Customer Reviews

The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson

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For the reader interested in a quick and easy introduction to the history of American multilateralism and a critique of the Bush unilateral approach, this is a useful book. On the other hand it is too sketchy and a bit simplistic.

For example, it really doesn't deal with the problems of utilizing the United Nations to deal with issues such as Iraq.
One of the repeated criticisms of the multilateral approach is that countries like Russian and France had economic interests in Iraq which prevented them from being willing to take action there to topple Saddam's regime. The argument is the kind of coalition which backed the Gulf war was not possible because of these collusions. I have never seen this effectively refuted. This is the kind of depth of examination which I believe is necessary to support multilateralism vs unilateralism.

Furthermore, the author contends that the invasion of Iraq created more potential terrorists and thus increased the chances of terrorism in the world. I did not read one piece of evidence supporting this contention. Although I believe it is true, the author did not back it up as I believe that he should.

The author did not extend his discussion to deal with likely hotspots like North Korea and Iran. How would a multilateral approach deal with these issues? How would it deal with "rogue nations" other than these?

One can look on this book as a good start for the full blown and fully articulated defense of multilateralism and critique of unilateralism that is so vitally needed at this time. I still await such a book.

This is a balanced book, well-grounded in history, with an objective air and a very pleasing integration of specific quotes from both the past and the present. It strips away the false airs of the neo-cons, and with trenchant scholarship shows how deeply ignorant America's neo-conservatives and their leading light are of the lessons of history.

The early portion of the book provides an excellent overview, concise, documented, easy to absorb, of the origins of American imperialism in the early century of Christian millennialism followed by civil millennialism. The chart on page 17 is useful, covering the seven period of various styles of American imperialism or avoidance thereof.

The book documents the explicit rejection by the Founding Fathers of empires based on conquest and distance rule, and of foreign political entanglements.

I especially liked a 1780 quote from Reverend Samuel Cooper that captures my own personal belief in how America should relate to the world: "Conquest is not indeed the aim of these rising states; sound policy must ever forbid it. We have before us an object more truly great and honorable. We seem called by heaven to make a large portion of this globe a seat of knowledge and liberty, of agriculture, commerce, and arts, and what is more important than all, of Christian piety and virtue."

I find it relevant that Mark Twain, among many others in our history, was a staunch opponent of American imperialism.

The middle portion of the book provides a non-judgmental review of how America was lured into imperialism for largely economic reasons, including a fear of losing access to China as well as coaling stations for a global navy.

At the same time, there is a recurring theme throughout the book of the arrogance and ignorance of white Protestants, who believed-as the Spanish did when they began the genocide in the Americas-that the heathen are savages that must be either absorbed or exterminated.

Especially interesting to me is the concept discussed in the book regarding the early American view that all land not under direct human cultivation was "waste land" whose occupants merited removal as a precondition to "civilized" stewardship [exploitation] of the land.

Theodore Roosevelt is discussed in both negative and positive terms-I have the note in the margin here of Roosevelt as the originator of what can easily be called "macho shit racism"-yet Roosevelt also matured, and ultimately set the stage for a discussion of the League of Nations concept.

Woodrow Wilson is the other historical figure in the center of the book, and his ideal of a collective multinational "conscience of the world" receives a good review. Critical within this section is Wilson early understanding that the "balance of power" model for nations was an inherent unstable model. To this I would add a pointer to my review of Philip Allot, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State where he documents the absurdity of allowing any crime against humanity to occur within any political boundary as part of the acceptance of sovereign borders.

Other specifics include a discussion of morality as an international force, of the importance of trust in mediators who avoid entanglements, of the CIA's early days sponsoring socialist alternatives to communism that now dominate Europe, and of the US failure to respect the North Vietnamese when they first declared independence and publicly stated their respect for the early American model of governance.

The final portion of the book is a review of modern history. Clinton comes across as disengaged, out-sourcing foreign policy to a very ineffective team, while Bush comes across as provincial and ignorant. In both cases the author notes that underlying conditions have changed, with various bits suggesting to me that there are three major things than have changed: capitalism has become immoral rather than innovative; democracy has become apathetic rather than engaged, and dictators have become the norm as US partners, rather than loathed.

The author links Ahmed Chalibi the thief and Iranian double-agent, with Bernard Lewis the historian fool, in a very compelling manner-both contributed to the debacle of Iraq by deceiving first the neo-conservatives, and then the American people.

The book concludes with some thoughtful assertions on the perils of empire, the legitimate historical and current grievances of the Muslims at large, and the urgency of returning to an American foreign policy that relies on collective security, a collective conscience, and a restoration of America's commitment to the rights of individuals to self-determination.

