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Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic Techniques

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The approach taken in this manual is firmly grounded in the positivist social science models of the 1970s and early 1980s. While useful on a tactical level, this approach neglects asking the larger questions and assumptions that tend to lead to genuine strategic surprises. For forecasting the likelihood of the use of a certain tactic (terrorism) by a known enemy, this book is fine. If you're trying to avoid strategic surprises involving this tactic or others, the approach in this book (and others of its type) won't get you there.

The fictional spy, George Smiley, created by John Le Carre' once remarked that "It's such a mistake, I always feel, to put one's trust in technique." (from The Looking Glass War). In this remarkable book and CD produced by Sundri Khalsa, a good deal of trust is put into technique as a means of improving tactical threat and warning analysis.

Based on the absolutely correct assumption that warning intelligence is effective only if it is accepted and acted upon by decision makers, Khalsa has developed a unique information system to produce warning intelligence, supporting evidence, and realistic risk assessment. This system is dependent on the availability of all "raw intelligence" (i.e. single source) which `raw reporting profilers' then use to build a basic information base (Terrorism Forecasting Data Base). Then `indicator specialists' review and extract data from this base to build indicator lists, evidence logs, and "Indicator Warning Narratives." This information is then used by "senior warning officers" to develop and update executive summaries of the warning narratives and to present warning intelligence to decision makers. Central to this entire operation is a very large relational data base (such as those built by Oracle) fed by the `profilers' from data extracted by them from a comprehensive Intelligence Community wide raw intelligence data base. The relational data base relies heavily on pre-programmed input and results management sub-systems which are designed to the extent possible to avoid human errors.

The core idea behind Khalsa's concept is a good one, but she has failed to take into account the basic analytic capabilities required for the analysis of a complex subject such as terrorism. The `raw reporting profilers' are the critical ingredient in her system for everything else is dependent on what they enter into the information base. She maintains that a profiler should be able to profile and enter a raw intelligence every five minutes. This discounts the need for the profilers to have the target knowledge necessary to know what is important enough to extract from a raw intelligence report for a profile or even to identify a significant piece of raw intelligence. In the same way target knowledge would enable the profilers to relate one piece of raw intelligence to another in the information base. The `indicator specialists' would require an even deeper level of target knowledge to perform their jobs. The system Khalsa is advocating will work only if the individuals operating it have considerably more capability than she seems to believe they will need.

Methodology and technique are fine, but only if it is understood that it still requires dedicated and competent individuals to make them successful.

Forecasting Terrorism demystifies intelligence methodology and demonstrates how relatively simple and cost effective it is to implement sound, effective intelligence systems, with our current capabilities, resources, and technology.

The key to preventing acts of terrorism is to identify and examine indicators of terrorist activity. As the findings of the 9/11 Commission confirm, terrorist attacks occur after years of careful planning, and these plans always leave a trail, such as movement of weapons, training, target surveillance, travel, and tests of security. Forecasting Terrorism is a methodology that plots 68 indicators of terrorist activity in web-based hypotheses matrices that are linked to raw reports, which are updated daily. It provides near-real-time assessments per location for threat, risk, and vulnerability, and provides safeguards against 38 of 42 common warning pitfalls, not the least of which are policy and politically driven intelligence decisions. By utilizing an intelligence methodology based on indicators and proven analytic techniques tied to daily-updated raw reports, we can more accurately recognize and assess terrorist activity and provide warning to prevent attacks (and unnecessary wars) and save lives.

People who know my daughter and I know that in many ways we are ideologically oppossed, but running good intelligence is one example of a place where we can, and the people of our country must come together to build agreement on common ground.

As a former intelligence analyst, I can say with confidence this is a great source full of procedures leaving little to guess work. Many forget intelligence is an art not a science. Author Sundri Khalsa has provided a framework for analysis that is far superior to some hit and miss technigues used in the past. The safeguards against common warning pitfalls is unprecedented, a key tool for all who make policy and do intelligence analysis.