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31 of 32 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Compelling & Thorough Look at the Economic Interpretation, January 30, 2004
This review is from: To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution (Hardcover)
"In To Form a More Perfect Union, Robert A. McGuire attempts to provide the first solid modern analysis to quantify the impact of the personal economic interests of the Founding Fathers on the structure and content of the U.S. Constitution. Readers familiar with the literature in this area will immediately, and correctly, associate this book with Charles A. Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan, [1913] 1935). In that book, Beard concludes that the delegates' personal interests shaped their behavior with respect to the drafting and the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. His hypothesis was generally accepted until the 1950s, when most scholars began to question the analysis. An onslaught of counterevidence came during the 1950s and early 1960s, and today most academics believe that Beard's original interpretation was too narrow and that the general political philosophies of the Founding Fathers had greater importance in determining the nature and contents of the U.S. Constitution. "McGuire essentially resurrects Beard's hypothesis and offers substantial evidence in favor of the view that the Founding Fathers' personal interests had a significant influence on the process of constitutional design and ratification. In light of the substantial body of empirical evidence this book provides, it is likely to bring the personal interest view back into widespread acceptance among academics. Although McGuire draws some of the analysis presented in the book from his previously published journal articles, at least half of what he offers is new and original. What makes the book so compelling is the use of today's significantly better empirical methodology to analyze data, in contrast to the techniques available during the 1950s, when the counterevidence to Beard's hypothesis was presented. "Readers searching for a middle ground in the debate over whether personal self-interest shaped the U.S. Constitution will find refuge in this book. McGuire repeatedly makes clear that these personal interests were relevant at the margin in the Founding Fathers' decision calculus and that many other factors (such as general political philosophy) influenced these individuals' overall behavior. Among the most compelling findings: (1) personal interests played a bigger role in the specific content of the U.S. Constitution than in the document's overall design; and (2) the framers' debt holdings and slave ownership and the degree of commercialization in their local communities are significantly correlated with their observed behavior and, hence, with the content of the constitution they produced.... "One of the book's strengths is the amount of underlying background data and statistics provided. For example, McGuire includes tables that show not only each individual delegate's vote on an issue (the data used for the dependent variable), but also the predicted probability of a yes vote for that delegate from the estimated logistic regression model. As anyone who has estimated a logistic regression model knows, it is possible for these models to fit well overall but still do a poor job of predicting individual votes. Throughout the book, however, McGuire provides the evidence necessary to comfort readers worried about such potential problems. The book's main weakness is that at times it becomes rather lengthy and dull, but this aspect is simply a cost of being thorough, which is necessary in this case because of the controversial nature of the theory being tested. "For the great number of readers who are likely to use the results of the book as a single-sentence footnote or reference in their own research, the eleven-page prologue provides all of the background and summary information necessary to make an informed citation of the work. The remaining three hundred or so pages merely fill in the sufficient details to support these conclusions. In that sense, the book reminds me somewhat of Bjorn Lomborg's Skeptical Environmentalist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). "Had I been a reviewer for the book prior to its publication, the only suggestion I might have offered to improve it would have been for the author to include a fuller discussion of the debate surrounding the adequacy and structure of the document that preceded the U.S. Constitution, the Articles of Confederation.... Had McGuire presented this discussion, he would have provided a fitting framework in which to view the Founding Fathers' choices as marginal institutional changes relative to the existing constitutional order. "To Form a More Perfect Union undoubtedly will elicit additional research in this highly debated area of constitutional research. Future research will benefit from the 122 pages of raw data and empirical results provided as appendix material. McGuire's book most likely will meet with a better initial acceptance than Beard's book received (it was banned from high school libraries in Seattle and condemned by President Taft and by the president of Beard's own university). "One important implication of McGuire's book is that the condition of a Rawlsian `veil of ignorance,' putatively necessary to produce a `just' social contract, is not and cannot be satisfied in reality. Any constitution or social contract will be shaped by its designers' individual self-interests. Modern public-choice scholars who favor theories based on the premise of methodological individualism will find comforting reassurance as they read To Form a More Perfect Union." ------------------------------ Excerpted from a review by Russell S. Sobel in "The Independent Review," Winter 2004.
