and is technically well informed.

It goes deeply into the background or the aircraft, its crew and even the geese complicit in downing the Hudson A320.

Another excellent book by the man I believe is America's Best Writer.

Langwiesche draws upon both his extensive aviation experience and his honed sleuthing skills to set forth what history will consider the record of the Miracle on the Hudson. His writing is sharp and clear. He presents his ideas clearly and provides supporting information. One of the strong points of Langewiesche's writing is how he draws comparisions that aren't comparisions - they are well thought examples that add information to the original subject. But more than all of this, his writing is interesting to read.

In learning about what happened during this one particular flight, Langewiesche provides relevant background information about the thinking behind the design of Airbus airplanes in such a way that not only is the reader able to understand all the components that led to the safe landing - but also how the design of the Airbus was extremely important to that success.

Another fine factual story. I can't wait to see what topic he tackles next.

I just happened upon this book in the library today; of course everyone knows the story but I thought it would be an interesting read. To say it is an "interesting read" is really not doing it justice. I have not been able to put it down.

William Langewiesche's writing is perfectly dead-on. He gives the facts but weaves it into a readable format including the parts about engine thrust and using birds to test engines. He does not over-dramatize and there isn't a word that doesn't belong. He has a sense of humor that makes you read it, stop, think "did he really say that?" and read it again.

I had never heard of Langewiesche but plan on reading all of his books. Easy, quick to read, enthralling from start to finish. READ IT TODAY!!!!!

Always thought "fly by wire" was basically just making controls electronic (vs mechanical). Little did I know it also is used to program "critical control" of the aircraft to keep pilots from doing stupid things.

I thought the author did a nice job of weaving the story/history of "fly by wire" into the story of the Hudson River "landing".

I first read the excellent article in the June 2009 issue of Vanity Fair upon which this book is based, and so when I heard that Mr Langewiesche was extending it into a book, I couldn't wait to read it. My high expectations were easily met. If you have any interest at all in aviation, you will enjoy this short and well-written book.

The Vanity Fair article inspired me to take up flying lessons again after 10 years out of the cockpit. While not necessary, a little aviation knowledge will help you further understand some of the issues and incidents described in the book. Mr Langewiesche brings a pilot's viewpoint to the events, following a long tradition of writing about aviation: his father Wolfgang wrote the highly influential _Stick and Rudder_, first written in 1944 and still used as a reference by pilots today.

The book covers the different aspects of the crash landing:

-- the birds that knocked out both engines (Canadian Geese)
-- the pilots
-- the airline industry
-- the airplane, the Airbus A320
-- related airline accidents, with both happy and tragic endings

Mr Langewiesche is among the best writers when it comes to describing and analyzing aviation accidents and incidents. An earlier reviewer bemoaned the short length of the book, but its brevity is what gives it its power. None of the half dozen avaition accident/safety books that I own contain the succinct description and analysis of the different accidents that Mr. Langewiesche uses to explore the "what if"s of the Hudson landing. Many magazine articles that get turned into books often get stuffed with filler material, diluting its message and making it a chore to read. In "Fly By Wire", despite the diverse range of topics covered, every sentence is carefully considered. More words do not make a better book.

By the way, if you want to read another in-depth Langewiesche article about another airline incident, I point you to "The Devil at 37,000 Feet", available (for free) on the Vanity Fair web site. Again, well written, excellent analysis.

While this case is not directly made in the book, the tireless efforts of the NTSB (an independent government agency not part of any other government agencies) shows the benefits of an independent, investigative branch of government. The accident rates in the US per mile flown has decreased steadily over the last few decades. Could this have happened if the airlines were in charge of investigating their own accidents? My feeling is no.

And now, on to the "Fly By Wire" debate.

First of all, Mr Langewiesche gives credit where credit is due. Of Mr Sullenberger's performance he writes, "Given the circumstances, [Sullenberger's] timing was astonishing and almost perfect. Years in the future, when he looks back... he will have proof in the data from this flare that he was a pilot at the peak of human performance."