See also, with reviews:
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy
The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone
A Foreign Policy of Freedom: Peace, Commerce, and Honest Friendship

I firmly believe that history can teach us virtually everything we need to know about our modern world. We have thousands of years of civilization behind us as humans, and a few hundred years behind us as Americans. We have the extreme benefit of learning from the mistakes of our fore-fathers and hopefully the wisdom to not repeat them. Unfortunately, it seems that we as a people are often forgetful or simply unlearned about the parallels between our world and the past. In his book, "The Folly of Empire," John B. Judis makes the case that the current Bush administration has been unwilling or unable to draw parallels between their present actions and the post-Imperialistic actions of previous generations.

Judis claims that the current Bush administration is leaping head-long into a new version of 19 th and 20 th century imperialism in modern Iraq. Bush, he states, is heading down the same failed road as some of his American predecessors have already tread. To illustrate this, Judis lays out two major examples of failed US imperialism: Theodore Roosevelt's attempts to annex the Philippines, Hawaii, Cuba and Puerto Rico, and Woodrow Wilson's attempt to overthrow the Mexican dictator, Huerta. In a nutshell, both presidents had what seemed to be honest intentions in their attempts to secure democracy around the world. However, their aims were short-sighted in the sense that they caused more backlash and ultimately failure.

Overall, Judis's book creates a strong parallel between our seemingly forgotten past as a country, and the current administration. The neo-conservatives love their Roosevelt in all his muscular imperialism, but forget his failures. They remember the failed efforts of Wilson to create a multilateral world but forget his lessoned learned as an attempted "liberator." Later generations would again forget these lessons in Vietnam where the fate of the world lay in the balance of US intervention. They would confuse the communist domino effect with Vietnamese nationalism. And they would again forget it in Iraq. Judis's points are well taken; the promotion of democracy and the ousting of dictators may be necessary from time to time, but the motivations must be reassessed and compared to the lessons of history. If we selectively cut off our history, then we cut off a wealth of knowledge on how to govern our country in the modern era.

Judis argues that President Bush and the neo-conservatives around him are overlooking critically important lessons US history should be teaching them relative to using imperial policies to make our country safer. Judis talks about Teddy Roosevelt's involvement in the Philippines (a disastrous event for America), our involvement in Mexico and what Wilson learned from these two events that led him to believe in the ideas reflected within the League of Nations. Judis argues persuasively that our current policy of anticipatory self-defense (also known as the doctrine of pre-emption) will have very negative effects to our credibility, our resources, and our ability to pay attention to other areas in the world where more serious problems are percolating.

In twenty-five words or less, this book says President George Bush's "liberation" of Iraq is remarkably similar to President McKinley's "liberation" of the Philippines more than a century ago.

So, what do Filipinos think of Bush? According to the Sept. 6, 2004, edition of The Financial Times of London, Filipinos gave Bush the biggest margin in any of the 35 countries surveyed by GlobeScan, in conjunction with the University of Maryland. The poll says 57 percent of Filipinos support Bush, compared to 32 percent for Sen. John Kerry. This isn't recent bubble of popularity; in 2002, a survey by a Manila-based polling group, Pulse Asia, found that Bush enjoyed a 56 percent trust rating -- much higher than the president of the Philippines.

Judis, one of the most perceptive and knowledgable writers in America, uses all the history that fits to argue that "through international organizations and treaties, the United States would keep the peace and promote prosperity much more effectively than it could accomplish acting alone." He doesn't ask what will happen if others use his recommended techniques against America.

He cites the experience of presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush to argue "Until the 1890s, the United States had adhered to George Washington and Thomas Jefferson's advice to stay out of 'foreign entanglements'." Of course, this ignores US invasions of Canada in 1775/76, 1812/14, and major threats in 1846 and 1865/67 which produced the Confederation of Canada, up to this century and the victimization of Canada by seizing lands in the Alaska Boundary dispute. It also overlooks the Monroe Doctrine, which in effect made the Caribbean "an American lake" and all of the Americas into a US colony.

"Bush was ignorant" Judis argues, saying his "religious beliefs seem to have grown out of a sense of personal redemption from sin -- in his case, alcoholism . . . . " After Sept. 11, 2001, he says US foreign policy was shaped by neoconservatives such as Irving Kristol and Wohlstetter who were both Trotskyists (i.e. communists) and former socialists who had undergone a sudden and complete transformation of faith similar to what Bush experienced.

True! True! True! He cites facts again and again and again. Only the uncurious and ignorant can dispute his facts. His conclusion addresses everyone who cares very deeply about the future, "When America goes out alone in search of monsters to destroy -- venturing on terrain upon which imperial powers have already trod -- it can itself become the monster."

This isn't a political book that will die with the election results, no matter who wins. The lessons Judis cites will live with us for decades, regardless of who is elected and whatever decisions are made. Maybe, in a century, 57 percent of Iraqis will think Bush was right. The real issue is the blood, treasure, toil, suffering and misery to get to that happy conclusion.

