H. Clark Johnson develops a narrative of the events that led to the major economic catastrophe of the 20th century. He identifies the undervaluation and consequent shortage of world gold reserves after World War I as the underlying cause of a sustained international price deflation that brought the Great Depression. And, he argues, the reserve-hoarding policies of central banks - particularly the Bank of France - were its proximate cause. The book presents a detailed history of the events that culminated in the depression, highlighting the role of specific economic events, national policies, and individuals. Johnson's analysis of how French domestic politics, diplomacy, economic ideology, and monetary policy contributed to the international deflation is new in the literature. He reaches conclusions about the functioning of the pre-1914 gold standard, the spectacular postwar movement of old to India, the return of sterling to prewar parity in 1925, the German reparations controversy, the stock market crash of 1929, the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, the central European banking crisis of 1931, and the end of sterling convertibility in 1931. The book also provides a picture of Keynes during the years before his "General theory" and deals at length with the history of economic thought in order to explain the failures of recent scholarship to adequately account for the Great Depression.
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Editorial Reviews
From Library Journal
Johnson (economist, Joint U.S.-Saudi Arabian Commission for Economic Development) addresses himself to the events that led to the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s. In his view, the underlying cause was the undervaluation of gold and the consequent worldwide shortage of gold reserves for banking systems after World War I. This triggered a sustained international price deflation and brought about the economic collapse that plagued the world from 1929 until the outbreak of World War II. The major villain in Johnson's scenario is the Bank of France and its misguided monetary policies. The highly refined nature of the subject matter and the dense writing limits this book's appeal to specialists. Suitable for academic libraries with large collections in money and finance.?Harry Frumerman, formerly with Hunter Coll., New York
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Vital Historical Insights You Won't Find in Pulp Histories,
By GamerJB "empireusa" (Acton, MA USA) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Gold, France, and the Great Depression, 1919-1932 (Yale Historical Publications Series) (Hardcover)
I've been a student/scholar of European central bank and foreign policy histories for decades, and rarely does one find such a well-argued and insightful work on the real causes of the Great Depression. While there were many, ranging from the valuation of gold to a general abhorence of deficit spending during this period (think of where the U.S economy would have been after 2001 without the massive deficit spending and easy credit/easy money policies -- two policies rejected strongly by the world's governments and central bankers in the early 1930s).What I found to be most significant in this work is that it elevates modern understanding of these events from the gross over-simplifications taught in colleges (leading to generally incorrect understanding) to incorporate a well-grounded case concerning the impact of INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKERS. The central banks of the world are not mere guiding hands, but fallible institutions run by cliques of persons with their own personal, political, and habitual biases. FRANCE was indeed an important culprit, but then so, too was the rise to power in France of socialist parties and "thinking" on economics -- as well as the continuing desire of France to wage economic warfare on Germany through a variety of means (to deprive pre-Hitlerian Germany of the financial resources, and gold reserves, etc., it needed to expand its export-dependent economy). What many students belatedly grasp is that the world in the 1920s and early 1930s was NOT a world at peace. European governments were busy amassing militaries, building Maginot and Siegfried lines, and waging economic warfare on each other through central banks and trade policies. This work was written by an economist by training, and therefore lacks some of the diplomatic and political context necessary to flesh out decision-making by the British and French central banks, but one cannot fully comprehend the heart of why the Great Depression occurred without reading this work. Some of the most important books one may ever read are obscure academic titles like this -- and worth every penny.
3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Tough but Informative,
By
This review is from: Gold, France, and the Great Depression, 1919-1932 (Yale Historical Publications Series) (Hardcover)
Johnson's book provides a detailed explanation of the causes of the Great Depression from a monetary policy standpoint. While the principal agent is the Bank of France, Johnson does not totally let the United States, Britain, and Germany off the hook either. Differing choices on the part of all four nations contributed to the impact of the decision on the part of the Bank of France that Johnson identifies as the cause of the Depression.While the argument is new and is very interesting, the nature of the discussion almost necessitates a degree in economics to truly understand the whole of Johnson's argument. If one is not an economist or if one doesn't have a lot of background in the subject matter, it is an incredibly difficult read. However, if one is truly interested in the causes of the Great Depression and is willing to take time, not just skim, but truly take time to process the material, it can be worthwhile and highly informative. I would recommend reading Galbraith's "The Great Crash" instead of this book, except that the argument is different between the two. As such, I can't in good conscience recommend the one over the other since there are two differing points of view in the material. This book is worth the time if you are inclined to take the time to try to process the material.
4.0 out of 5 stars
For once, a good reason to hate France.,
This review is from: Gold, France, and the Great Depression, 1919-1932 (Yale Historical Publications Series) (Hardcover)
I don't know why the neo-cons didn't discover this book when they were mouthing off about "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" and "freedom fries". It actually makes a pretty good argument that the Great Depression (and hence Hitler, maybe Japanese expansionism, WW2 and its associated joys) were caused by suicidal French monetary policy.OK, "caused" is a loaded word. "Vital contribution", or "could have been avoided if not for . . .", if you prefer. There were many other things going on, and these have been covered in the classic works such as Friedman & Schwartz, Kindleberger, and Temin. But a vital point that these authors did not emphasise is that the price level under the gold standard depends on the supply of and demand for monetary gold (duh!), and that this price level was at a century high (or equivalently, the real price of gold was at a century low) following the inflation of WWI. It is axiomatic that maintaining this price level would require unprecedented economy in the demand for monetary gold - substitution of banknotes & cheques in domestic transactions, and foreign exchange in central bank reserves. The supply effect, of course, goes the wrong way - a low real gold price reduces the incentive for mining and increases the demand for non-monetary uses such as jewelry.) If these economies were not made, the inevitable result would be deflation in currencies fixed to gold, as the real price of gold returned to its equilibrium level. While the first substitution was carried out in many countries, the second was not, at least where it mattered. Which brings us to the French Monetary Law of 1928. The French went back on the gold standard at an undervalued exchange rate, refused to accept foreign currency in settlement of the resulting balance of payments surplus, and sterilised the gold inflow, thereby ensuing that it was continued. Thus they went from holding 8% to 28% of the world's monetary gold in a few years (Dec '26 - Jun '32) that "coincidentally" bracketed the Great Crash and the beginning of the end for the gold standard. It is about the only comparison I can think of that makes Jean-Claude Trichet look good right now. Of course, I cannot summarise the whole argument in this review. Johnson makes many other fascinating points about the politics of this move (more muddle than conspiracy), the prewar gold standard, and why the immediate postwar deflation of '20-1 did not result in a Great Depression. He also spends a lot of time on the income vs profit deflation framework of Keynes' Treatise on Money, which to me does not add much value. But if you get the book and are not interested in the details, simply glance at Fig.2 (p.52) showing the real gold price, and Appendix 1 showing the distribution of the world's monetary gold. They speak for themselves.
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