So Langewiesche does not say that the Airbus electronics landed the plane. In a Q&A attached to the original Vanity Fair article he refuses to speculate on whether Mr Sullenberger would have been able to execute a similar landing in a Boeing with fewer fly-by-wire capabilities. He rightly points out that the workload would have been higher in the Boeing, requiring more precise adjustments on the way down.

The problem is that few pilots come to professional flying via the same path that pilots did in Mr. Sullenberger's generation. Mr. Sullenberger first started flying in an Aeronca with no electronics in the plane. There are no instrument to tell you your bank angle, for instance -- you simply looked out the window. In this way you learn to feel the airplane responding to you. You get to test the limits of the plane, and learn how to fly in extreme situations. He also spent several years flying gliders.

We are also reaching the end of the era when most airline pilots get their training in the military. Sullenberger himself flew F-4's. Sure, we still have military pilots, just fewer of them going into the airlines.

An even more extreme illustration of this comes in 1983 (related by Langewiesche on pp 83-85) when a 767 ran out of fuel and Capt Robert Pearson executed a slip (a dangerous landing manuever usually performed in single engine planes, not 767's, used to bleed away speed and lose altitude quickly) onto a drag racing strip surrounded by people, without hydraulics (no flaps, speed brakes, or landing gear lock). No fatalities resulted, and the plane was fixed up and flew for another 25 years. Mr Pearson had previous sailplane experience that taught him how to pilot the plane in extreme considitons.

Compare this to many of today's pilots: they will to go a flying academy, get certified, then spend time as an instructor to build up their hours. Many pilots do not have the money to fly their own or rented planes, so they do not get the benefit of flying in many different (possibly extreme) situations like the old-timers.

Compare the Hudson landing to the Colgan crash near Buffalo on Feb 12, 2009. (This is a much clearer case for fly-by-wire than the Dec 20, 1995 Columbia crash he relates in great detail starting on p. 119, while reserving only a paragraph for the Colgan crash.)

With a stall imminent, the Colgan aircraft (a Dash-8) automatically pushes forward on the stick, trying to nose down to get more airspeed. Many beginning pilots learn that when a stall is imminent, you nose down to gain speed and avert the stall. If you spend a lot of time flying small aircraft, this reaction almost becomes automatic. Instead, the captain wrestled the stick back, overriding the automation, pulling the nose up, and further descreasing the speed. Lastly, the first officer -- who earned $16,000 the year before, was working in a coffee shop when she was hired by the airline, and lived with her mother to save money -- retracted the flaps, further reducing much-need lift to keep the plane in the air. The crash claimed 50 lives.

As a student pilot, I can tell you first-hand that once things start going wrong in the cockpit, the knowledge that you had on the ground does not necessarily get used in the air. Your brain does not function properly during high stress. In the Colgan crash, the time from the first warning to the crash took 28 seconds. The "knowledge" comes from years of flying, from muscle memory and intuition to feel the right thing to do. This really is the "miracle" part of Sullenberger's performance, that he was able to produce such a perfect landing in this situation. Absent that experience, you may want compensate with computers, which do not panic in times of crisis.

When you have an airline industry desperate to save money on pilot salaries, combined with the circumstances that today's pilots do not get the "raw flying" time that the old-timers and military pilots had, it seems reasonable to have very strict limits on the flight envelope that cannot be overriden by the pilot. There is simply no good reason why you'd want to stall an airliner, so make it impossible to do so. Similarly, it's difficult to see why you'd want to exceed 2.5G's or -1.0G.

To the reviewer who was opposed to PC's flying the airplane, the (fortunate) truth is that computers already control a huge portion of your flight, both on the ground and in the air. Autopilots are mandatory in aircraft over 20 seats. The debate is now over the degree to which the computer will handle the plane. I think Mr Langeweische makes a strong argument for limits that cannot be overridden by the pilot.