Judis says there are much better techniques than shooting first and letting Allah sort out the good guys. This book is for the years ahead. The election of 2004 is a mere speed bump on the road of history. The future may be a smooth highway, or a rutted mass of potholes and quagmires, depending on what voters decide.

John B. Judis' Folly of Empire is a wonderfully contructed case against American imperialism. From the Puritans to Fanklin Roosevelt to the current President, Judis clearly cites and explains the history and the role of imperialism in American.
He champions the Wilsonian belief that imperialism will inevitably lead to strong nationalism as well as world conflict. He also goes on to explain the source of the American drive towards imperialism. He cites America's vision of having a special role in history, a milienial mission. He states that this vision and the various interpratations of it are responsible for American foreign policy throughout this country's history.
In comparing the Indian Wars and the conquest of the Philipines to the present situation in Iraq as well as other areas of foreign policy, Judis makes a very clear and easily accessible overview of imperialism in America. I found this book to be intriguing and logical; it was well worth the read.

No need to repeat many of the boilerplate points already made. The book does serve as a sketchy introduction to multilateralism vs. unilateralism in American foreign policy. However, by limiting itself to the narrow scope of the political to the neglect of the economic and other aspects (e.g. military), Judis comes to equate contemporary imperialism with unilateral political actions, such as Iraq II, but not with multilateral interventions, such as Iraq I. Now I may have missed something, but nowhere, I believe, does he explicitly recognize that multilateral interventions can be as imperialistic as the unilateral variety. Thus emerges his constant tributes to Wilsonian visions of collective interventions and his equally constant opposition to the McKinley-Bush brand of go-it-alone imperialism.

As a result, his strictly political level of analysis conceals more than it reveals. To put the criticism in a nutshell, collective action no more guarantees the absence of imperialist objectives than does the unclothed Bush variety. For example, take a look at NATO's ruthless diamemberment of Yugoslavia, particularly the mischaracterized Kosovo phase. Though retailed to an uninformed American public as a humanitarian intervention, the facts nevertheless indicate a concerted effort to break apart that nation's state controlled economy which had functioned reasonably well for decades outside the soviet orbit, (see Diana Johnstone's, "Fools' Crusade, Yugoslavia, NATO, and Western Delusions" for an eye-opening account"). Now whether or not this dismemberment ultimately benefits the people of the region is a separate question and remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the NATO onslaught undeniably opened fresh markets and investments to Western investors, along with the opening of a huge new military base (Bondsteel) in Kosovo. At the same time, an acute observer might well wonder just whom that huge base is aimed at, and just where Kosovo's world-class bauxite deposits will go now that the formerly Yugoslav-owned mines have been privatized.

Other examples of multilateral imperialism could also be given, such as the economic variety associated with the now notorious multilateral IMF and World Bank. Of course, such topics are complex matters subject to heated debate. Nonetheless, the substructure of imperialism extends far beyond the diplomatic level to include most importantly the economic; on the other hand, I don't blame Judis for not expanding a 200 page scope to include this substructure. However, I do blame him for leaving the impression that the problem exists only at the political and diplomatic level. Wary readers should consider these points before incautiously accepting Judis's superficial binary approach. Of course, the attraction of a binary approach is strong-- our two party tyranny has a lot invested in an approach like Judis's. That way, consulting with allies instead of going it alone looks like an ethical alternative to neo-conservatism. But in my book, it's not. Instead, under present world circumstances, multilateralism is just a subtler way of implementing the traditional rule of empire, in this case America's.

"The Folly of Empire" opens with President George W. Bush visiting Manila, in October 2003, and praising America's role in making the Philippines a democratic nation. Meanwhile he was being shepherded around with heavy security (including F-15's) and counseled not to stay there overnight. If only he knew the true history of US actions in the Philippines....and how that correlated with the current actions in Iraq....

The United States (and, before 1776, the 13 Colonies) has held to a theory of having a "special" place in the world. Over the years, this "mission" has varied from being a "New Israel" on earth to "making the world safe for democracy". (A chart displaying these various missions, as well as adversaries ranging from "the Papal Antichrist" to global terrorism, is displayed on Page 17). These missions have motivated both the westward expansion of the United States and its overseas actions.

Up to around 1876, the United States, taking the advice of Washington, Adams and Jefferson, avoided "entangling alliances" with other nations and concentrated on its own westward expansion. This changed with the election of President William McKinley. At that time several quarters of American society (business interests, intellectuals, the press and others) advocated more involvement in the world, and, eventually, war with Spain.

