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Foundations of environmental ethics

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Hargrove, as editor of the journal Environmental Ethics, is arguably the
most influential philosopher in the field---yet this is the first book
length statement of his position. The status of the author alone would be
enough to make this an important contribution to the field of environmental philosophy, but this is also a powerful argument concerning the roots of environmental ideals in the Western tradition. In part, the book answers John Passmore's contention that a philosophy of nature preservation is alien or marginal to Western culture. The rebuttal of Passmore involves a far-ranging investigation of the intellectual history of environmental attitudes, both those that have inhibited environmental thought (notably, the Western philosophical tradition of idealism, and the Anglo-Saxon conception of property rights) and those that have supported preservationist intuitions (primarily, scientific and aesthetic ideals). Based on the demonstrated existence of Western aesthetic intuitions, Hargrove presents a detailed argument for the ethical foundations of preservationist policy. He argues against the justification of preservation based on "therapeutic nihilism:" since we cannot know precisely how nature operates, we should let it alone. This prevalent ideal is expressed as Barry Commoner's "third law" of ecology: "nature knows best," a platitude which Hargrove convincingly rejects. The central problem with the preservationist argument based on therapeutic nihilism is that its force is contingent upon developments in the science of ecology and technological power. If we do learn more about nature, so that we may re-create it, then the preservationist position loses its support. Much better, argues Hargrove, to ground environmentalist policy
on the aesthetic values we discover in nature. Nature, even more than
human-created art, is beautiful and good; and moral agents have an
obligation to preserve and promote goodness in the world. Nature is
beautiful (and hence good) by its mere existence; Hargrove thus terms his
argument "an ontological argument" for environmental ethics. Central to this discussion is an excellent analysis of the attempted human domination of nature and how this destroys the beauty and autonomy of the natural world. "The authenticity of nature arises out of the fact that its existence precedes its essence" (p. 195). In sum, Hargrove attempts to create a middle position between an instrumental justification for environmental policy based on human interests and an intrinsic justification based on the direct consideration of non-human value. The aesthetic value for nature is an intrinsic value for humans; it thus is intrinsic and anthropocentric, with a secure place in Western traditions. The central problem for Hargrove's argument is the claim that aesthetic value is intrinsic and not instrumental. Although he is careful to distinguish higher level aesthetic experience from the mere "consumption" of natural beauty, the possibility remains that any human interest in aesthetic experience is primarily (and exclusively) an instrumental good.