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7 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Fascinating reading, February 16, 2008
This review is from: To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution (Hardcover)
Colloquially speaking, the main thesis of this book is that the Constitution of the United States was ratified by those who "voted their pocketbook." This has been claimed before in both popular culture and by the historian Charles Beard in his books written in the early years of the twentieth century. What sets this book apart from Beard's work however is that the author attempts, and succeeds to a large degree, to justify his claims with a rigorous statistical study. For those with the appropriate mathematical background and interest in the subject matter will find the book fascinating, even though at times the reader can get lost in the details. Absent for the most part though, and this is refreshing, is excessive moralizing by the author, for such would make the book irritating to some, with a consequent loss in readership.
The main mathematical tool used is logistic regression, which it is fair to say is the most popular tool among economists, even though at times it strains credulity to apply it in some situations that they do. This book could even be used by statistics instructors as a source of more challenging problems in logistic regression. Overall the author is convincing in his use of this tool, and therefore the conclusions of the book are difficult to counter if one accepts logistic regression as being a viable tool. It certainly is in other contexts, such as finance and biological modeling.
If one investigates the economic history of the United States after the war of independence it is not surprising to hear that Americans at the time were fed up with the loose conglomeration of states under the Articles of Confederation. Being financed essentially by paper money by the Continental Congress this currency suffered dramatic depreciation in value as the war dragged on. Some economic historians have estimated that $449 million dollars were issued during this time by the Continental Congress and the states, with none of it bearing interest. Certainly this situation motivated many at the time to seek a hard-money policy, and their attitudes are reflected in their votes for the ratification of the Constitution, as the author shows clearly in this work. To allow the states to issue paper money by fiat would be an anathema to those who lived through it during the war, and its prohibition in the Constitution would thus be a very desirable goal.
The Constitution of the United States is thus a product of the attitudes and interests of those who framed it and voted to adopt it. But their intentions, whether economic or otherwise, are in the final analysis irrelevant since only its social, moral, and legal efficacies are important. If the Constitution is an umbrella of freedom and sound justice for all of its citizens then it does not matter what the intentions of its founders are. If it is not, it should be altered, and it does not matter what the intentions are of those who alter it. The primary value of studying intentions is to shed light on the attitudes of the citizens at the time, and how they reacted to the absence of British rule after the war. No longer a part of the world market system via the British mercantile system, and having a government that could not pay the interest on domestic and foreign debt, they sought out a new alliance, a new government, to ameliorate their dire situation. Their efforts were in retrospect successful, and the government they invented has done a fair job since then.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Provides the Facts instead of mere narratives, April 10, 2011
This review is from: To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution (Hardcover)
1) Many historians create narratives that lack quantitative evidence.
Perhaps because that makes it easier to promote the political agenda
of patrons -- as others have noted, the attacks from academia upon
Beard's "Marxist" interpretation of the Constitution did not occur in
his lifetime but years later in the early period of the Cold War.
2) The most hilarious example of professional history's
paradigm is cited by McGuire --
Bruce Ackerman's praise of "Gordon Wood's great book of 1969":
"First, and most important, his [Wood's] book takes political culture
seriously. His six-hundred page study does not contain a single
statistical tabulation of the economistic kind."
Bernie Madoff, of course, would have found life easier if not for the
accountants.
3) Fortunately for those interested in the facts, Robert McGuire
HAS done the accounting -- and it is all laid out here. As are the strands
of self-interest guiding the Founders. His account is essential if
you want to understand the mechanism that, over the course of 225
years, has bought us to our current state: 1 percent of the
populations gets 24 percent of the national income and controls
much of the national wealth.
4) The one shortcoming I see is McGuire's vagueness on who the Founders'
"constituents" were -- because while some Rich Men attended the Convention
(Robert Morris , for example), the delegates were more often representatives
of wealthy men. Alexander Hamilton, for example, had a small estate --but
a very wealthy father-in-law to look after. Plus a brother-in-law who was one
of the richest men in America.
Forrest McDonald himself noted that delegates George Clymer and Thomas Fitzsimons were "Morris party hacks" and James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris were
Morris's "brilliant henchmen". (p. 156)
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