The Spanish American War lasted only three months and was won handily by the US. However, holding on to some of the former Spanish possessions proved to be more than a little problematic. In the Philippines, there was already an independence movement fighting against the Spanish; once the Americans took over, they became the new target of the movement. Fighting in the Philippines dragged on for decades. The US occupation of Cuba was a disaster too; it was run by a succession of US puppet governments until Fidel Castro took over in 1956.

The book goes on to describe Theodore Roosevelt as warlike, subsuming religion ("muscular Christianity"), Social Darwinism pro Anglo-Saxonism into a rationale for military action. (He did soften or back down from some of these ideas later in life).

Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, after a couple of disastrous attempts to "impose democracy" in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, was more in favor of encouraging cooperation between nations to bring democracy to the world.

After World War I, the US went through its isolationist period. Franklin Delano Roosevelt (a nephew of Theodore, above) tried to make a moral case for US involvement in what would eventually be known as World War II. FDR also dusted off Wilson's "League of Nations" plan and formed the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was getting stronger. Initially an ally of the US, postwar American military superiority (including the atomic bomb) drove the Soviets to build up their own military forces and sphere of influence (e.g. the "Iron Curtain" countries in Eastern Europe). This escalated into the well known Cold War, which lasted until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In the years after World War II, many of the former European colonies became independent countries. But Cold War politics led many of these countries to align with either the West or with the Soviet Union. The book describes US involvement in Vietnam after the French were defeated in 1954; the US, fearing the (now discredited) "domino effect" of a communist North Vietnam, occupied the South and installed a succession of unpopular dictators until 1975 when the North Vietnamese took over.

The story of the Middle East, at least from 1798, is one long British, French (and later, US) colonial occupation. During the Cold War, US involvement in the region was justified by wanting to minimize Soviet influence there. (Of course, all that oil didn't hurt!). Western interference and pro-Israel support in the Middle East is credited with sowing the seeds of radical Islam and terrorism.

Ronald Reagan is presented as a Cold Warrior, influenced by a strong religious streak. His foreign policy (particularly Central America) was colored, at least initially, by his characterization of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire". The book credits the Iran-Contra affair and its aftermath, with Reagan softening his views toward the Soviet Union.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, The United States became the world's only superpower. During this time, George H. W. Bush, and, later Bill Clinton, concentrated more on international cooperation, both in the economic sphere (removal of trade barriers, NAFTA, World Trade Organization) as well as militarily (Gulf War, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, the Balkans, etc.). But meanwhile, Osama Bin Ladin's Al-Qaeda was starting to take presence...first in the Balkans....then the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993....then the African embassy bombings in 1998....then the USS Cole in late 2000....). Clinton more or less concentrated on trying to develop an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty as a way to diminish Arab support for Al-Qaeda, but was unsuccessful.

And now we come to George W. Bush. He outright rejected the doctrine of international cooperation (as witnessed by his attitude toward the Kyoto Protocol, the World Trade Organization and similar international treaties and organizations). After the September 11 attacks (which, according to the book, took Bush by surprise), he made the case, and got international support, to attack Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The Taliban was driven from power in a matter of weeks, with much the same effect on American military attitudes as the US victory over the Spanish in 1898. Buoyed by this success, certain figures (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Cheney, and others) called for a war in Iraq to oust Saddam. Their reasons included "keeping Saddam from getting nuclear weapons", "building a democracy in Iraq" and of course oil.

So in March 2003 the US invaded Iraq, with little international support other than from the UK. And the rest of the story is in your local news media. Besides the obvious loss of blood and treasure, the Iraq War has hurt the position of the US as world leader in ways that may never be fully known for decades.

At the end of the day, this is a pro-internationalist (Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Bush I, Clinton), anti-imperialist/unilateralist (McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, to some extent Reagan, but definitely Bush II) book.
On reading it, one gets the feeling that the United States alone is culpable for all the bad foreign policy decisions that reverberate to this very day. The author is also a bit "soft" on the old Soviet Union (they weren't imperialistic in the Middle East? What about Afghanistan?) and tends to downplay Reagan's involvement (and upsell Gorbachev's) in ending the Cold War). The book is also silent on the Korean War, as well as Presidents Kennedy's and Johnson's involvement and attitudes toward the Vietnam War.

If you like History, are care about the future course of American foreign policy and its place in the world, this is the book for you. Wonderfully written and researched, it helps the reader understand how the views of two important presidents were shaped by events in the world and how George Bush should learn from their experiences. Those that do not study histroy are doomed to repeat it and those who care about the future direction of the country should start by reading this wonderful book.

This sounding against American Empire shows the remarkable, and unsettling, resemblance of the current Bush escapade to the first brush with empire in the period of McKinley onward. The Cuban venture, of Rough Rider fame, and especially,the Philippine quagmire show the same sequence of intoxicating military escape followed by quicksand colonial ambitions. Many are accused of forgetting history. Bush couldn't have forgotten anything--he doesn't read history.